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Introduction 
Reading Accident and the Accidents of Reading 
The key question is: what is meant by “chance” in fiction? Without chance all narration is dead 
and abstract. No writer can portray life if he eliminates the fortuitous. On the other hand, in his 
representation of life he must go beyond crass accident and elevate chance to the inevitable.    
–Georg Lukács, “Narrate or Describe” 
I.  Accident Now 
If, in 1983, you happened to read in Rolling Stone magazine Don DeLillo’s essay 
“American Blood: A Journey Through the Labyrinth of Dallas and JFK,” you may have 
experienced an accident of reading upon reaching its conclusion. You may have been haunted by 
the essay’s first sentence, “Once the business in Dealey Plaza was settled—a matter of 5.6 
seconds, we are told—the process of unraveling could safely begin,” when, in order to reach the 
essay’s conclusion, you flipped to page seventy-four, where, in the first column of that page, the 
essay ends (21). Maybe memory of the first sentence, as you flipped the pages, would lead you to 
consider that first section’s title: “Mysteries of Time & Space” (21). And perhaps, when recalling 
this line, you, by chance, glanced at the adjacent column on page seventy-three titled “Films.” If 
so, you would have read this advertisement: “Zapruder Assassination Footage. Kennedy exhibits: 
videocassettes, photographs, literature. Catalog: $2.00. Collector’s Archives. Box 42, Winnipeg, 
Manitoba R3K 1Z9” (Rolling Stone 73). A little mystery of time and space emerges from the 
accidental placement of DeLillo’s essay in the back matter of this issue, wherein someone 
attempted to sell copies of the home video of the event you had just read DeLillo discuss. Such 
an accident of reading would, possibly, draw you back to DeLillo’s conclusion pondering 
Malcolm X’s assassination, which occurred shortly after Kennedy’s: “Red shined shoes in a 
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dance hall in Boston when Jack was a student at Harvard. Beyond this, and a scathing comment 
Malcolm made when Kennedy was shot, we don’t know where to look for a connection not made 
in a moment of sudden blood” (74). We don’t know where to look for connections, but here we 
are, in the back pages of Rolling Stone, making connections. All the coincidence, all the time: 
DeLillo could not have authored the chance juxtaposition of his essay on assassination and 
conspiracy theory beside an advertisement for the Zapruder film and other Americana depicting 
the events of November 22nd 1963 and the days that followed. The meaning ascribed to such an 
accident of reading belongs solely to the reader and the culture in which he reads. To read such 
an accident in any other way means to find meaning where none exists. There’s a danger in such 
reading, for once you read meaning into one accident, one meaningless event, what’s to stop you 
from finding meanings and messages in any accident, any sign, anywhere?  
Accdent happens, despite one’s intentions, without expectation or known cause. At first, 
the first word of the last sentence embodies what it fails to say: accident. The author misspelled. 
However, once I admit that the misspelling is intentional, the accident almost disappears. 
Almost, because while I can deem the misspelling intentional, once printed, the missing ‘i’ 
cannot be replaced; the already-written sentence creates a teleology that leads to the meaning of 
the current sentence, the explanation of the misspelling that turns out to be no accident. As 
Lukács writes in the epigraph to this introduction, chance is a vital element of narrative fiction, 
but accident in fiction is always inevitable. When a character in a novel suffers a car accident, for 
example, the accident is the effect of the author’s intentions, and therefore, like the misspelling 
above, it is not accidental. The words and images that constitute the meanings and events of the 
text do not change. The accidents in the narrative always happen the same way, reading after 
rereading. Drawing from this observation, the question that I attempt to answer in this 
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dissertation is, in its simplest iteration: how can narrative accurately represent accident when its 
textual representation is not subject to the effects of accident? In the pages that follow, I ask this 
of a number of American cultural objects that were produced over the last fifty years, from the 
assassination of President John F. Kennedy to the present. Narrative at Risk interrogates 
representations of accident primarily in novels and films—but also television, roleplaying games, 
comic strips, and videogames—in order to provide an understanding of how contemporary 
American culture has made meaning from the accidental.  
A number of recent critical studies have taken accident as their subject. Ross Hamilton’s 
Accident: A Philosophical and Literary History appeared in 2009, the same year that Catherine 
Malabou’s philosophical essay Ontology of the Accident was published in French. Crash: 
Cinema and the Politics of Speed and Stasis, Karen Beckman’s historical-theoretical study of 
filmic and literary representations of car accidents from the late-nineteenth to the twenty-first 
century, was published in 2010. Two years later, Malabou’s essay was translated into English, 
the same year that saw the publication of Jason Puskar’s Accident Society and Steven Belletto’s 
No Accident, Comrade, each a study of accident in American literature, the former treating 
novels from the 1890s to the mid-1940s, and the latter treating novels from the mid 1940s to the 
late 1990s. Below I discuss each of these important studies in greater detail, contextualizing my 
project among them and explaining how Narrative at Risk provides, through drawing on a range 
of cultural objects, a broad cultural study of how accident and artistic representations of accident 
have shaped American history and politics from the 1960s into the present. I proceed to read 
critical and historical understandings of the Kennedy assassination and its coverage and 
depiction in mass media in relation to the crises of the American 1960s, particularly in 
conceptions of the Kennedy assassination as the moment that the story of the American century 
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took an unforeseen turn as well as when television crystallized into its present form. I conclude 
with a reading of two novels written in the midst of these crises, The Crying of Lot 49 (1966) by 
Thomas Pynchon and Play It As It Lays (1970) by Joan Didion, arguing that both novels depict 
the epistemological and ontological crises of the 60s, especially in response to the Kennedy 
assassination and mass media. Throughout the three parts of this introduction, I contend that in 
the 1960s Americans’ understanding of accident began to change. An awareness of accident 
began to rise, invading everyday life and shaping both cultural production and American 
society’s understanding of itself and its place in the world. 
The concurrent publication of the above texts raises a question: why was so much 
published on the accident over the past five years?1 Surely one should not take this for pure 
coincidence. Before I answer this question, it is first necessary to explore the origins of the word 
accident and define how this term has been deployed in the above works and will be used in the 
chapters that follow. The Greek word for accident, συµβεβηκός, which Aristotle discusses in his 
Metaphysics, is the noun form of the verb συµβαίνω, to stand with two feet together, to come 
together, to coincide, or fall to one’s lot.2 The Latin casus—accident—with its origins in cadere, 
means to fall or cut into. Accident, in its earliest sense, means a fall, an event that cuts; in 
Aristotle’s conception, the accident cuts through the surface of an object and reveals its 
substance. Ross Hamilton’s study explores the development of accident in literature and 
philosophy from Aristotle to the late twentieth century. Focusing on the development of 
Aristotle’s conception of συµβεβηκός, Hamilton writes that Aristotle used accident to 
“distinguish the mutable or inessential qualities of a thing from its defining essence or substance. 
He used the same term to refer to accidental events, so a link between the unexpected events and 
the defining qualities of a person or thing appears at the beginning of the history of accident” (1). 
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Hamilton draws from the works of Paul Virilio, for whom “the innovations of the twentieth 
century have taken accidental events to extremes, mass-producing them in preparation for what 
he calls the ‘integral accident,’ a continental, multicontinental, or even planetary event that will 
involve the serial production of catastrophes” (Hamilton 3). The accident exemplifies modernity 
against itself, which transforms, according to Hamilton, “Aristotle’s accident of substance into 
what [Virilio] calls an accident of knowledge” (3). The accident, for Virilio, complicates 
epistemology; every perceived progress comes with its own unforeseen means of destruction, its 
own series of setbacks. As he writes in The Original Accident (2005), “To invent the sailing ship 
or steamer is to invent the shipwreck. To invent the train is to invent the rail accident of 
derailment. To invent the family automobile is to produce the pile-up on the highway” (10). 
Technological progress necessarily produces disastrous accidental consequences. “As Virilio 
reminds us,” notes Hamilton at his study’s close, “technology hides its potential for damage 
within the promise of scientific progress—the automobile preparing for car crashes or nuclear 
power preparing for atomic and hydrogen bombs—but the power to detonate what he regards as 
the impending cataclysm resides in ‘thought technology’—film, television, and digital media” 
(Hamilton 299). These media alter one’s experience of time while replicating and disseminating 
accidents, “further[ing] the sense that all acts are equally accidental” (Hamilton 300). In Virilio’s 
own words, “Lately, as though an accident was now an option, a privilege granted to chance to 
the detriment of error or the desire to do harm, the accident argument has become one of the 
mass media’s pet themes, flagging, by this very fact, the confusion now creeping in between 
sabotage and breakdown, on the one hand, and between the suicide bombing mission and the 
industrial or other accident, on the other” (15). Mass media has depicted the accident as an 
option—as a choice—for at least half a century. Nonetheless, Virilio’s imperative, that we must 
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distinguish between the intended destructive acts of individuals and groups and unintentional 
disasters, which are accidents, is epistemological.3 The mass media blurs what we know to be 
accident and intention. For both Hamilton and Virilio, the problem with the mass media rests in 
its conflation of intentional events with accidental events, and with the reduction, to the same 
level, of all accidents. Every misfortune quickly becomes one of innumerable tragedies, which 
blinds one to the range of risks and their varying degrees of danger. This provides one reason 
why, in the following pages, I read novels alongside film, television, and videogames: to provide 
a coherent reading of how accident has been represented in multiple media over the past fifty 
years while scrutinizing how each media provides different representations of the accident.  
However, Virilio’s theory of the accident has its flaws. The above conception—that the 
invention of a technology always results in a new accident—creates a teleological understanding 
of accident. Karen Beckman challenges this aspect of Virilio’s theories of the accident; 
“Resisting Virilio’s misogynist vision of technology, which emerges in opposition to 
subjectivity, sexual desire, and femininity, while recognizing the imminent threat of the accident 
to which his work draws attention” she “explore[s] how film, through the recurrent trope of the 
car crash, stages, excites, and disciplines the unconscious drives that pull us toward speed, risk, 
and the vulnerability of the self that is forged by these drives” (13). Beckman accuses Virilio of 
misogyny not only in his equating the car with “‘the woman of burden’ who provides man with 
‘the potential for movement,’” but also in his pedantic and conservative attitudes of “the 
moralistic safe-driving discourse of the late 1950s” (12). Virilio wishes to suppress the 
unconscious facets of human subjects in order to prevent accidents, which leads him to his 
teleological understanding of accident (11). Miriam Hansen, whom Beckman also cites, likewise 
resists this teleological understanding of technology:  
  8 
As my excursion into Benjamin’s speculations on first and second technology should 
have made clear, these speculations cannot be easily assimilated to contemporary media 
theory, certainly not the teleological variant (for example, in Paul Virilio, Friedrich 
Kittler, or Norbert Bolz) that marshals a vast number of sources to demonstrate—
celebrate or decry—the subject’s inevitable abdication to the a priori regime of the 
apparatus. (325) 
Filmic and photographic forms of technology—and thus technology at large—does not limit the 
subject to a foregone conclusion, namely their own demise due to incomprehension of both their 
own desires due to one’s ignorance in regard to how technological apparatuses marshal these 
desires and thus shape how they exist and enter the world; instead they cultivate “an imagination 
that plays games [. . .] to invoke Kracuer—gambles with technology’s otherness” (Hansen 324). 
In other words, with technology we take chances that do not always lead to cataclysmic accidents 
and predetermined ontological and subjective states; sometimes one makes a fortuitous 
discovery. Yet in other instances, as we will see, cataclysmic accident and fortuitous discovery 
coincide. While mass media can level all accidents so that they carry the same import and have 
the same affect—a wildfire reported after news of a traffic jam, followed by the melting of the 
polar icecaps, all seen on the six o’clock news—it also allows for chance encounters, like the 
advertisement for the Zapruder film that appeared beside DeLillo’s conclusion, which provide 
insights into an historical moment. 
While for the above critics, and Virilio in particular, the accident is, to greater or lesser 
degrees, an object in the world, Jason Puskar argues from the premise that “Chance is made out 
of words. No mystical force, no scientific property, no real thing, chance is a conceptual category 
crafted through language and put to use in a wide range of institutional and political contexts” 
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(1). For Puskar, accidents lack meaning because those who witness them—and especially those 
who write about them—lack an understanding of their causes, a history in which to place them. 
Puskar contends: “In writing the accident” novelists of the late nineteenth to mid-twentieth 
centuries “purported to detect and describe a radical instability at the heart of modern life, but in 
fact they were producing that instability by modeling it in narratives of causeless and blameless 
catastrophe” (1). Puskar argues that events depicted to have happened “for no reason at all” are 
deemed accidents, which removes blame from individuals and organizations in the face of 
numerous man-made disasters (1). Because of this denial of complicity, he insists that accident 
instead can only be understood within its historical context: “Definitions of chance [. . .] must be 
historical definitions, particularized to a time and place, and always attentive to the term’s inner 
tensions, residual meanings, and constantly shifting boundaries” (5). Thus one should question 
Aristotle’s definition of the accident as Virilio does, and question Virilio’s definition of accident, 
like Hansen and Beckman, for doing so allows one to recognize that what is meant by accident 
has changed over time and continues to do so in our present moment. It is necessary to 
understand accident as no longer neatly fitting into Aristotle’s definition; the car accident does 
not so much reveal the substance of the car, nor is it necessarily helpful to understand the 
invention of the car as the invention of the car accident. Rather, the accident, from at least the 
early 1960s forward, points to crises of agency and individuals’ and organizations’ culpability in 
events that seem to be beyond one’s control, a subject that Ralph Nader famously treated in 
Unsafe at Any Speed (1965). Moreover, the accident should be taken as its own event—studied 
on its own terms—not as revealing the substance of an object, but as an object itself. In doing so, 
one can see how, in the instance of this study, recent American society has understood itself in 
relation to the accident and has applied meaning to the accident in light of its history. 
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Steven Belletto further illustrates historical developments of the notion of accident. He 
writes that the Cold War “put pressure on the idea of narrative itself—the designed nature of 
which seems fundamentally at odds with chance—and especially on the work of so-called 
literary fiction” (5). In ideological opposition to Soviet conceptions of historical determinism, 
American writers incorporated chance into their narratives in order to emphasize the role that 
absolute chance plays in history (21). Belletto helpfully conceptualizes “narrative chance” as 
distinct from “absolute chance.” While the latter exists in the world, Belletto shows that it does 
not exist in narratives: “Whenever an accident or other chance event occurs in a fictional 
narrative, it is always an example of ‘narrative chance’—that is, chance which is tied to 
planning, intention, and purpose” (23). While accidents occur in history—events that have 
causes beyond comprehension—and while absolute chance exists in quantum theory, neither 
exists in narrative (14). Belletto maintains that, in American narratives composed during the 
Cold War, accident served to undermine and subvert Soviet teleology. Yet the Cold War lineage 
of narrative chance continues to operate in a similar manner, undermining other forms of 
teleological thinking, such as religious fundamentalist understandings of history, progressive 
biological determinism, and psychoanalytic conceptions of the subject.  
While the third and fourth chapters of Narrative at Risk respectively treat accident’s role 
in upsetting the former two types of teleological thinking, biological determinism and 
evangelical mythology, this entire study engages the third, reading representations of 
subjectivity, primarily characters’ responses to accident, and the relationship between how 
narrative representations of accident affect characters, readers, and viewers. Catherine Malabou’s 
challenges to the psychoanalytic subject, which she makes through confronting psychoanalysis 
with the reality of the accident, proposes a development in understanding accident within 
  11 
contemporary history, as well as how this questions earlier understandings of subjectivity. In 
“Post Trauma,” Malabou challenges the “always-already” of the Freudian-Lacanian subject and 
its relationship with primordial trauma. Malabou, in response to Slavoj Žižek’s essay “Descartes 
and the Post-Traumatic Subject,” constructs, from the vantage of neuroscience, an argument 
against the always-already in a reading of “Father I am Burning” from both the seventh chapter 
of The Interpretation of Dreams (1904) and Lacan’s seminar on Freud in The Four Fundamental 
Concepts of Psychoanalysis (1973): 
If there is a beyond the pleasure principle, can we still understand it as a beyond chance, 
beyond the accident or beyond contingency? This is precisely what is no longer possible. 
When the victims of traumas are “burning,” we certainly don’t have a right to ask: where 
is the reality in these accidents? We certainly don’t have a right to suspect contingency 
for hiding a more profound kind of event, for being the veiled face of the compulsion to 
repeat. To split reality from the Real, contingency from necessity, the transcendental 
from the empirical, good or bad fortune (tuché), from necessity (automaton). Reading 
this Lacanian interpetation [sic], we cannot help but visualize the psychoanalyst as a 
fireman looking at the catastrophe and saying: “there must be something more urgent, I 
am due to take care of a more originary emergency.” (233) 
The ethical imperative, for Malabou, is to confront and treat the accident before moving on to 
search for the substance it reveals—if it reveals anything. For me, the importance of 
understanding narrative representations of the accident resides in historically understanding how 
American culture’s conceptions of the accident changed over the past fifty years—how, as a 
society, we have come to be more aware than ever of the risks of everyday life, and how through 
narrative representations of accident, works of art and entertainment have attempted to both 
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normalize and raise one’s awareness of accident. In other words, many continue to address 
accidents as if they are merely the symptom of an underlying threat rather than their own unique 
danger, while those most sensitive to the risk accidents pose insist that we address the accident as 
its own substance, not a surface element that reveals the substance of another object. While 
Lacan’s deployment of tuché and automaton return us to Aristotelian conceptions of accident, 
Malabou takes us beyond them in Ontology of the Accident: An Essay on Destructive Plasticity. 
“No one thinks spontaneously about a plastic art of destruction,” writes Malabou, “Yet 
destruction too is formative. A smashed-up face is still a face, a stump a limb, a traumatized 
psyche remains a psyche. Destruction has its own sculpting tools” (4). Malabou’s conception of 
the accident cuts beyond Aristotelian metaphysics to the substance of the accident, identifying 
accident as the substance of subject formation, and thus at the center of one’s understanding of 
history: 
The individual’s history is cut definitively, breached by the meaningless accident, an 
accident that it is impossible to re-appropriate through either speech or recollection. In 
principle, a brain injury, a natural catastrophe, a brutal, sudden, blind event cannot be 
reintegrated retrospectively into experience. These types of events are pure hits, tearing 
and piercing subjective continuity and allowing no justification or recall in the psyche. 
How do you internalize a cerebral lesion? How do you speak about emotional deficit 
since words must be carried by the affects whose very absence is precisely what is in 
question here? (29) 
For Malabou, the accident does not reveal the primordial components of subject formation but 
instead forms new subjects. The accident molds plastic subjectivity—it doesn’t so much cut 
through as it shapes, sculpts a new subject from the old.  
  13 
In The Echo Maker (2006), Richard Powers provides a lucid example of this meeting of 
accident and neuroscience. In this post 9/11 novel Mark Schulter, after a car accident, develops 
Capgras Syndrome: he perceives that those closest to him—his sister, his dog—are doubles, 
imposters perpetrating a conspiracy against him. Mark’s sister contacts Gerald Weber—a 
cognitive neurologist and writer of Oliver Sacks-like popular science books—and asks him to 
examine her brother. In Weber’s reflection upon his most recent book, Country of Surprises, 
Powers articulates the shifting conceptions of narrative, subject, and accident that each of the 
above authors, Malabou in particular, take as their object of study:  
The Country of Surprises was the richest thing he’d ever written. It consisted of a dozen 
re-created case studies of patients who’d suffered what Weber studiously refused to call 
brain damage. Each of his twelve subjects had been changed so profoundly by illness or 
accident that each called into question the solidity of the self. We were not one, 
continuous, indivisible whole, but instead hundreds of separate subsystems, with changes 
in any one sufficient to disperse the provisional confederation into unrecognizable new 
countries. (170-171) 
This passage reflects upon what Malabou calls destruction’s sculpting tools, and alongside this 
meditation on the creative capacity of destruction rests an historicizing of the year in which the 
novel is set, 2002. The language mirrors the rather schizophrenic condition of the United States. 
Like the attack that destroyed the World Trade Center, September 11 happens twice, with the 
exact phrase repeated, in The Echo Maker: “September came, and then the attacks” and 
“September came, that bleak first anniversary” (212, 271). September 11th 2001 comes to mean 
through the events of Schulter’s car accident and the subsequent changes to his brain, which 
raises the awareness of American society’s perception of itself as vulnerable to the accidents and 
  14 
acts of those who wish to author history and to the fact that these acts have changed the way the 
society perceives others and itself. The purposes of the aforementioned studies, whether the 
historical development of the accident in Hamilton, the understanding of mediated crashes as 
fulfilling “the drives” in Beckman, the responsibility of individuals in the perpetration of what 
are officially designated accidents in Puskar, the deployment of narrative chance as supporting 
American ideology and hegemony in Belletto, as well as human subjectivity as being not whole 
but wholly contingent, are all manifest in this one passage from Powers’s novel.  
From Hamilton and Malabou to Beckman, Puskar, and Belletto, the accident, in the last 
few years, become an event to scrutinize and synthesize with other theories of subjectivity and 
history in works of art. At the beginning of this introduction I said that I would provide an 
answer to why, in the last four years, so much has been published on the accident. Taking into 
account that these works were composed from the beginning of the 21st century into its second 
decade, one may want to answer that the events of September 11th 2001 were a cause, and while 
certainly those attacks have contributed to an extension of Western desires for control, as well as 
revitalized how we understand accident and the trauma it inflicts, there are causes beyond that 
historical event that are nonetheless closely related to it: primarily the preventive war waged 
against Iraq. The unilateralism of the administration of George W. Bush and the deployment of 
pre-emptive strikes were a response to an invisible threat—weapons of mass destruction—that 
turned out to be a fiction. However, the Bush administration’s use of unilateralism began before 
September 11, 2001 when the administration withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. 
Cold War nostalgia for military dominance rekindled before the terrorist attacks of September 
11; the attacks merely tempered the administration and the society’s resolve to prevent any future 
attacks, even if that meant the United States would attack first. Such foreign policy demonstrates 
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American society’s desire to go to any length to manage risk. The culture’s rising awareness of 
risk, due to the events of September 11, 2001 and the ensuing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, were 
furthered by the devastation of natural disasters—particularly for Americans, the devastation of 
Hurricane Katrina and the federal, state, and local governments’ inadequate management of that 
disaster. Meanwhile, concurrent discoveries in genetics, biology, and neuroscience also 
profoundly contributed to a pervasive attention to accident’s role in natural events; the more we 
learned about our bodies, about our environment, our planet, our solar system, and our universe, 
the more contingency we came to see. The economic disaster of 2008 has also surely contributed 
to the feeling that our lives are contingent upon factors beyond our control, but not beyond 
anyone’s control—the federal government, banks, Wall Street brokers, of whom, nevertheless, 
we realize (and hope) do not and cannot exert total control over any system, no matter their 
claims. In other words, in America, the first decade of the twenty-first century saw a rising sense 
of everyday life put at risk from a number of factors at the level of the individual’s body, and its 
components, as well as on a global scale. These are but some of the reasons that critical attention 
has turned to accident, and I imagine, as more risks accumulate, more scholars will begin to 
study that for which Aristotle said there was no science: the accident.  
Therefore, rather than look any further at our recent history, in the next section of this 
introduction I will turn to a reading of the 1960s, wherein the conditions of the mass media 
traumatic spectacle were established. The mass media coverage of accident—that which Virilio 
fears numbs us to the reality and import of accident—has become part of the everyday life of 
most Americans. The twenty-four hour news cycle thrives on recycling images of disaster. Such 
mediation, many have remarked, made the events of September 11, 2001 so familiar that it 
seemed we had seen this all before on television and cinema screens. Reality looked all too much 
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like bad fiction. In reading an event that, rather than replaying that fiction—the always-already—
instead opened new wounds that have yet to heal, I turn to a moment in our history that many 
critics and historians claim saw the crystallization of the mass media that brought many horrible 
events, September 11 among them, into our homes again and again. I refer to what Abraham 
Zapruder filmed on November 22, 1963: the assassination of President John F. Kennedy and the 
epistemological and ontological crises the event, the media coverage of it, and that strip of film, 
initiated. 
 
II.  Assassination, Mass Media, Postmodernism 
Yet it is clear that the entire outlook has changed for both parties, and the unexpected death of 
President Kennedy has forced Washington to meditate a little more on the wild element of 
chance in our national life. 
–The New York Times, November 23, 1963 (Grossman) 
Artists, historians, critics, and theorists have come to perceive the Kennedy assassination 
as the first of a series of post-war traumas that shaped and continue to shape American society—
and every image of the event was captured by accident. When Abraham Zapruder began filming 
the procession, he intended to record his beloved President at the height of his life, not the 
moment of his death. When the news cameras rolled filming Oswald and his police escort, they 
intended to record answers, a glimpse of the assassin, not his death. J. G. Ballard has gone so far 
as to portray the Kennedy assassination as “a special kind of car crash”—and this reading, upon 
scrutiny, describes both metaphorically and literally how the event was and continues to be 
perceived (Crash 130). The Kennedy assassination, while not necessarily the moment 
“everything changed,” is nonetheless the moment that generations have understood as when 
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everything changed. “John Kennedy’s death may not be the most significant aspect of his 
assassination,” writes Art Simon in Dangerous Knowledge: The JFK Assassination in Art and 
Film (1996): “What was of crucial importance was the struggle over its framing” (5). The 
difficulty with this framing was that, as Christopher Lasch wrote in “The Life of Kennedy’s 
Death,” which appeared Harper’s in 1983, “His murder plunged the country into a time of 
troubles, or at least coincided more or less, with the beginnings of a turbulent era” (32). While 
there were the political assassinations in the nation’s past, the Kennedy assassination contributed 
to Americans’ sense of cultural decline (Lasch 32). Yet the Kennedy assassination happened to 
transpire as the nation was facing a series of crises, amongst them: the Civil Rights movement’s 
struggle against institutionalized racism; the blight of American cities that Jane Jacobs wrote of 
in Death and Life of Great American Cities (1961); and the rising awareness of environmental 
threats, which Rachel Carson brought to the nation’s attention in Silent Spring (1962). The 
nation, prior to the Kennedy assassination, was already in the midst of several coinciding crises 
at home and abroad—the failure at the Bay of Pigs and the terror of the Cuban Missile Crisis 
were still fresh in Americans minds, the latter tempered by the popularization of Herman Kahn’s 
On Thermonuclear War (1960) and the publication of the popular novel Fail-Safe (1962), which 
was originally published in installments in The Saturday Evening Post during the missile crisis. 
As Simon writes, “What made the assassination political, then, beyond the subtle change in 
power and its possible ideological motives and execution, was its textual encoding, its telling and 
retelling, the very struggle over its transformation into history” (5). Kennedy’s death is that 
which all of these other crises came to orbit. The events in Dallas on November 22, 1963 came to 
be understood as the moment everything changed primarily because it is a moment that almost 
the entire nation witnessed simultaneously.  
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The assassination and its repercussions were experienced for years after the fact due to 
media coverage that released stills of the Zapruder film piece by piece, calling Americans to 
continually witness and interpret those events. The act of reading and rereading the Zapruder 
film greatly contributed to the assassination’s pervasive influence upon American culture, 
leading to the film’s transformation from an historical to an aesthetic object. In Shooting 
Kennedy (2003), Michael Lubin describes the Zapruder film: “It’s a home movie but also a micro 
version of a Hollywood film; a private artifact of one man’s affection for a leader he never met 
but also an eyewitness account of a public political event; material evidence of a crime 
scrutinized by investigators but also an endlessly chewed-over bone of contention between 
warring sides in the ongoing debate about government conspiracy and cover-up” (163). Lubin 
continues, “we might call it a nihilist film. Or existentialist. Or dada,” and reads the Zapruder 
film “as a crucial cinematic text of the twentieth century, one that intersects in myriad ways with 
myriad other cinematic texts before and after” (1, 37).4 The crises of the United States in the 
early 1960s would proliferate throughout the decade, as other texts that shaped the anxieties of 
the early 1960s show. Among these other texts are Michael Harrington’s demand for government 
action against poverty in The Other America (1962), the warning of violent protest from African 
Americans in James Baldwin’s The Fire Next Time (1963), and Betty Friedan’s The Feminine 
Mystique (1963), which reinvigorated feminism. While each of these texts point to a series of 
domestic problems, of particular interest to this study of accident and narrative is what Karen 
Beckman writes of the early sixties. She points out that from Ralph Nader’s 1959 article, “The 
Safe Car You Can’t Buy” to the success of his Unsafe at Any Speed, published in 1965, the 
decade was marked by Americans’ rising awareness of “auto-vulnerability” (Beckman 138). For 
Beckman:  
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The assassination of Kennedy in his Lincoln Continental on 22 November 1963 marked a 
turning point in the way automobiles appeared in art and film, unleashing not only the 
largely repressed figure of the accident, but also, perhaps surprisingly, the comic tone that 
had been associated with the accident at an earlier cinematic moment. Kennedy’s 
assassination disrupted the dream machine’s promise of unrestrained forward mobility, 
physical invulnerability, and access to a better life, and replaced this image with one of 
vulnerability, stasis, and death-as-media-spectacle. Nineteen sixty-three, the first year in 
which vehicular suicide was the subject of psychiatric research, perhaps as a result of 
despairing people hoping at least to die in a presidential style, was the year of the car 
accident. (146) 
The assassination of Kennedy correlates with a cultural shift in representations of the car 
accident, and the car accident, this dissertation contends, is one of many symbols of American 
culture’s rising awareness of the risk accident presents for the individual and nation.5 Kennedy’s 
death in a car, presidential, at the very least, because of its cause—assassination—and its 
coverage in the media, was also populist in that it had become the most common cause of death 
for American citizens.  
Over the next fifty years narrative representations of the accident attempted to provide a 
sense of control to a history that was seemingly out of control; however, it is important to focus 
on American culture’s reading and reception of the Kennedy assassination—an event that, like 
the texts this dissertation examines, seemed to happen again and again. In fact, the Zapruder film 
would not be displayed to a mass audience until twelve years after the assassination, while Life 
magazine would run several articles, along with stills from the film, presenting various, often 
conflicting, theories and conspiracies about what happened that day in Dallas.6 Fredric Jameson 
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diagnoses the impact of the assassination as a mass mediated spectacle, identifying it, like 
Beckman, as a formative moment in post-war American culture.7 The coverage of the Kennedy 
assassination provided “a unique event, not least because it was a unique collective (and media, 
communicational) experience which trained people to read such events in new ways” 
(Postmodernism 355).8 In marking the Kennedy assassination as the moment televisual media 
came into its own, Jameson resists the standard reading of the Kennedy assassination as the 
moment when America lost its innocence.9 This new way of reading was one of synchronous 
experience shared among an entire national community, which provided a glimpse, through 
grief, into utopia (355).  
However, the utopian quality of this method of reading was fraught from the start: 
immediately the events of that day were read as having different meanings, different resonances, 
which, almost wholly, affected citizens in the same way. Moreover, ways of reading the 
assassination—New Critical close reading to Derridean deconstruction and beyond—would only 
instill a way of reading that takes a text, such as the Zapruder film, as a single entity from which 
meaning can be read.10 However, the film, as many have noted, does not and cannot, hold such 
answers. Jameson claims that the media event itself would later be “recontained through sheer 
mechanical technique (as with the instant playbacks of the Reagan shooting or the Challenger 
disaster, which borrowed from commercial sports, expertly emptied these events of their 
content)” (355). The Kennedy assassination “can no longer be separated from its media 
coverage” (95), which has heightened the culture’s fantasies and anxieties about conspiracy 
through mass media and has resulted in media conflating fiction and reality, much in the manner 
that Virilio warns against. If every film and video provides a secret message, how does one read 
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for meaning, and if one could discern a meaning, what one meaning would mean more than 
another?  
Such a crisis of epistemology was but one consequence of the media event that the 
Kennedy assassination catalyzed. For Jameson, Kennedy’s assassination also provided 
something originary, something different. That day in Dallas, “television showed what it could 
really do and what it really meant—a prodigious new display of synchronicity and a 
communicational situation that amounted to a dialectical leap over anything hitherto suspected” 
(355). Although Marhall McLuhan had recently announced the coming of the global village in 
The Gutenberg Galaxy (1962), for many critics and historians it formed on November 22, 1963. 
When the cameras captured what no one intended—Ruby shooting Oswald—and broadcast this 
murder, the power of television was further revealed to American viewers and took its place as 
the dominant communicational form, which only recently the World Wide Web has begun to 
supplant.11 The same happened when Life, no less than a week after the assassination, published 
stills from Zapruder’s film.  
Life rushed to purchase the rights to the film from Zapruder and then refused to show the 
film, instead printing frames from the event—out of order, creating a different, more grotesque 
narrative of the assassination.12 From chance frames, Life made an order, a story, that would 
capture the attention of its readers, at once claiming to show the truth of what happened in Dallas 
while attempting to mystify, entertain, keeping their readers coming back for more frames, which 
would be published in later issues. While this can be read as print media responding to the 
usurpation of its role as the dominant mode of mass communication in American culture, taken 
as a televisual and print media event—a multimedia event—the coverage of the Kennedy 
assassination, from Walter Cronkite’s tearful yet composed announcement of the President’s 
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death on NBC, to Jack Ruby’s execution of Lee Harvey Oswald, to the publication of the 
assassination in Life magazine, Americans began to read in new ways, and much of what they 
read was about the Kennedy assassination.13 This reading practice would be refined from the 
sixties forward, and it involved looking at multimedia closely, scrutinizing and deconstructing 
pieces of information much in the manner that Governor Connaly did in a 1966 issue of Life, 
studying, with a magnifying glass, the Zapruder film strip one frame at a time, and concluding 
that the findings of the Warren Commission were incorrect.14 Analysis of the assassination was 
also depicted on television: “national television networks returned to the subject throughout the 
thirty years following the assassination, CBS being the most interested. The CBS coverage 
included at least one program each year from 1963-1965, a four-part series in in June 1967, a 
two-part inquiry broadcast in 1975, and a two-hour report marking the thirtieth anniversary in 
November 1993” (Simon 7). The representation of the Kennedy assassination in the mass media 
contributed to rising doubts about what happened that day in Dallas, as well as to skepticism 
regarding the United States government’s involvement in domestic and international affairs, such 
as race at home and the war in Vietnam abroad, which would become a driving force of the New 
Left’s politics (Simon 8). On the other side of the political aisle, the Kennedy assassination 
fueled what Richard Hofstader famously termed “The Paranoid Style in American Politics” in a 
series of lectures delivered at Oxford in 1963 and published in Harper’s Magazine in November 
1964. The Cold War, in the words of Adam Piette, demonstrated itself to be “the most 
spectacular breeding ground” for this style and manner of thinking (Piette 177). Over the course 
of the 1960s and the decades that followed, a narrative began to cohere regarding the 
assassination, namely that it was the moment when everything fell apart; yet it was also the 
moment that, when represented, garnered high ratings.15 
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The Zapruder film and the scrutiny with which it was read provides the reading practices 
that Jameson identifies with the Kennedy assassination as the “inaugural event” that “gave what 
we call a Utopian glimpse into some collective communicational ‘festival’ whose ultimate logic 
and promise is incompatible with our mode of production” (355). The instantaneity of the news 
of Kennedy’s death resulted, for Jameson, in “the shock of a communicational explosion” that 
could not be understood because it had never happened before (355). The experience of learning 
of Kennedy’s assassination from television was unprecedented. Øyvind Vågnes notes that “The 
mass media began to shape the cultural memory of the assassination almost as soon as it 
happened; the news of Kennedy’s death spread to most Americans within half an hour” (25). For 
Jameson the sixties begin here, and perhaps, so too does the postmodern, with an unreachable 
Utopia seen through a corporatized mass-mediated convergence that deprives its viewers of 
sensation while producing the sensational.16  
The epistemological crisis that the Zapruder film in particular, and the Kennedy 
assassination in general, produced was that all interpretations of the film raised more questions 
than answers. “Indeed,” Art Simon observes, “to theorize the epistemological status of such 
imagery is not just to insist on its instability but to register its shifting movement, its negotiation 
between legibility and ambiguity” (31). The ontological crisis of simultaneously seeming 
insignificant in the frame of national and global history and residing at the center of such an 
epistemological crisis developed from the seemingly infinite barrage of questions and conspiracy 
theories that attempted to answer the questions surrounding the Kennedy assassination. As Peter 
Knight claims in Conspiracy Culture (2000), “Far from the assassination leading steadily and 
inexorably to a consensus of conspiracy theorists, then, it has produced a hermeneutic of 
suspicion that begins to doubt everything—even the fundamental ground rules of proof and 
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evidence” (96). The inability to read epistemologically produced fears about state control and 
authorship over domestic life. Such fears bled into the culture, intermingling with already 
prevalent problems, particularly those of the Civil Rights Movement and the simultaneous 
escalation of military actions in Vietnam.  
Marianne Dekoven, in Utopia Limited: The Sixties and the Emergence of the Postmodern 
(2004) reads the sixties along lines similar to Jameson, arguing that they “represented the final, 
full flowering of modernism/modernity, particularly of its utopian master narratives” (8). The 
Kennedy assassination, and the numerous epistemological crises that it inspired, contributed to 
the new reading practices that Jameson identifies, and to the collapse of the Enlightenment belief 
in master narratives. DeKoven continues, “In the full realization and extension of the popular, 
egalitarian, subjectivist trajectories of the modern, but in rejection or curtailment of the 
totalizing, utopian master narratives associated with those trajectories in modernity, the sixties 
political and countercultural movements were transformed into something in continuity with, but 
radically different from, those modern master narratives; transformed into the ‘utopia limited’ of 
the postmodern” (8-9). The Kennedy assassination saw the beginning of the end of that cultural 
construct and piece of political public relations, Camelot, which, would ultimately end with the 
assassination of Robert F. Kennedy on June 6, 1968.17 As well, the Great Society of Lyndon 
Johnson would begin to crumble as his administration’s attentions turned from domestic projects 
to the orchestration of the Vietnam War, which found many of the bodies of its soldiers by 
chance, through the lottery of the draft. The reality of and resistance to chance fueled the 
countercultural movements of which DeKoven writes, proliferating and accumulating throughout 
the decade; from the death of a president, accident invaded the everyday life of every citizen. 
The Zapruder film provided the document that should have answered all of the questions that the 
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assassination raised, but instead, each reading resulted in more questions, and each viewing 
further undermined epistemology.18 
For Don DeLillo, the novelist who has most substantially represented the assassination 
and the events surrounding it, Kennedy’s death and televisual media’s potential to disseminate 
truth began to teach viewers how to read not for coherent truth, but for fragments. He claims, 
“What has become unraveled since that afternoon in Dallas is not the plot, of course, not the 
dense mass of characters and events, but the sense of a coherent reality most of us shared” 
(“American Blood” 22). In 1983 DeLillo was so compelled to write of the assassination that he 
set aside composing White Noise (1985) to write “American Blood” for Rolling Stone Magazine 
(Arensberg 42). Before this, he had never interrupted one project to begin writing another. His 
reflection continues, “We seem from that moment to have entered a world of randomness and 
ambiguity, a world totally modern in the way it shades into the century's ‘emptiest’ literature, the 
study of what is uncertain and unresolved in our lives, the literature of estrangement and silence” 
(22). A world of randomness. The century’s “emptiest” literature. The Kennedy assassination, 
which DeLillo describes in Libra (1988) as “the seven seconds that broke the back of the 
American century,” immediately cast, as the epigraph to this section indicates, the shadow of 
chance over American life (181). The literature, films, videogames, and other texts read in the 
following chapters attempt to represent just such a world of randomness and ambiguity.  
Of the authors who represented the Kennedy assassination and its cultural impact, J. G. 
Ballard provided the most immediate response in his collection of condensed novels, The 
Atrocity Exhibition (1970). Ballard, who according to the initial reviewers of Crash (1973) 
authored some of the emptiest of post-60s literature, reflected on the period in the 1990s, with a 
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Jamesonian echo, identifying “an affectless world” that emerged from the 1960s and specifically 
Kennedy’s assassination: 
I saw this event not as the annihilation of Kennedy, but as the way electronic media was 
born and spawned itself and formed the landscape of our lives. I saw November 1963 as 
the catalyst for the explosion of energies, good and bad, that created the Sixties: the space 
programme, the drug scene, the youth explosion, the Vietnam war which was another TV 
anatomising of violence and pain. I saw Kennedy’s assassination as a key event. [. . .] It 
is a key event, there is no doubt about it. Now it’s almost a visual cliche [sic], which 
itself is a sad comment. The Zapuda [sic] film is almost the Sistine Chapel of our era. 
(Ballard) 
Ballard marks the Zapruder film as the apex of mid-century American art. Likewise, in “Lee 
Harvey Oswald and the Postmodern Subject” Thomas Carmichael describes the assassination as 
“the first postmodern historical event” (207). For both critics and artists, the Kennedy 
assassination confronted American culture with a crisis of reading through reframing mediation. 
An historical event was captured on film, but instead of providing answers to what happened in 
Dealey Plaza, the media raised far more questions than it answered. Hayden White has written 
that the assassination destroyed our sense of historical events, which inspired “new genres of 
postmodernist parahistorical representation” (Figural Realism 67). The history of the event 
became personal, and in Ballard’s language and that of many others, nearly religious. White 
writes: 
Any attempt to provide an objective account of the event [the assassination], either by 
breaking it up into a mass of its details or by setting it within its context, must conjure 
with two circumstances: one is that the number of details identifiable in any singular 
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event is potentially infinite; and the other is that the context of any single event is 
infinitely extensive, or at least is not objectively determinable. (71) 
The assassination cannot be broken into parts, nor can it be read as a whole; it cannot be 
contextualized and it cannot be decontextualized. Objectivity yields no truth as to what 
transpired in Dallas. Instead, one is left with more questions, not only about Kennedy’s death, 
but also about the nature of epistemology itself. The ways in which the Zapruder film has been 
and continues to be scrutinized resulted in its transformation into an aesthetic object, as Øyvind 
Vågnes discusses in his monograph, Zaprudered: The Kennedy Assassination Film in Visual 
Culture (2011). For Vågnes, the film reveals that, “the technological realities of the period in 
question are bound not only to shape any cultural study of the Zapruder film, but also to 
transform how we think and write about images and about the material conditions in which they 
appear” (16). Whether or not the Kennedy assassination was the zero hour of postmodernism, the 
artists and critics who significantly shaped our sense of the post-60s, postmodern period have 
read it in just such a manner. Moreover, the assassination accrued meaning throughout the 
decade, reaching another level of significance for American culture with the Watergate scandal. 
“Linking Dallas and Watergate,” writes Andreas Killen in 1973 Nervous Breakdown, “held out 
the possibility of finding a master key to the traumatic decade framed by the two events” (243). 
However, reading these two events beside one another leads to truth just as much as reading the 
conclusion of DeLillo’s “American Blood” beside the facing page’s advertisement for the 
Zapruder film; the period inspired conspiratorial thinking, which creates meaning through 
reading accidents and through accidents of reading.  
By 1966, the Zapruder film was described in the pages of Life as simultaneously an 
“unimpeachable” piece of evidence for the Warren Commission’s findings—that Oswald acted 
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alone—and as “highly suspect” in terms of evidence. Life characterized the film as unreadable 
and open to multiple interpretations, raising doubts in regard to Oswald’s role in the 
assassination and the film as a piece of evidence that can yield epistemological proof of the 
events of November 22, 1963 (Vågnes 41-42).19 The Kennedy assassination and the Zapruder 
film’s representation of it have been read as the moment that mass media cohered as the barrage 
of information and misinformation that we know today. While many have read cultural 
representations of the Kennedy assassination and the Zapruder film, critics have primarily 
focused upon its depiction in texts that appeared after the sixties, such as DeLillo’s Libra and 
Oliver Stone’s JFK (1991). However, in order to demonstrate how thoroughly and immediately 
the assassination and its depiction in media permeated Americans’ understanding of mass media 
penetrating their everyday lives, I will now turn to a reading of two novels—Thomas Pynchon’s 
The Crying of Lot 49 and Joan Didion’s Play It As It Lays. Both novels are the authors’ second, 
both are set in the American southwest, primarily the Los Angeles area, and neither explicitly 
represent the Kennedy assassination. Yet the novels nonetheless depict accident and mass media 
in a paranoid style that, upon scrutiny, shows that at the center of their female protagonists’ 
epistemological and ontological crises lies the death of President Kennedy.  
 
III.  Cracking Up and Breaking Down: 1960s California in Pynchon and Didion 
I am talking here about a time when I began to doubt the premises of all the stories I had ever 
told myself, a common condition, but one I found troubling. I suppose this period began around 
1966 and continued until 1971.  
–Joan Didion, “The White Album” (1979) (185).  
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 Few critics have read the writings of Thomas Pynchon and Joan Didion together, despite 
the parallel trajectories of their careers. Their first novels were published in 1963, and they are 
both authors whose styles, no matter how distinct, mark for perpetuity the crises of the American 
1960s. While their first novels have instances in which mass media—film and television—are 
mentioned as minor details in the lives of their characters, their second novels are saturated with 
mass media. The Crying of Lot 49 and Play It As It Lays, set, respectively, in the years 1964 and 
from October 1967 to June 1968, tell the stories of two women who may be going insane, or who 
may be in the process of discovering secret truths about themselves and America.20 Oedipa 
Maas, protagonist of The Crying of Lot 49, is married to Mucho Maas, a radio DJ, and has a tryst 
with Metzger, a child actor turned lawyer. Her last name, Maas, can be understood as a pun on 
mass media—more media—all of which gravitates around her, especially in the form of her 
deceased former boyfriend, Pierce Inverarity, who has chosen Oedipa to execute his estate.21 
Maria Wyeth of Play It As It Lays is a former model and a quickly falling film star who is 
married to film director Carter Lang. In the apocalyptic southern California setting of Santa Ana 
winds and burning Hills, Didion portrays Maria as both subject and object of the mass media, 
particularly Hollywood cinema.22 For Oedipa, mass media permeates her life from the novel’s 
beginning. Immediately after she has learned of Inverarity’s death “she stood in the living room, 
stared at by the greenish dead eye of the TV tube” (1). The television watches her, and this 
reversal of roles signals Oedipa as both the object of our entertainment and also as the prevailing 
awareness of mass media in American society after the Kennedy assassination.23 While the 
pervasive presence of mass media in both novels signals the coalescence of television as the 
dominant medium from Kennedy’s assassination forward, both of these novels also signal, in 
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their Southern California setting, the rise of the political figure who used the tools of mass media 
best, Ronald Reagan, a subject I will turn to in the first chapter.24 
When Oedipa first meets Metzger, he asks if she wants to know what Inverarity told him 
about her. She declines “And snapped on the television set” (18). On the screen a young Metzger 
appears, playing the role of Baby Igor. Oedipa denies that Metzger’s appearance on the 
television could be an accident: “Either he made up the whole thing, Oedipa thought suddenly, or 
he bribed the engineer over at the local station to run this, it’s all part of a plot, an elaborate, 
seduction, plot” (20). The plot, of course, is Pynchon’s own—that of The Crying of Lot 49—
which makes much of what is possibly nothing. Yet television serves the role of the media that 
traps and fixates the characters’ attentions and continually introduces accident, rather than plots, 
into their lives. Oedipa, having lost Pierce, stares at the TV or turns on the TV when confronted 
with his death, watching Metzger’s film, which breaks for a variety of commercials that advertise 
Pierce’s business ventures. Rather than face reality, she would rather be given a representation of 
reality, be told what constitutes the fabric of her life. 
 So it goes for Maria Wyeth. For her, there is nothing, only accident, a series of events 
that have no meaning. At the novel’s beginning, she reflects upon her doctor’s psychiatric 
evaluations of her: “They will misread the facts, invent connections, will extrapolate reasons 
where none exist, but I told you, that is their business here” (2). But her life means nothing, is 
simply a series of events that she plays as they lay and watches as if her life were a movie. When 
she tells Carter of her pregnancy, “She paused. It came to her that in the scenario of her life this 
would be what was called an obligatory scene, and she wondered with distant interest just how 
long the scene would play” (49).25 Like the plot in Lot 49, this obligatory scene, while important 
to Maria, signals to the reader that the narration of life as film is also necessary for the plot of 
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Play It As It Lays. The abortion of her child is one of the causes of her mental breakdown. While 
undergoing the abortion she begins to distinguish her life as not being plotted, not part of a film: 
“No moment more or less important than any other moment, all the same: the pain as the doctor 
scraped signified nothing beyond itself, no more constituted the pattern of her life than did the 
movie on television in the living room of this house in Encino” (81). The abortion that Carter 
coerces her to undergo traumatizes her and opens the earlier trauma of her mother’s death in a 
car crash, which may have been a suicide or an accident—neither Maria nor the reader know.  
While Maria terminates her pregnancy, Oedipa, either pregnant or driven to extreme 
mental anguish and paranoia due to the possible existence of the Trystero—or both—experiences 
“headaches, nightmares, menstrual pains. One day she drove into L.A., picked a doctor at 
random from the phone book, went to her, told her she thought she was pregnant. They arranged 
tests. Oedipa gave her name as Grace Bortz and didn’t show up for her next appointment” (142). 
While this moment could create a fork in the novel’s plot—who’s the father? what will Oedipa 
do with the child?—the narrator quickly dispels the possibility of her pregnancy: “The 
toothaches got worse, she dreamed of disembodied voices from whose malignance there was no 
appeal, the soft dusk of mirrors out of which something was about to walk, the empty rooms that 
waited for her. Your gynecologist has no test for what she was pregnant with” (144). Oedipa and 
Maria have become pregnant with paranoid plots, a fear that everything connects in a 
conspiratorial web—or that their lives, the world, are comprised of a series of accidents 
connected only through their experiences of mass mediated events. Media itself weaves the 
fabric of their lives; beyond it lies nothing.26 
Both characters, due to the men in their lives, have lost everything while discovering their 
inheritance. In Oedipa’s case this is primarily due to the deceased Pierce Inverarity; in Play It As 
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It Lays Maria struggles to repress the lack of inheritance she has received from her father, 
namely the Nevada town of Silver Wells, to which she moved when she was nine years old 
“because my father lost the Reno house in a private game and happened to remember that he 
owned this town, Silver Wells. He had bought it or won it or maybe his father left it to him, I’m 
not sure which and it doesn’t matter to you” (3). Just as we do not know how her father came to 
own Silver Wells, we do not know how he lost it; what we do know is that it has become a 
missile range (4). Inverarity’s fortune, Oedipa discovers, was built upon a similar use of real 
estate speculation, primarily his drawing the business of the aerospace contractor Yoyodyne to 
the southern California city of San Narciso. The military-industrial complex stalks both novels, 
the threat of nuclear annihilation looming over these protagonists’ quests for self-discovery and 
an understanding of the missing men in their lives. Daniel Grausam has demonstrated that 
Pynchon’s second novel explicitly deals with the horrors of nuclear apocalypse: “The 1964 
setting of The Crying of Lot 49 places us in the immediate aftermath of arguably the most 
dangerous period of the conflict prior to the Reagan years”; this is why Pynchon addresses “the 
paradigm-changing nature of nuclear weapons” in a text “that might be said to inaugurate a 
definitively ‘postmodern’ fiction” (57). Didion provides a similar representation of the risks of 
nuclear war when, toward the end of Play It As It Lays, Maria goes on location with Carter in the 
high desert of Nevada. We are told: “The heat stuck. The air shimmered. An underground 
nuclear device was detonated where Silver Wells had once been, and Maria got up before dawn 
to feel the blast. She felt nothing” (206-207). The pervasive sense of feeling nothing echoes 
through the inner lives of both Oedipa and Maria. However, both often feel this way when 
feeling too much, when overwhelmed. Adam Piette, in The Literary Cold War (2009), writes of 
the cultural conditions that shaped such an affective state as emerging from the state itself, “The 
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launching of the second war in Indochina meant that the State Department’s paranoia-as-history 
spilled over into the body politic, even into the minds and members of the peace movement” 
(178). Oedipa’s experience at Sproul Plaza on Berkeley’s campus and Maria’s total apathy 
regarding anything having to do with a movement points to their alienation from the politics of 
the peace movement.27 They are the conservative paranoids—Oedipa herself a young 
Republican—who proliferate fears and anxieties until their meaning either connects in a web of 
conspiracy, or means nothing at all.28 Piette continues, “It was not only that there was something 
in the air that favoured the toxic extension of the paranoid style to all forms of politics in the 
United States—the Cuban missile crisis and the assassination of Kennedy could be said to have 
triggered this. It was also that the very nature of fiction-making during the 1960s Cold War had 
undergone a cynical sea-change” (178). Both novels bear the marks of this change in their 
representations of nuclear war and as responses to the Kennedy assassination, though the 
ostensible cynicism of Pynchon’s novel is less sincere than the overwhelming air of hopelessness 
that Didion delivers.  
At the end of Play It As It Lays Maria tells us, in the terms of craps, “One thing in my 
defense, not that it matters: I know something Carter never knew, or Helene, or maybe you. I 
know what ‘nothing’ means, and keep on playing” (216). Maria’s understanding of nothing is 
based upon her conception of life consisting of a series of chance events. In the face of this 
existential crisis, she chooses to keep playing, much as Camus’s Sisyphus chooses his rock. 
Oedipa also associates “nothing” with chance and accident. Towards the end of The Crying of 
Lot 49 she ponders whether the Trystero, an underground postal service, is an elaborate hoax that 
Inverarity authored or if it actually exists: 
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Yet she knew, head down, stumbling along over the cinderbed and its old sleepers, there 
was still that other chance. That it was all true. That Inverarity had only died, nothing 
else. Suppose, God, there really was a Tristero then and that she had come on it by 
accident. If San Narciso and the estate were really no different from any other town, any 
other estate, then by that continuity she might have found The Tristero anywhere in her 
Republic, through any of a hundred lightly-concealed entranceways, a hundred 
alienations, if only she’d looked. (148) 
Both characters consider that they may have stumbled, by chance, upon a truth that they can 
never wholly discern as true, while also considering that the events that have guided and 
influenced their lives mean nothing.29 While Carter Lang can find meaning in the films he 
directs—has gone so far as to cast Maria in these films and continues to try and direct her in their 
personal lives—and Pierce Inverarity, in death, directs Oedipa’s pursuit of the truth behind 
Trystero, both Oedipa and Maria awaken to the horror that they lack agency, are merely objects 
of the men who have abandoned them. Their lives are either a series of plots that men have 
written, or a series of accidents that mean nothing.  
Yet the dilemma these characters face is also one that faces the reader.30 The choice a 
reader is given, at the end of both The Crying of Lot 49 and Play It As It Lays is whether or not to 
continue interpreting the words and events of these novels. “Pynchon’s novel anticipates,” writes 
Peter Knight, “in a stylized form how the assassination has become submerged into an abyss of 
infinite interpretation and suspicion over the ensuing decades” (102). For Timothy Melley, 
“Kennedy’s murder epitomizes the condition of knowledge and history in postmodernity because 
it turns on an unbridgeable gap between historical events and historical narrative,” which The 
Crying of Lot 49 represents in Oedipa’s inability to read reality and fiction so as to understand 
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her situation in the present (43).31 Both primarily search for understanding through means of the 
car; in this manner, the novels place them in the same role of—were one to read the Zapruder 
film as telling a story—as Jacqueline Kennedy. Dressed in the style of Jackie, large dark 
sunglasses and similar clothes, both women mourn in cars, in search of a meaning that they 
cannot find. However, their endurance, if read as similar to the first lady, makes them heroic. As 
the first lady famously stood beside Lyndon Johnson, witness to his inheritance of presidential 
power, both Oedipa and Maria inherit a similar legacy—whether it is as Oedipa ponders America 
itself, or in the case of Maria, the meaning of “nothing.” The choice of depicting woman’s 
struggle for meaning, for understanding amidst accidents that may be authored, garners both 
sympathy from readers in insisting that they are trapped within the same vehicle, attempting to 
hold the president together, and with him, the future of the nation. This task does not demand 
that they actually mend the horrors of the past, but that they endure those that may come. Their 
breakdown under the pressure is only incidental; what matters is their struggle, their attempt to 
solve the puzzle. In this way, both Oedipa and Maria gain independence from the men in their 
lives—while the men abandon them or die on them, they continue to understand theirs and their 
nation’s present and past, their heritage. 
 Their acts of driving epitomize the aimlessness of their quests for self-discovery and the 
manner in which readers navigate the traffic of these novels’ plots. Maria wanders the highways 
of southern California, “In the first hot month of the fall after the summer she left Carter (the 
summer Carter left her, the summer Carter stopped living in the house in Beverly Hills), Maria 
drove the freeway” (13). Unlike Kerouac’s On the Road (1957), which portrays a journey of 
discovery by means of car, and Nabokov’s Lolita (1955), which depicts Humbert Humbert’s 
exerting control of Dolores Haze through the freedom the automobile and the entire interstate 
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system provides him, the car leads Oedipa and Maria on a series of endless bypasses and exits. 
The Crying of Lot 49 explicitly represents the car as an object that cannot provide Oedipa with 
the freedom that it provides men: 
She drove more or less automatically until a swift boy in a Mustang, perhaps unable to 
contain the new sense of virility his auto gave him, nearly killed her and she realized that 
she was on the freeway, heading irreversibly for the Bay Bridge. It was the middle of 
rush hour. Oedipa was appalled at the spectacle, having thought such traffic only possible 
in Los Angeles, places like that. (87) 
For Oedipa, this is the first of two car accidents that do not happen. While the boy’s Mustang 
gives him power—that which Karen Beckman identified, above, as at least the means to a 
presidential death—Oedipa only gets locked in traffic. Yet this traffic also allows her a moment 
of meditation:  
Amid the exhaust, sweat, glare and ill-humor of a summer evening on an American 
freeway, Oedipa Maas pondered her Trystero problem. All the silence of San Narciso—
the calm surface of the motel pool, the contemplative contours of residential streets like 
rakings in the sand of a Japanese garden—had not allowed her to think as leisurely as this 
freeway madness. (87) 
The realization that she nearly had an accident allows her to consider the meaning of the 
Trystero. It is only when she becomes aware of accident that Oedipa can consider the possible 
plots that have been authored for her. Similarly, Maria finds tranquility when, recklessly driving, 
she willfully avoids a car accident: “Again and again she returned to an intricate stretch just 
south of the interchange where successful passage from the Hollywood onto the Harbor required 
a diagonal move across four lanes of traffic. On the afternoon she finally did it without once 
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braking or losing the beat on the radio she was exhilarated, and that night slept dreamlessly” 
(14). Driving to the music blaring from her car radio, Maria finds a moment of harmony merging 
in traffic. These two instances of driving provide both characters a sense of peace while denying 
them the freedom that the car provides men. While the car provides men with a linear plot that 
resolves by the narrative’s end, it provides Oedipa and Maria with a series of loops, near misses 
that, like the plots of their novels, force the reader to meditate on meaning without ever reaching 
a satisfying conclusion. In these novels the highway to narrative resolution is jammed with an 
overwhelming number of interpretations. 
When Oedipa nearly crashes for the second time she is contemplating suicide. After 
learning that there is a mysterious bidder for lot 49, “Oedipa went back to Echo Courts to drink 
bourbon until the sun went down and it was as dark as it would ever get. Then she went out and 
drove on the freeway for a while with her lights out, to see what would happen. But angels were 
watching” (146). Robbed of her agency, Oedipa drunk-drives the freeways, passively hoping that 
an accident will find her. Having not experienced a car accident, Oedipa calls a man she met in 
San Francisco. She demands to know whether she is part of a plot or if her life’s recent events 
are all accident, pleading: “I don’t know your name, don’t want to. But I have to know whether 
they arranged it with you. To run into me by accident, and tell me your story about the post horn. 
Because it may be a practical joke for you, but it stopped being one for me a few hours ago. I got 
drunk and went driving on these freeways. Next time I may be more deliberate” (146). Oedipa 
perceives even accidents as possibly being part of a plot—which points to the fact that the 
accident in The Crying of Lot 49, like those of any novel, are the plots of the author. Maria, in a 
state of such intoxication that she cannot drive, still relies on the fantasy of the open road: “she 
imagined herself driving, conceived audacious lane changes, strategic shifts of gear, the 
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Hollywood to the San Bernardino and straight on out, past Barstow, past Baker, driving straight 
on into the hard white empty core of the world. She slept and did not dream” (163). Part of other 
men’s plots, Oedipa and Maria find no freedom in the car, only the opportunity to meditate on 
their role: being driven in other’s plots. They reflexively imagine themselves as simultaneously 
at the center of a plot and at the convergence of a series of accidents.  
In their form and content both novels replicate for the reader the problems of 
interpretation that face both Oedipa and Maria. For both protagonists the world takes shape as a 
text that they are asked to interpret, to read for plot and meaning; nevertheless, in a realistic 
manner, they cannot read the world, because it turns out that actual events present no underlying 
meaning or accurate means of interpretation. In The Program Era (2009) Mark McGurl writes, 
“Strictly regulating the commerce between the reader and the third person narrator who might (in 
theory) have solved the mystery of the Tristero rather than letting it ride, Pynchon aligned the 
experience of untold thousands of college students who have tried to understand The Crying of 
Lot 49 with an English major protagonist who is doing much the same thing” (191). Both Maria 
Wyeth and Oedipa Maas attempt to understand their world through New Critical reading 
practices, but only find themselves alienated by a culture that they no longer understand; their 
own alienation is that which fuels the mystery and provides their quests with a simultaneous 
overabundance and total lack of meaning.32  
Both novels thus capture the sense of epistemological and ontological crisis that 
proliferated throughout American culture in the years after the Kennedy assassination. While 
neither text explicitly mentions Kennedy’s death, both take as their subject women of the same 
age who have lost authoritative male partners and struggle with their perception of society’s 
deterioration—a society that, nevertheless, takes them as objects to be possessed in order to be 
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dispossessed. Even if they could discern that everything in their lives was plotted by a male other 
or was the result of a series of accidents, they would still not be any closer to possessing 
knowledge or making meaning of such plots or events. Like the numerous interpretations that the 
Zapruder film opened, their lives simultaneously mean too much and mean nothing. Throughout 
her early career, Didion avoided writing explicitly about the Kennedy assassination. Writing of 
the attack on Pearl Harbor in “Letter from Paradise, 21º 19’N., 157º 52’ W.,” collected in 
Slouching Towards Bethlehem (1968), Didion distances herself from the impact of the 
assassination: “A few days ago someone just four years younger than I am told me that he did 
not see why a sunken ship should affect me so, that John Kennedy’s assassination, not Pearl 
Harbor, was the single most indelible event of what he kept calling ‘our generation.’ I could tell 
him only that we belonged to different generations” (145-146). By Didion’s own account, she 
and Pynchon—born in 1937—may be part of a separate generation. Nevertheless, their writings, 
though disparate in style—Didion’s direct, minimalist, new journalistic; Pynchon’s indirect, 
excessive, modernist—take as their subject the epistemological and ontological struggles that 
come with historically understanding their present, the breakdown of American culture in the 
years that followed Kennedy’s demise.33 Writing of Hawaii again in “In the Islands,” collected in 
The White Album (1979), Didion said of her romantic worldview:  
I have trouble reconciling salvation with those ignorant armies in my mind. I could 
indulge here in a little idle generalization, could lay off my own state of profound 
emotional shock on the larger cultural breakdown, could talk fast about convulsions in 
the society and alienation and anomie and maybe even assassination, but that would be 
just one more stylish shell game. (278)  
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Didion desires to understand American culture through looking beyond the apparent symptoms 
of its crises. She reads like Oedipa Maas—a character who finds herself out of sync with mid-
sixties youth culture and the counter culture. Both were English majors, Oedipa at Cornell, 
Didion at Berkeley, and both approach American society’s ruptures with conservative skepticism 
through the tools of close reading.  
While Didion did not explicitly write of the Kennedy assassination until Miami (1987), 
Pynchon—whose exploits were very much the indulgent decadences of the sixties that Didion 
depicts in Play It As It Lays, would explicitly meditate upon the death of Kennedy in his next 
novel. In Gravity’s Rainbow (1973) Pynchon identified Kennedy as the figure who could have 
prevented the crises that faced American society in the 1960s—primarily by not dying. When, in 
a state induced by sodium amytal, Tyrone Slothrop recalls/hallucinates dropping and following 
his mouth harp down a toilet at the Roseland Ballroom in Boston, we are told: 
Gone away upstream, bas-relief Dumpster lost in the gray light as now Slothrop is going 
past the sign of Will Stonybloke, of J. Peter Pitt, of Jack Kennedy, the ambassador’s 
son—say, where the heck is that Jack tonight, anyway? If anybody could’ve saved that 
harp, betcha Jack could. Slothrop admires him from a distance—he’s athletic, and kind, 
and one of the most well-liked fellows in Slothrop’s class. Sure is daffy about that 
history, though. Jack . . . might Jack have kept it from falling, violated gravity somehow? 
Here, in this passage to the Atlantic, odors of slat, weed, decay washing to him faintly 
like the sound of breakers, yes it seems Jack might have. (65) 
The reader knows where Jack is, but is induced to wonder how the 1960s would have unfolded 
had he not died. However, toward the end of Gravity’s Rainbow any hope for what Kennedy 
could have provided for the future dissipates. Pynchon has just before this passage shown Red, 
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who grew up to become Malcolm X, shining shoes in the Roseland (as DeLillo would ten years 
later in “American Blood”). But the reader knows that these figures, Jack and Red, are connected 
through the politics of assassination and little else. Gravity’s Rainbow evokes nostalgia for the 
days of Camelot, while reminding the reader “daffy about that history”—should that reader need 
any reminding—that the present of the novel’s publication, 1973, bears the yet-to-heal wounds 
of 1963. Gravity’s Rainbow, hundreds of pages later, turns back to the Roseland Ballroom: “It is 
nice to think that one Saturday night, one floor-shaking Lindyhopping Roseland night, Malcolm 
looked up from some Harvard kid’s shoes and caught the eye of Jack Kennedy (the 
Ambassador’s son), then a senior [. . .] Eventually Jack and Malcolm both got murdered” (688). 
While Sean McCann reads this scene as evidence that “Gravity’s Rainbow never really gets 
beyond its ambivalent fascination with the imperial presidency and the charismatic leadership 
Kennedy and his supporters glamorized,” the scene actually calls attention, between the ellipses, 
to a third figure, Tyrone Slothrop, and thus, to a third way (266-267):  
Did Red suspend his ragpopping just the shadow of a beat, just enough gap in the moiré 
there to let white Jack see through, not through to but through through the shine on his 
classmate Tyrone Slothrop’s shoes? Were the three ever lined up that way—sitting, 
squatting, passing through? Eventually Jack and Malcolm both got murdered. Slothrop’s 
fate is not so clear. It may be that They have something different in mind for Slothrop. 
(688)  
Slothrop is not assassinated; his fate is to fade from memory, from history—not to become a 
martyr in the vein of Kennedy or Malcolm X. As the fragmented figure of a fragmented history, 
possessing a fate that “is not so clear,” Slothrop marks an alternative to the New Frontier and to 
the New Left, providing an underground history akin to that found in The Crying of Lot 49. For 
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what is meant when the novel asks whether a young Malcolm X stopped shining Slothrop’s 
shoes long enough so that Kennedy could see “through through” the moiré of his shoes is first of 
all, whether or not Kennedy could experience an accident of reading: whether he could see 
through the moiré, the pattern on Slothrop’s shoes, to the substance. “Daffy about that history,” 
the novel questions whether or not Kennedy could see the historical relationship between the 
three figures and their place in a larger historical pattern, like Oedipa researching the Trystero, a 
possible underground postal system—for “moiré” also means the ripple pattern on a stamp. The 
novel suspends our knowledge of whether or not this happened, whether Kennedy saw the 
message, or saw through the message, through the means of delivering meaning in history to a 
larger pattern. In representing the reading of history as a series of moments of seeing through—
of accidents of reading—and despite veiling these meanings in intricately fraught scenes and 
language that hold more than one interpretation, Pynchon opens possibilities for reading the past 
and the present as a means to authoring the future. Rather than content then, the key difference 
between Pynchon and Didion’s style lies in their representation of history, namely a stylistic 
quality common in Pynchon’s writing that I call inauthentic authenticity.  
 The texts discussed in the following chapters each deploy inauthentic authenticity, which, 
as the term suggests, is a stylistic mode prevalent in postmodernist texts. I use such unwieldy 
language in naming this stylistic mode because its name provides an initial insight into its 
purpose: to call attention to a structure of feeling—historical experience, feeling historically—
through reading and viewing fictions. One unexpectedly becomes grounded in reality through 
seeing it represented in a hyperbolic, hysterical manner. Raymond Williams most clearly defines 
structure of feeling in The Long Revolution as being: 
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as firm and definite as ‘structure’ suggests, yet it operates in the most delicate and least 
tangible parts of our activity. In one sense, this structure of feeling is the culture of a 
period: it is the particular living result of all the elements in the general organization. And 
it is in this respect that the arts of a period, taking these to include characteristic 
approaches and tones in argument, are of major importance. For here, if anywhere, this 
characteristic is likely to be expressed; often not consciously, but by the fact that here, in 
the only examples we have of recorded communication that outlives its bearers, the actual 
living sense, the deep community that makes the communication possible, is naturally 
drawn upon. I do not mean that the structure of feeling, any more than the social 
character, is possessed in the same way by the many individuals in the community. But I 
think it is a very deep and very wide possession, in all actual communities, precisely 
because it is on it that communication depends. (48) 
I quote Williams at length because his concept of the structure of feeling informs what I 
understand to be the impulse that lead artists in the post-war period, especially after the Kennedy 
assassination and the ensuing traumas of that decade and those that followed, to deploy 
inauthentic authenticity: a style that in its distancing readers from a clear purpose—an ideology, 
a politics, an ethics, even a meaning—insisted that its readers and viewers engage with history in 
order to find coherent meaning in the work, their lives, and society. Williams’s concept of the 
structure of feeling emerged over the post-war period, first appearing in his and Michael Orrom’s 
Preface to Film (1954). It was applied explicitly to literature in Marxism and Literature (1977) 
as indicating a change in social, rather than personal, experience: “characteristic elements of 
impulse, restraint, and tone; specifically affective elements of consciousness and relationships: 
not feeling against thought, but thought as felt and feeling as thought: practical consciousness of 
  44 
a present kind, in a living and interrelating continuity” (132).34 To attend to inauthentic 
authenticity is, at its minimum, to understand how fiction reveals truths about text’s historical 
moment, what an author was thinking and feeling, and, from these thoughts and feelings, how 
he/she weaves continuity from a seeming array of discontinuities—historical events that just 
seem to be happening by accident.  
The director Sam Peckinpah eloquently touches upon the stylistic mode of inauthentic 
authenticity in a discussion of the use of violence in his films and the ethical basis of such 
hyperrealistic violence. Speaking of Vietnam and its coverage in mass media, Peckinpah says, 
“We watch our wars and see men die, really die, every day on television, but it doesn’t seem real. 
We don’t believe those are real people dying on that screen. We’ve been anesthetized by the 
media. What I do is show people what it’s really like—not by showing it as it is so much as by 
heightening it, stylizing it” (“Playboy Interview” 70). Peckinpah’s words are often cited in 
discussions of filmic violence, but I would like to extend them to an understanding of style in 
post-war American cultural objects, particularly in regard to inauthentic authenticity as a style 
that becomes dominant in film and literature of the 1960s and the proceeding decades. For 
Peckinpah, as for the critics discussed earlier in this introduction, media saturation has distanced 
subjects from understanding what they see on a screen—and I would argue, read in a book—as 
having an actual basis in reality, a grounding in history. As a stylistic mode, inauthentic 
authenticity is distinct—but not exclusive—from Linda Hutcheon’s conception of 
historiographic metafiction, which she defines as “those well-known and popular novels which 
are both intensely self-reflexive and yet also lay claim to historical events and personages” which 
through “its theoretical self-awareness of history and fiction as human constructs 
(historiographic metafiction) is made the grounds for its rethinking and reworking of the forms 
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and contents of the past” (A Poetics of Postmodernism 5). Inauthentic authenticity may be 
deployed in works of historiographic metafiction—and surely is the form’s dominant style—but 
it is also used in numerous texts that do not fit the form of historiographic metafiction. Hutcheon 
gives as examples of historiographic metafiction novels such as The French Lieutenant’s Woman 
(1969), Ragtime (1975), and Midnight’s Children (1981); yet in the chapters that follow, I find 
inauthentic authenticity in novels such as Blood and Guts in High School (1984), White Noise, 
and films such as The Deer Hunter (1978) and Crash (1996), which do not abide by Hutcheon’s 
above parameters.  
In these more various texts, one can see that inauthentic authenticity is also deployed in 
texts set in their own current historical moment, acting as a form of critique, of cutting through 
“the waning of affect” which Fredric Jameson has called “The end of the bourgeois ego, or 
monad” and “the end of much more—the end, for example, of style, in the sense of the unique 
and personal” (Postmodernism 15). Jameson quickly draws back from announcing the end of 
style to say that “in the narrower context of literary criticism” the waning of affect characterizes 
“the waning of the great high modernist thematics of time and temporality” (16). On the 
contrary, I contend throughout the pages of this dissertation that inauthentic authenticity is the 
dominant style of art works that emerged from the historical traumas of the 1960s, which 
attempted to work through and understand—historically—those traumas and how they continue 
to trouble the present of a work’s composition.  
For Jameson the cultural dominant of postmodernism limits cultural objects’ ability to 
understand their historical situation in their present—for “it is safest to grasp the concept of the 
postmodern as an attempt to think the present historically in an age that has forgotten how to 
think historically in the first place” (ix). What Jameson identifies in the cultural dominant of 
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postmodernism is a structure of feeling that fails to identify its structure of feeling. This affective 
breakdown of American society resulted in a turn away from understanding the present 
historically—all of which, as seen above, was based upon his understanding of mass media 
taking form in its coverage of the Kennedy assassination. Yet American culture’s breakdown and 
fragmentation did not stop artists from historically thinking and representing their present. 
Jameson’s own work cuts against his own assertion, for he identifies the aforementioned 
structure of feeling, as do the works of art and entertainment discussed in the following chapters. 
They show that their makers—novelists, poets, filmmakers, and programmers—remembered to 
follow Jameson’s most famous imperative to “always historicize!” even if such an act called for 
veiling explicit historical understanding with style in order to depict the American subject’s 
ongoing ontological crisis, fragmenting meaning to represent epistemological crisis—all effects 
that were achieved through the myriad manifestations of the accident (The Political Unconscious 
9). 
 
IV. After 1945, After the Cold War, After the Contemporary: Narrative at Risk 
While Jameson’s theories of the postmodern greatly influenced our understanding of 
post-45 American culture, recent trends in the field of literary studies have begun to look at the 
period in terms beyond those of postmodernism. Narrative at Risk intervenes in current literary-
historical understandings of periodization in providing a coherent cultural history of the 
transitions from 1960s literary traditions to those of the present, bridging the period of post-45 
American literature and contemporary literature, recently understood as works composed after 
1989. Amy Hungerford has referred to the period of post-45 literature as “The Period Formerly 
Known as Contemporary,” writing that the initial academic understanding of contemporary 
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literature was “a legacy of New Criticism’s investment in modernist difficulty” and “was one of 
the primary ways that modernist understandings of the literary stretched beyond the moment of 
high modernist aesthetic production” (411).35 More recently, Mark McGurl’s The Program Era 
has provided a highly influential understanding of post-45 American writing through studying 
the institution of the M. F. A. program and the place of the author in the academy. McGurl has 
provided a genealogy of the period which develops from the “High Modernism” of a Joyce or 
Faulkner, the “Professionalism” of a James or Hemingway, combining the former’s “genius” 
with the latter’s “craft,” within the academic institution. This has, he argues, has yielded the 
“High Culturalpluralism” of a Roth or Morrison, and, on the edge of genre fiction, the 
“Technomodernism” of a Barth or Pynchon, and the “Lower-Middle-Class Modernism” of a 
Carver or Oates, which is based upon the representation of work (409). In just these two 
examples one can see that the fields of post-45 and contemporary literature are currently 
undergoing a reevaluation of their periods and a renaissance in scholarship akin to that of Cold 
War studies.36 Narrative at Risk, in treating media such as film, television, and videogames 
alongside literature, broadens our understanding of how accident both developed as a danger 
over the past fifty years and how these various media influenced and shaped one another through 
borrowed reading practices. The texts that this dissertation takes as its objects of study span 
McGurl’s categories while also reading more recent texts that bridge these categories. 
In the following chapters I read a wide array of accidents—from mechanical failures to 
failed suicides, understandings of biological evolution and games of chance—in order to provide 
a broad but nonetheless coherent understanding of how American society has, over the past fifty 
years, conceived of accident in relation to individuals, communities, and the species as a whole. 
In the first chapter, I read accidents of mechanical failure in four texts: David Cronenberg’s film 
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Crash, Don DeLillo’s novel White Noise (1985), Colson Whitehead’s novel The Intuitionist 
(1999), and Rockstar Game’s Grand Theft Auto: San Andreas (2004). I locate these as influenced 
by what historian Sean Wilentz has called the age of Reagan, taking as my initial subject Ronald 
Reagan’s understanding of his most formative moment, his role as a victim of a train accident in 
the film King’s Row (1941) and his discussion of this role in his 1965 memoir Where’s the Rest 
of Me? Reagan’s influence upon J. G. Ballard, author of Crash (1973), informs both his novel’s 
and Cronenberg’s film’s deployment of inauthentic authenticity. Both texts attempt to present the 
viewer with a series of haptic sensations in watching the car accidents represented in the film as 
a means of shocking them into historical awareness of the present. In White Noise the presence 
of Reagan looms over the text and its narrator, Jack Gladney, whose experience of a toxic spill 
and the contaminated cloud that it forms changes his relationship with the federal government, 
primarily in his understanding of the government’s role in managing risk for its citizens. In The 
Intuitionist an elevator accident sends its protagonist, Lila Mae Watson, on a quest to clear 
herself from, what she believes, was an act of sabotage for which she was framed. Set in the 
midst of the Civil Rights Movement, The Intuitionist reads into that past struggle the 
consequences of Reagan and George Herbert Walker Bush’s attempts to undo many Civil Rights 
laws, while presenting a method of resistance that imagines a future for racial and sexual 
equality. Grand Theft Auto: San Andreas, set in a fictional version of early 1990s Los Angeles, 
leads its player through the Ramparts Scandal and the L. A. riots—an environment that is the 
product of President Reagan and Bush’s cuts to social programs—with a series of cars stolen, 
raced, and crashed. Both it and The Intuitionist provoke the reader to understand the accidental 
quality of race alongside mechanical failures, much in the same way that Crash and White Noise 
insist that accident shapes identity, but also reveals the politics that reside beneath identity. Each 
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of these texts’ protagonists struggle with control in the face of accident, and the narratives of the 
novels reveal authorial control over the accident as a means of calling the reader’s attention to 
the events depicted in the texts as fictions that uncover, via the deployment of inauthentic 
authenticity, history. In reading several texts that range from the late 1960s to the early 2000s I 
establish the scope of Narrative at Risk, reading representations of accident as stemming from 
the traumas of the 1960s and calling the characters’ and readers’ attentions back to that historical 
moment as one that continues to be felt in our present. 
 Chapter two shifts from the first’s broad historical range to texts specifically composed 
and published at the end of the Cold War: Paul Auster’s novel Leviathan (1992), Jeffrey 
Eugenides’s novel The Virgin Suicides (1993), and “Musings of a Cigarette Smoking Man” 
(1996) an episode of the television show The X-Files (1993-2002). Each of these texts represents 
strained attempts to imagine the future of the United States in the face of the seemingly 
accidental and abrupt end of the Cold War. I read failed suicide attempts in these texts as 
accidents that express the limits of intentionality, which bring to the fore the nation’s inability to 
conceive of a future beyond the ideological bounds of the conflict with the Soviet Union that 
provided meaning during the Cold War. The characters in these texts struggle with understanding 
their own futures and the accidents of intention that they have experienced. In Leviathan, The 
Virgin Suicides, and “Musings of a Cigarette Smoking Man” the events of the Cold War and the 
domestic strife of the American 1960s, 70s, and 80s, haunt characters that cannot move beyond 
the events of those decades to understand their own present historical moment. At the level of 
narrative form, each of these texts deny closure, insisting instead on a closed future either 
through meditating upon the inability for their narratives to wholly express the events they 
depict, or in undermining the veracity of these events through conflicting stories.  
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 The third chapter continues to focus upon the final years of the Cold War, albeit from a 
different perspective. In it I read Richard Kenney’s poem, “A Colloquy of Ancient Men” from 
his collection, The Invention of the Zero (1993), alongside two novels: Michael Crichton’s 
Jurassic Park (1990) and The Gold Bug Variations (1991) by Richard Powers. These three texts 
represent the Cold War anxiety of thermonuclear annihilation shifting to a fear of genetic 
manipulation. Each of these texts depicts evolution as a series of random, accidental changes that 
take place in the history of a species’ development. Rather than depicting the futurelessness of 
the United States, these texts look to deep history on the scale of evolutionary time, using their 
representations of evolutionary biology as an argument against the threat that capitalism poses to 
Western liberalism in its becoming, after the fall of the Soviet Union, the dominant economic 
system and ideology. I read these texts alongside works of science—particularly Stephen J. 
Gould’s writings and theory of punctuated equilibrium—to show that while the future remained 
closed, meditations on the past, particularly deep history, revealed anxieties throughout 
American culture. The second and third chapters discuss texts that, respectively, depict failures 
of imagining the future and critique wildly counterfactual understandings of evolutionary time, 
both discuss symptoms of American culture’s inward turn and debates regarding its future and 
revisions of its past in the culture wars.  
 The fourth chapter, rather than moving forward in time, turns back to the 1970s in order 
to investigate the early years of the culture wars. I begin by reading how chance disrupts the 
linear narrative of Kathy Acker’s novel Blood and Guts in High School (which was published in 
1984 but copyrighted in 1978), then shift to how games of chance disrupted the religious rights’ 
teleological understanding of history through reading hyperbolic and inflammatory 
condemnation of the role of chance in TSR’s roleplaying game Dungeons & Dragons (1974). I 
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continue to read the role of games of chance in two other texts, Michael Cimino’s film The Deer 
Hunter, and Thomas Pynchon’s novel Gravity’s Rainbow before concluding with a return to 
Dungeons & Dragons, this time in Sam Lipsyte’s short story “The Dungeon Master” (2010). In 
each of these cases chance undermines the paranoid fantasy that there are forces that author the 
world and control one’s actions within it. The players of Dungeons & Dragons and the 
characters in the aforementioned novels take risks in order to avoid chance—the characters in 
The Deer Hunter enlist in Vietnam in order to avoid the lottery of the draft, Tyrone Slothrop 
loses his identity in a Casino and takes an active role in the quest for the rocket 00000 in order 
not to be victim to chance. In Lipsyte’s story “The Dungeon Master” a group of teenage 
friends—those whom the evangelical right showed such concern for—embark on a campaign of 
Dungeons & Dragons, only to find themselves and their characters suffering horribly due to their 
ill-fortuned rolls of the dice and their ill-mannered Dungeon Master, the narrator-author of their 
campaigns. With paranoid fantasy as a means of controlling—or ignoring—chance, I read these 
texts as commenting on the immediate societal consequences of the 1960s’ end, particularly the 
Watergate Scandal and the end of the Vietnam War. These works depict characters embracing 
and denying chance in order to craft a teleology from a series of disparate traumas so as to assert 
control and order to a domestic sphere that has become overwhelmingly chaotic, authored by 
accident rather than intention. In this way, I return to many of the issues discussed in this 
introduction, but from a different vantage, arguing that while accident disrupted the narrative of 
the American dream in the early sixties, it became the dominant narrative, the one to be 
countered, in the 1970s.  
 I conclude with a brief discussion of the growing prevalence of the accident in the present 
through a discussion of episodes from two television shows—Breaking Bad (2008-2013) and 
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The Americans (2013-)—alongside Steve Erickson’s 2012 novel These Dreams of You. Each of 
these texts imagines accidents as the fault or cause of the government. This points to American 
culture’s continued reliance upon teleological thinking and conspiracy theory. Such irrational 
thinking emerges in a time when we witness accidents and tragedies unfold, much like the 
Kennedy assassination, in real time, but far more frequently, and almost immediately in their 
wake conspiracy theories emerge in order to explain how some agent—from a shadow 
government to the President himself, has authored this threat. The risk to national narrative 
comes, in these cases, almost always from inside American society rather than from a foreign 
enemy. 
 The structure of Narrative at Risk attempts to avoid chronology in order to upset a 
teleological understanding of the period. Similarly, the choice of texts studied in the following 
chapters could be replaced with others; their inclusion often matches canonical understandings of 
post-war American literature and film, but also diverges into what I can only account for as my 
own taste. However, such a structure and such a sampling of texts support this dissertation’s 
claims. In resisting a teleological understanding of literary history and a strictly canonical 
selection of texts, I show that accident was prevalent in American society in both high and low 
culture. In other words, like any cultural study, Narrative at Risk could—and should—be able to 
support its thesis from any constellation of a wide range of texts. I only wish that personal taste 
had not interfered in the choice of some texts, so that the entire sampling could have been truly 
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Notes 
1 While there are certainly earlier studies of the role accident plays in literature, they do not treat accident in the 
same manner as these more recent works. As well, they do not take American culture and society as their subject but 
instead, focus on a range of Western texts. See for instance: Ian Hacking’s The Taming of Chance (1990), Gerd 
Gigerenzer’s The Empire of Chance: How Probability Changed Science and Everyday Life (1990), Gerda Reith’s 
The Age of Chance (1999), Jackson Lears’s Something for Nothing (2003), for broad studies of chance and accident. 
For literary studies of chance see: R. Rawdon Wilson’s In Palamede’s Shadow (1990), David Bell’s Circumstances: 
Chance in the Literary Text (1993), Leland Monk’s Standard Deviations: Chance and the Modern British Novel 
(1993), Brian Richardson’s Unlikely Stories: Causality and the Nature of Modern Narratives (1997), Michael 
Witmore’s Culture of Accidents (2002), and William Paulson’s “Chance, Complexity, and Narrative Explanation.” 
 
2 All Greek definitions are taken from the Lidell-Scott-Jones Lexicon of Greek. 
 
3 Gary Saul Morson, in Narrative and Freedom: The Shadows of Time (1994) articulates that which Virilio believes 
mass media has conflated: the difference between narrative fiction and reality in regard to chance. He writes of 
literary texts, though his words apply to all narrative: “To those who believe that time is open, the shape of narrative 
fiction seems most artificial whenever it reminds us of its status as an artifice with structure and closure. If time is 
open our lives lack inherent structure and allow for multiple possibilities. The possibilities that were realized were 
not necessarily the most fitting, and we have no right to expect that the incidents of the future will make sense of all 
past contingencies. Unlike art, life does not subject contingencies to a pattern and thereby turn accidents into a 
meaningful inevitability” (38). 
 
4 Lubin discusses at length the aestheticization of the Zapruder film in Shooting Kennedy, pp. 163-193, as does 
Karen Beckman, pp. 137-161. 
 
5 For an extended reading of the Lincoln Continental in which Kennedy was riding when he was killed, see Pamela 
McElwain-Brown’s essay “SS-100-X” in Mikita Brottmann’s Car Crash Culture (2001). For a history of managing 
risk in regard to the car and the use of film in doing so, see “The Accident is Uncontainable/The Accident Must be 
Contained: High Speed Cinematography and the Development of Scientific Crash Testing” by Greg Siegel. 
 
6 In Tangled Memories: The Vietnam War, the AIDS Epidemic, and the Politics of Remembering (1997), Marita 
Sturken writes of the Zapruder film: “When an image coincides with traumatic events of historical rupture, it plays a 
central role in the construction of national meaning [. . .] It is both a still and moving image icon: because the 
moving image was restricted from public view, for twelve years it was seen in public only as a series of stills. The 
Zapruder film represents history as a succession of individual frames sliding forward in slow motion, offering only 
fragments of clues to what happened. It is a secret image, hidden from view, imbued with a kind of sacred status” 
(26). 
 
7 In National Trauma and Collective Memory: Major Events in the American Century (1998), Arthur G. Neal reads 
the exceptional quality of the Kennedy assassination as of moment when secular politics entered the realm of the 
sacred: “The assassination of President Kennedy became a sacred event to Americans. Analogies were drawn 
between the death of Kennedy, the assassination of President Lincoln, and the crucifixion of Jesus Christ. Each 
constituted a human sacrifice in cementing the bonds of society as moral community. Through bloodshed, suffering, 
and death, the sacred character of social life became rejuvenated. For a few days following Kennedy’s assassination, 
the nation became totally engrossed in the news media coverage of the event and in the collective mourning 
process” (32).  
 
8 For Jameson’s extended mediation on the 1960s see his article “Periodizing the 60s.” For a more recent attempt to 
periodize the postmodern, see Brian McHale’s “1966 Nervous Breakdown; or When Did Postmodernism Begin?” 
Timothy Melley, in Empire of Conspiracy: The Culture of Paranoia in Postwar America (2000) reads Jameson’s 
understanding of the assassination as a “mass-mediated experience” that was “‘collective,’” but contends that “what 
the mainstream media actually mounted for collective inspection was the epitome of capitalist individualism: the 
antisocial, ‘lone gunman’ in the tradition of the American Western—not only in the figure of Lee Oswald but also in 
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that of Jack Ruby” (133). For Melley, “What may seem to be at odds with capitalist individualism, however, is the 
widespread popular resistance to” the theory of the lone gunman (134).  
 
9 Sturken writes, “The Trope of America’s losing its innocence at a precise moment is a well-worn one, a concept 
reiterated with Pearl Harbor, the Vietnam War, the Watergate scandal, the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, and other 
events,” to which one must add the attacks of September 11, 2001 (29). 
 
10 Øyvind Vågnes, in Zaprudered: The Kennedy Assassination Film in Visual Culture (2011), writes: “The definitive 
moving image of the assassination, the Zapruder film provides a time frame of the event that has inspired endless 
and contradictory theories about what happened when Kennedy was shot; bodily movements have been scrutinized 
in search of evidence of a second shooter. The film has been used to argue both for and against a wealth of 
conspiracy theories. Indeed, as the forensic gaze has continued to reveal the immense number of dots of which a 
photographic image ultimately consists, and as the epistemological status of the film consequently has been 
threatened by this removal from figurality to abstraction, artists have increasingly turned to its expressive aspects, to 
its allegorical potential. The epistemological crisis described by several cultural theorists thus simultaneously 
produces and reflects a transformation of the performative function of Zapruder’s images form the evidentiary to the 
aesthetic. The images hide as much as they reveal, making the spectator look hard for what they seem to conceal, for 
what is there but seems to be invisible” (13). For a history of the rise of French theory in the American academy 
during this period, see François Cusset’s French Theory, pp. 54-75. 
 
11 Barbie Zelizer, in Covering the Body: The Kennedy Assassination, the Media, and the Shaping of Collective 
Memory (1992), argues extensively that the Kennedy assassination “was a turning point in the evolution of 
American journalistic practice not only because it called for a rapid relay of information during a time of crisis, but 
also because it legitimated televised journalism as a mediator of national experience” (4). 
 
12 Erika Doss, in her introduction to Looking at Life Magazine (2001), writes, “Life paid $150,000 for Zapruder’s 
film. Its printed presence in the magazine gave it a ‘privileged position’ in the long and convoluted history and 
analysis of JFK’s murder; even today, the Zapruder film (recently released for public purchase) retains the sanctity 
of revelation and visual truth. Yet Life’s deliberate out-of-order printing of select frames from the film—done to 
maximalize its most horrific visual moments, one assumes—considerably muddied the interpretations of the 
specifics of the president’s death” (15). 
 
13 Art Simon writes that “Between 1963 and 1979 over 2,300 articles and books were devoted to some aspect of the 
assassination or the ongoing inquiry” (7). For an extensive history of the Zapruder film, see David R. Wrone’s The 
Zapruder Film: Reframing JFK’s Assassination (2003). 
 
14 Vågnes writes: “In the November 25, 1966, issue of Life, a comprehensive spread of frames supports Governor 
Connally’s argument that he and Kennedy were hit by two different bullets. The Zapruder film, now referred to as 
famous, is the center of attention. The magazine shows a single frame, 230, on its cover, against a black background. 
A photograph of Connally poring over single frames of the Zapruder film with a magnifying glass takes up the 
whole of the issue’s page 39. This suggests that Zapruder’s images can render vital information when magnified or 
enlarged dramatically” (40). 
 
15 For a concise timeline of the popularization of the Kennedy assassination and debates surrounding it, especially 
conspiracy theories, see Art Simon’s Dangerous Knowledge, pp. 9-27. 
 
16 For Melley, “If there is a form of utopian collectivism anywhere in this affair [the Kennedy assassination], it 
would seem to be here, in the conspiracy theorist’s relentless willingness to use the crime to imagine the causal 
power of large social systems and organizations” (134). Reading DeLillo’s Libra in A Pinnacle of Feeling: 
American Literature and Presidential Government (2008), Sean McCann writes, “For, while as a living president, 
JFK proves too small and conventional a politician to actually form a new city around himself, in his death [. . .] he 
nevertheless serves to articulate an alternative collective story that would go otherwise unreported [. . .] ‘The 
assassination sheds a powerful and lasting light, exposing patterns and links’ not because it illuminates the ordinary 
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violence and desperation of American society otherwise concealed by the falsity of political rhetoric and popular 
ideology” (174-175). 
 
17 For an extended study of the presidency of Kennedy and the American literary establishment, see Michael 
Szalay’s Hip Figures: A Literary History of the Democratic Party (2012). 
 
18 Brian McHale, in Postmodernist Fiction (1987), emphasizes the ontological status of postmodernist writing, “one 
of the features of this ontological landscape is its permeation by secondary realities, especially mass-media fictions, 
and one of the most typical experiences of members of this culture is that of the transition from one of these fictional 
worlds to the paramount reality of everyday life, or from paramount reality to fiction,” articulating this transition in 
terms of an airplane accident: “‘The flight decks of exploding 747s’: if our culture’s ontological landscape is 
unprecedented in human history—at least in the degree of its pluralism—it also incorporates one feature common to 
all cultures, all ontological landscapes, namely the ontological boundary between life and death. Yet even here our 
culture is innovative, for it alone has had to make room in its ontological landscape for mass technological death—
‘exploding 747s’—even, ultimately global nuclear death” (38-39). McHale’s own terms for the postmodern rely 
upon the experience of technological accident.  
 
19 For an extended discussion of interpretations and methods of reading the Zapruder film, see Simon, pp. 35-54. 
 
20 While there is no evidence that I know of that Pynchon and Didion met, they did move in the same circles. Didion 
published her piece, “Just Folks at a School For Nonviolence,” on Joan Baez in The New York Times in 1966, and 
Pynchon, after the death, also in 1966, of his good friend Richard Fariña (to whom Gravity’s Rainbow is dedicated), 
became very close to Fariña’s wife, Mimi Baez, Joan’s little sister. In Positively 4th Street David Hadju writes: “In 
1968 Joan married antiwar activist David Harris, with whom she had her only child, a son, Gabriel, the following 
year. Mimi moved to an apartment on Telegraph Hill in San Francisco. She and Pynchon became close friends, 
visiting briefly” (296). 
 
21 Victoria N. Alexander provides an extended reading of the name Pierce Inverarity and chance, chaos, and 
teleology in her essay “The Crying of Lot 49 and C. S. Peirce’s Theory of Self-Organization,” relating Peirce’s 
theories of chance and semiotics to Inverarity.  
 
22 Samuel Coale describes in “Didion’s Disorder: An American Romancer’s Art” Didion’s style as filmic: “For 
Didion as in films montage becomes metaphor; the arrangement of episodes reveals the state of mind of her 
heroines, of her modern world. The abstract and concrete meet head-on in her ordering of images, her expert cutting 
from scene to scene, the discontinuous juxtapositions of a shattered world” (162). For a discussion of paranoia in 
Didion’s oeuvre, including a discussion of Play it As It Lays see his Paradigms of Paranoia: The Culture of 
Conspiracy in Contemporary American Fiction (2004). In his study he treats, among others, the writing of both 
Didion and Pynchon, though the most he claims regarding the similarities of their writing is: “The postmodern 
victim, like Thomas Pynchon’s caricatures, Don DeLillo’s diffuse and anxious characters, Joan Didion’s troubled 
and drifting women, and Paul Auster’s self-eviscerating men, is loose in a world that has become so mediated, 
dispersed, intricate, and coded that one cannot possibly fathom it and feels only that bitter sense of absence, loss, 
and impotence” (11). 
 
23 Charles Hollander, in “Pynchon, JFK, and CIA: Magic Eye Views of The Crying of Lot 49” provides a thorough, 
though often forced, reading of the novel’s coded representation of the Kennedy assassination. In what follows I 
write of the impact that the Kennedy assassination had upon the form and content of Lot 49 and Play It As It Lays 
and hope to avoid the conspiratorial, paranoid style of reading that one finds in Hollander. 
 
24 For a thorough examination of neo-conservatism and The Crying of Lot 49, see Casey Shoop’s “Thomas Pynchon, 
Postmodernism, and the Rise of the New Right,” in which Shoop writes sardonically of the 1966 election that would 
result in Reagan becoming California’s governor: “The election, it would seem, was not simply a matter of political 
preference but also a referendum on the capacity of the California electorate to distinguish the ‘real’ activity of 
governance from the illusory, televisual spectacle of the same: voters could surely tell the difference between a 
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career politician with a substantial record and a former Hollywood actor performing in the role of a politician” (51). 
Needless to say, both Maria and Oedipa have a hard time distinguishing mass media spectacle—television and 
film—from their political and historical reality. 
 
25 Coale writes, “Maria is well versed in cinematic terms and devices. She speaks of scenarios, cuts, images in freeze 
frame, set-ups, almost in the matter of Carter [. . .] On the one hand these film techniques constantly distance her 
from her own life by conscious choice; on the other they suggest an unreal realm of theatre and Hollywood 
dialogues that disconnect her from herself all too completely, all too habitually” (165). 
 
26 See Kristin L. Matthews “Reading America Reading in The Crying of Lot 49” for an interpretation of Oedipa’s 
pregnancy as signaling a new form of reading that moves beyond “the object of interpretation in New Critical 
inquiry” to a more Derridean form of reading. 
 
27 Sean McCann, in “‘Down to the People’: Pynchon and Schlesinger ‘after the imperial presidency’” writes of 
Oedipa’s experience walking through Sproul Plaza: “Like the activists of the New Left, Oedipa now sees in electoral 
politics not agents but structures and pathologies. In the suggestion that only death had the power to cure those 
illnesses, moreover, Pynchon underscores the point by implying that the caution of the fifties extended well past the 
1960 election, ending only with the assassination of Kennedy and, possibly, the bloodshed of the Vietnam War” 
(257). 
 
28 Shoop writes: the “complementary anxiety on the right is vital to an understanding of paranoia in Pynchon’s 
California novels, which span the period of Reagan’s ascendance. Paranoia is not merely the occasion for an 
allegorical exercise in hermeneutic uncertainty but also an exploration of a precise cultural-historical situation: the 
1960s California of The Crying of Lot 49 is the state of representational breakdown, the place where the linear 
metanarrative of national destiny might be said to end in a welter of competing postmodern projections” (65). 
 
29 In “Joan Didion’s Play It As It Lays: Alienation and Games of Chance” Lynn Howard Goodhart argues that the 
role chance plays in the novel “amounts to an injunction against independent judgment and action. It leads to the 
feeling that something unseen controls our destinies” (66). 
 
30 Emily Apter’s “On Oneworldedness: Or Paranoia as a World System” treats, at length, primarily through readings 
of Pynchon and DeLillo, the development of such problems of reading in the proliferation of paranoia from the 
1960s to the 21st century, particularly in instances of “overinterpr[etation]” (376). 
 
31 In “After the Post(al)” Daniel Grausam writes that “while it is certainly the case that Pynchon’s novel plays with 
the ontological questions so common to our understanding of the postmodern, the novel is also engaged in an ethical 
project of re-understanding America as fundamentally pluralist rather than hopelessly fractured” (639), based upon 
reading Oedipa’s quest as her discovering alternate histories and ways of life than those she would have found had 
Inverarity not left her to execute his estate. In this redemptive reading, the epistemological and ontological crises 
that the novel depicts speak to difference and a nuanced understanding of both history and the present. 
 
32 In “Reading America Reading in The Crying of Lot 49” Matthews “contends that Oedipa Maas’s development as 
a reader reflects a broader historical shift away from the belief in literal, transparent, and rationally ordered language 
typical of 1950s reading discourses and toward a method of reading grounded in possibility and metaphor” (93). 
 
33 For a reading of Didion’s style and the influence of Hemingway’s American modernism upon it, as well as the 
novel’s representation of patriarchy and Hollywood cinema, see Chip Rhodes’s “The Hollywood Novel: Gender and 
Lacanian Tragedy in Joan Didion’s Play It As It Lays.” 
 
34 In Preface to Film Williams wrote: “In principle, it seems clear that the dramatic conventions of any given period 
are fundamentally related to the structure of feeling in that period. I use the phrase structure of feeling because it 
seems to me more accurate, in this context, than ideas or general life. All the products of a community in any given 
period are, we now commonly believe, essentially related, although in practice, and in detail, this is not always easy 
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to see. In the study of a period, we may be able to reconstruct, with more or less accuracy, the material life, the 
general social organization, and, to a large extent, the dominant ideas. It is not necessary to discuss here which, if 
any, of these aspects is, in the whole complex, determining; an important institution like the drama will, in all 
probability, take its colour in varying degrees from them all. But while we may, in the study of a past period, 
separate out particular aspects of life, and treat them as if they were self-contained, it is obvious that this is only how 
they may be studied, not how they were experienced. We examine each element as a precipitate, but in the living 
experience of the time every element was in solution, an inseparable part of a complex whole. And it seems to be 
true, from the nature of art, that it is from such a totality that the artist draws; it is in art, primarily, that the effect of 
the totality, the dominant structure of feeling, is expressed and embodied. To relate a work of art to any part of that 
observed totality may, in varying degrees, be useful; but it is a common experience, in analysis, to realize that when 
one has measured the work against the separable parts, there yet remains some element for which there is no 
external counterpart. This element, I believe, is what I have named the structure of feeling of a period, and it is only 
realizable through experience of the work of art itself, as a whole” (21-22). 
 
35 Gordon Hutner, in “Historicizing the Contemporary: A Response to Amy Hungerford” largely agrees, though he 
argues for a return to teaching realism, arguing that students are more likely to read and engage with these texts 
rather than texts suffused with modernist difficulty, and that “Scrutinizing the writing of our day, we might come to 
know the contemporary so well that we even have something to say to the populace—not to mention our students—
about the books of their time instead of leaving it to Oprah, for then we would be producing readers, not just 
consumers” (424).  
 
36 In his review of three monographs—David Castronovo’s Beyond the Grey Flannel Suit: Books from the 1950s 
That Made American Culture (2004), Andrew Hoberek’s The Twilight of the Middle-Class: Post-World War Two 
American Fiction and White-Collar Work (2005), and Leerom Medovoi’s Rebels: Youth and the Cold War Origins 
of Identity (2005)— Steven Belletto examines how each of these texts “invite us to reconsider how the period is 
most profitably conceptualized” and “suggest the richness and complexity of the period” (150-151). Belletto 
identifies how, in the twenty-first century, Cold War studies has moved beyond investigating only the impact that 
domestic and foreign policy had upon American culture. New works like these reveal how the study of the Cold War 
has developed different nuances and cultural registers as time has distanced us from the years of red scares and 
containment policy, while these very anxieties have continued to shape the nation’s culture and politics into our 
present moment. The Cold War has ended, but nostalgia for the Cold War and the period’s logic continues to haunt 
American culture. Narrative at Risk also participates in current scholarship on the Cold War, attempting to further 
the way that accident is understood as shaping and being shaped by anxieties that arose from the conflict while 
demonstrating how texts written after the end of the conflict continue to make meaning in reference to the conflict 
while complicating our understanding of it. 
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Chapter 1 
Chance Characters: The Politics of Accident and Authorial Control 
There are no accidents in politics.  
–Joseph Kennedy, 1960 
I. Acting the Accident 
Ronald Reagan opens Where’s the Rest of Me, his 1965 memoir written to bolster his bid 
for the governorship of California, with a description of what he purports to be his most 
formative moment: his role in the film King’s Row (1941). The moment transpired in one pivotal 
scene in which he performed the consequences of surviving a railroad accident: he must awaken 
in bed horrified at the realization that both of his legs have been amputated.1 Upon this 
recognition the script called for his delivery of the line “Where’s the rest of me?” Reagan writes, 
“it was the portrayal of this moment of total shock which made the scene rough to play. Coming 
from unconsciousness to full realization of what had happened in a few seconds, it presented me 
with the most challenging acting problem in my career” (4). It was in acting this scene that 
Reagan claims he realized that “part of his existence was missing” (3). The missing part, 
according to Brian Massumi, was his role in conservative politics (55). Performing the 
realization of the accident’s consequences shocked Reagan into perceiving a return to the past as 
a viable path to the future. Reagan enacted this nostalgia through engaging in conservative 
politics. While such politics arose from acting out an accident, they disavowed the role accident 
had played in the nation’s past while promising to erase the accident from its future.2 
If, as Enda Duffy has argued in The Speed Handbook, the experience of speed should be 
thought of as political, then the consequences of mechanical accident—losing control at speed or 
of speed—should also be thought of as political (1, 3). While Ronald Reagan’s role as accident 
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victim begins to indicate the importance of reading the accident’s political consequences, this 
chapter extends this initial reading of Reagan’s experience to the ways in which his politics are 
framed in terms of mechanical accidents—automobile crashes and railroad accident—in J. G. 
Ballard’s novel The Atrocity Exhibition (1969) and Crash (1973), David Cronenberg’s 1996 
adaptation of the latter, and Don DeLillo’s White Noise (1985).3 White Noise, set during the 
Reagan administration, explores the liberal subject’s disillusionment with conservative politics in 
its depiction of Jack Gladney’s conflicting desire for personal and governmental protection from 
accident. As a member of the white middle class, Jack believes that disasters only happen to the 
poor and minorities. When he cannot manage risk as an individual he finds himself fantasizing, 
to no avail, for a government that can manage risk for him.  
Such cultural fantasies of Reaganism are based upon historical revisionism. In portraying 
his presidency as the dawn of a new political era, Reagan insisted upon undoing the turmoil of 
the 1960s and 1970s, going so far as to say, in 1980, that the Vietnam War, “was a noble cause. 
A small country newly free from colonial rule sought our help in establishing self-rule and the 
means of self-defense against a totalitarian neighbor bent on conquest” (qtd. in Nadel 197). Alan 
Nadel, in “The Empire Strikes Out” and Flatlining on the Field of Dreams (1997) has 
demonstrated that Reagan’s presidency relied upon American subjects looking up—as they 
would at a movie screen—for external proof of their own and their society’s improvement, 
“based less on logic than on narrative, less on criteria than display” (3). Reagan poached from 
popular culture, especially film, in order to validate “his form of display, and his success accrued 
from embodying narratives that had cultural currency” (3). The texts discussed in this chapter 
show how narrative embodied Reagan, and the historical revisions his presidency relied upon, to 
restore history and reality to the revisionism and fictions that his presidency promoted.  
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Following this engagement with Reagan era novels, their representation of Reagan’s 
body and his administration in the events of mechanical failure, the chapter turns to an 
examination of the continued influence of such politics in more recent texts, particularly Colson 
Whitehead’s The Intuitionist (1999) and Rockstar Games’ Grand Theft Auto: San Andreas 
(2006). In each of these texts, both speed and the accident expose the nuances of a varied politics 
meant to achieve total control over events, especially accidental events. Both The Intuitionist and 
Grand Theft Auto: San Andreas represent a continuation of these politics, providing a transition 
from the Reagan era while interrogating its politics—conservative nostalgia for the past, the 
effects of cuts to social programs, and the role of race.  
In The Reagan Presidency and the Politics of Race (1998) Nicholas Laham writes, “a 
major focus of the Reagan Presidency was to curtail federal enforcement of the landmark civil 
rights laws passed during the 1960s and 1970s” (1). While Laham proceeds to argue that 
Reagan’s policies concerning race were based upon his investment in a “colorblind” America, 
texts such as The Intuitionist and Grand Theft Auto: San Andreas represent moments in 
American history, respectively the 1960s and 1990s, in which conservative politics attempted to 
limit racial equality. From the beginning of his political career Reagan, at best, provided a two-
faced policy on race. For instance, while campaigning for the governorship of California Reagan 
insisted that the Civil Rights act must be enforced, “at gunpoint if necessary”, while “remaining 
opposed to Civil Rights legislation and [arguing] for a voluntary solution to the problem of 
racism” (Dallek 199-200). The Intuitionist, in its representation of race and history investigates 
just such a two-faced approach, while Grand Theft Auto: San Andreas explores the voluntary, 
personal solution that Reagan “argued throughout his career [. . .] [that] government efforts to 
ameliorate racial prejudice were at best inferior to personal efforts to change hearts” (Longley 
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75). In placing the player in the role of a young African American male, Grand Theft Auto: San 
Andreas gives the player a virtual experience of racial discrimination that culminates in the Los 
Angeles riots of 1992. In both of these texts race itself becomes an accident that the player 
experiences through other accidents—the elevator, the car. They emphasize the importance of 
Civil Rights laws and problematize the “personal solution” through distancing the reader/player 
from the text through their self-reflexive meditations on their own mediums. The Intuitionist and 
Grand Theft Auto: San Andreas, while representing speed, insist that there are no fast and easy 
solutions to the problems they depict. 
Of the early days of the automobile, Duffy writes that speed came to comprise “the single 
new pleasure invented by modernity,” and that the experience of speed could “be felt: it did not 
need to represent itself. Still, it could be represented” (3). In other words, one can depict speed in 
writing, film, or digital media, while the accident, by definition, cannot be represented 
intentionally; one can only represent accidents in texts as events that the author controls in order 
to remove any control from the text’s characters. Thus the accident itself always emerges, within 
traditional narrative, as the intention of the author/narrator. While an accident can be captured on 
film—think of the numerous found footage shows that proliferated in the mid-1990s and 
continue airing to this day, many with titles such as, When Buildings Collapse—it is an accident 
only because the subject filming intended to record something else. In approaching 
representations of the accident as the products and assertions of various politics, this chapter 
extends the introduction’s discussion of the consequences of the assassinations and accidents of 
the 1960s to the politics and political ramifications of controlling accidents so as to author the 
politics of the present. These accidents transpire across several decades and various media—
from memoir and novels to film and video games—expressing an anxiety over authority, both 
  62 
political and textual, proliferating throughout American culture. While each of these texts 
express differing politics in regard to the accident, they share the same desire for control over 
that which, by definition, cannot be controlled: the accident. 
Such politics as I’ve begun to demonstrate in the above reading of Reagan’s memoir 
depict historical events and draw upon the history of the 1960s in order to fulfill a desire for 
teleology and conspiracy in their audiences. These texts, like both the film and novel Crash, are 
aware of how they use the past to critique the desires of their audiences through depicting what I 
named, at the end of the introduction, inauthentic authenticity. Inauthentic authenticity is a 
product of the cultural circumstances of postmodernism, late capitalism’s cultural manifestations. 
The inauthentic in the above scene—Reagan, awakening and realizing that he has become an 
amputee—provides authenticity through the haptic. The scene is intended to touch the viewer. 
Watching this, reading that, we know that we are experiencing fiction, yet the images on the 
screen and the words on the page earnestly reach out to us—and, often, we reach back. The 
viewer/reader’s response, the touch back, provides the inauthentic with authenticity. These 
images, these words, are not real, but they could be, and that “could be” opens one to the 
possibility that not only could they be real, they will be real, or were real.  
The haptic in Crash, White Noise, The Intuitionist, and Grand Theft Auto: San Andreas 
shapes what Jameson described in Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism as 
the waning of affect: the loss of historicity and reality, existence in a world without difference 
that instills in one anxieties and desires for such mundane moments to be punctuated with 
extreme experiences, among them this dissertation’s subject: the accident (Jameson 10, 28-29). 
While haptic sensations can begin to explain the desire for inauthentic authenticity, these four 
texts attempt to create authentic historical experience from fictions. They touch the reader in 
  63 
rewriting historical events, whether from the past or from a present moment, attempting to bring 
one into direct contact with the present. In this way they combat the waning of affect through 
providing a reality effect—often written off as postmodern reflexivity or metafiction—by calling 
attention to fictional narrative’s inability to represent actual accident. This reality effect draws 
the reader into a direct engagement with the present and the history that, like so many cars in a 
traffic jam, have blocked one’s road to the future. 
 
II.  Ballard and Reagan: Writing, Acting, and Accident in the late 1960s 
In King’s Row, when Reagan awakens in his bed, legs hidden through stagecraft, and 
enacts the realization of the railroad accident, the viewer is meant to sympathize with this 
horrific experience. “The movie” in the words of a character from DeLillo’s White Noise—
discussing other filmic representations of accidents—“breaks away from complicated human 
passions to show us something elemental, something fiery and loud and head-on” (218). This 
head-on collision with Reagan’s passion—terror at the current state of his body—immediately 
registers a desire for how things were. “Where’s the rest of me?” becomes “I want to live in a 
future where once again I feel whole.” What Reagan portrays, again, in the words of Murray Jay 
Siskind in DeLillo’s Reagan Era novel, is “a conservative wish-fulfillment, a yearning for 
naïveté. We want to be artless again. We want to reverse the flow of experience, of worldliness 
and responsibilities” (218). The consequences of the accident are first expressed as a loss of 
one’s self, one’s control: “Where’s the rest of me?” From this emerges blame, which is placed 
upon the event itself, rather than upon one’s own actions. After Reagan screams his famous line 
he adds, “it was that accident.” This imagined accident, part of a role, a mere act, became the 
moment to which Reagan said he owed the events of the rest of his life. The imagined loss of 
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control instilled a desire to strive for total control—the means of which were not to be found 
upon the screen, but in politics. Control could not be found on the screen because there the 
director, or editor, or studio was always in control. As noted in Reagan’s biographies, his roles as 
President of the Screen Actors Guild and as FBI informant placed him, politically, on the 
periphery of Hollywood politics (Rogin 31). In Parables for the Virtual Brian Massumi theorizes 
how Reagan created an affective event through acting the accident in order to assert control over 
his life:  
Reagan invents a technology of the event that is also a technology of the self. He starts 
from the need to portray a scene culminating in an event that can be taken as exemplary. 
The accident, in the suddenness of its inclusive disjunctive transformation not only of the 
shape of a body but of an entire life, can be seen as a figure of the event in general. The 
generic or exemplary event is short of actual. It need only be acted. But its acting yields a 
reality of its own. (Massumi 56) 
 Massumi, in reading Reagan, has described a cognitive event that, in the words of Douglas 
Hofstadter, “gives rise to the strange loop of selfhood, a trap into which we humans all fall” 
(205). Reagan’s “self-perception inevitably ends up positing an emergent entity that exerts an 
upside down causality on the world, leading to the intense reinforcement of and the final, 
invincible, immutable locking-in of this belief” (Hofstadter 205). Reagan’s imagined mark upon 
the body leaves a mark upon his imagination—an imagined mark that becomes an idea allowing 
him to author and extend himself. In describing the experience of speaking that line, of acting 
that role, as formative to his political career, Reagan uses intertextual references to author 
himself. Effectively, he embodies waning affect, transparent intertextuality through alluding to 
his body in various filmic and political roles. His acting out of the accident allowed him to 
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realize that his future was in conservative politics, so that, in some way, the imagined accident 
opened the reality that made him whole. The promise in his memoir is that a vote for him is a 
vote for completeness, for a return from the California of the 1960s to one of the 1950s. He will 
correct the accidents of history and restore a past devoid of political upheaval. Yet while Reagan 
promises that in voting for him the citizen will ward off the accidents of the future and the past, it 
is in the accident that he found his political identity. 
Reagan finds himself complete only through enacting incompleteness: he must erase and 
rewrite his self through affective experience in order to enact and embody conservative politics. 
Massumi describes this affective authoring of Reagan as a moment of inauthenticity: “the feeling 
of the event washes through him (or that in-between of space and time), a wave or vibration that 
crests in spoken lines. This time the repetition of the lines effectively produces the event. But the 
event, as produced, is different. It has the reality of an acted event, a performance: short of 
actual” (57). Reagan takes the lines that author him, feels them, and through feeling them, 
authors himself. The idea of acting out the accident leads to the idea of a future Reagan, one 
engaged in conservative politics. He forges control out of the accident, “the feeling of the event,” 
and makes it a deliberate moment in which he can author himself and his role as politician 
through rewriting, retelling. This is the “short of actual” become actuality. Writing of this 
experience and how it felt to portray a character missing part of himself, Reagan expresses how 
it felt to realize that he, too, was missing something, that he was incomplete. Massumi continues: 
The “short of actual” is expressed as a prolonging of the intensive in-betweenness of the 
event in the empirical world. It is a subsidence of the emotion, a flattening of the wave as 
it spreads out to fill a wider area. Reagan will now be extensively what he was 
intensively. He will be an ambulant blend of the ordinary everyday and the exemplary 
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event: he will be a walking amputee. His flesh will carry the mark of the artifice that 
jolted him into the event, endowing it with a kind of half-life: he will be a 
semiautomaton. He will find a method that will take this new self, semitechnologized 
through acting, through a similar transformation, after which he will feel it to be 
complete. (Massumi 57)4 
Reagan, like the characters discussed in this chapter, will become a being who feels the affective 
wear and the affective pleasure of conservative politics, of the Cold War as an authoring force. 
As well, like the characters that have suffered accidents, he will celebrate rebirth through 
imagined wounds that leave real scars. When Reagan shouts his line, he looks at the absence of  
 
Figure 1. Ronald Reagan awakens to find his legs amputated in King’s Row. 
 
his legs. In medium close-up the viewer can register the dismay on his face, the pain at realizing 
part of him is missing, but we can also see his arms move, his body respond along with his face 
to this realization (Figure 1). Of course, this is if we read Reagan as the character. If we read this 
merely as Reagan playing Reagan, he looks confused. Both pained and confused, a disoriented 
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Reagan fully realizes who he actually is based upon a confrontation with what he has lost and 
what he has never had—fictional legs, a desire to enter politics outside of Hollywood. 
 While in the above shot we see Reagan’s affective event, this shot and the event it 
captures can also be read, in the words of J. G. Ballard, as “a unique ontology of violence and 
disaster” (The Atrocity Exhibition 168). Although Ballard is not writing of King’s Row or 
Reagan’s memoir, he is writing of Reagan. Composed in 1967, the first year of Reagan’s 
governorship of California, Ballard’s “Why I Want to Fuck Ronald Reagan” provides a 
fictionalized case study of the population’s response to scenarios in which Ronald Reagan 
engages in sex acts and is involved in “the conceptual auto-disaster” (Ballard 165). Collected in 
The Atrocity Exhibition, “Why I Want to Fuck Ronald Reagan” endured an obscenity trial in 
England and ultimately was the reason Doubleday pulped the first American edition of Ballard’s 
montage novel.5 At the 1980 Republican National Convention in Detroit, former Situationists 
from Berkeley, California passed out to delegates a pamphlet version of “Why I Want to Fuck 
Ronald Reagan,” the title of the piece replaced with “Official Republican 1980 Survey.” 
According to Ballard the pamphlet “was accepted for what it resembled, a psychological position 
paper on the candidate’s subliminal appeal, commissioned from some maverick think-tank” 
(Ballard 170). Mixing reality with fiction, Ballard casts Reagan in a pornographic role—the 
fictional piece itself entering the political arena, taken by delegates as a real study. The 
inauthentic becomes authentic when “Why I Want to Fuck Ronald Reagan” is read in such a 
way, just as the fictional event, when acted, can lead to the desire for a “real” politics. One 
knows this desire when it is felt, just as one knows pornography when it is seen. 
“Pornography,” Ballard stated, “is the most political form of fiction, dealing with how we 
use and exploit each other in the most urgent and ruthless ways” (qtd. in Kauffman 167). In 
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casting Reagan in a pornographic role, Ballard theorizes the effect that the political body has 
upon the body politic. Linda Kauffman asserts that, “if Ronald Reagan had not existed, Ballard 
would have invented him. The Great Communicator’s true genius was to empty himself so the 
public could project fantasies onto him. To Ballard, the former Hollywood actor saved his best 
role for last: he played benevolent father to a nation longing for Daddy” (Kauffman 167). 
Reagan’s political body allowed for Americans to project their desire for control onto him, 
gaining in return a sense that history had come under control, naïveté returned to many, 
conservative wishes fulfilled. The body of the screen actor became itself a screen upon which 
American desires and dread could be projected and fulfilled, the past overwritten and overcome. 
For Ballard, Reagan’s body expresses pure politics rather than words: “Verbal material was 
found to have minimal effect, as demonstrated by substitution of an edited tape giving 
diametrically opposed opinions” (Ballard 166).6 While Reagan’s words come to mean little or 
nothing, the opening of “Why I Want to Fuck Ronald Reagan” expresses an American public 
that desires to reconstitute the nation’s political body.  
Ronald Reagan and the conceptual auto-disaster. Numerous studies have been conducted 
upon patients in terminal paresis (G. P. I.), placing Reagan in a series of simulated auto-
crashes, e.g. multiple pile-ups, head-on collisions, motorcade attacks (fantasies of 
Presidential assassinations remained a continuing preoccupation, subjects showing a 
marked polymorphic fixation on wind-shields and rear trunk assemblies). Powerful erotic 
fantasies of an anal-sadistic character surrounded the image of the Presidential contender. 
(Ballard 165) 
Ballard invokes the politics of assassination that governed the 1960s, at once providing scenarios 
of Reagan’s body in car accidents while also describing the American public’s desires as 
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projected upon that body. Placing this study of Reagan into the fictional history of studies of 
other political leaders, Ballard writes, “the continuing tension of buccal sphincters and the 
recessive tongue role tally with earlier studies of facial rigidity (cf., Adolf Hitler, Nixon)” (166). 
When “the edited tape giving diametrically opposed opinions” is played with “parallel films of 
rectal images [. . .] a sharp upsurge in anti-Semitic and concentration camp fantasies” are 
revealed (Ballard 166). According to Ballard, the words have no effect; the fascist body itself 
excites the masses.  
 Reagan’s face, in the above scene, says more than his exclaimed question, “where’s the 
rest of me?” It, in fact, answers his question: mouth agape, eyes gazing at his absent legs, but in 
that absence seeing something, the specter of the future in which he will emerge as a 
reconstituted political body. His body becomes a whole as it emerges from the simulated 
accident. “A walking amputee,” Reagan strides upon the prosthetics of an accident-laden past 
into a totally controlled future—reconstituted from absence, his political body says whatever one 
wants to hear, and in finding the rest of himself, reveals a fantasy of the nation’s future as 
scripted, sanitized, under control. 
 
III.  When an Accident is not an Accident: The Direction of Control in Cronenberg’s 
Crash 
Reagan celebrated his political rebirth in his wounds; so too do the characters of Ballard’s 
Crash (1973). In the following deceleration and declaration we are told that no accident belongs 
solely in the past but awaits as a future crash: “In our wounds we celebrated the re-birth of the 
traffic-slain dead, the deaths and injuries of those we had seen dying by the roadside and the 
imaginary wounds and postures of the millions yet to die” (203). James Ballard, the narrator of 
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Crash, describes the affective impact of touching the scars and engaging in sexual intercourse 
with the scholar and artist of crashes, Vaughan. Reading their scarred bodies as memento mori, 
Vaughn and Ballard celebrate the survival of their accidents—actual and intended, reenacted—
while fantasizing the future accident that will end their lives. The novel itself, as the textual body 
that carries the details of these scars, prepares the reader for the future crash with which it began, 
that of Vaughan’s death. The description above provides the narrative suture that makes the 
novel’s beginning inevitable, formally beyond accident. The future of which it speaks is past for 
the reader. We know that Vaughan has died in his last car crash: at the novel’s beginning he is 
merely one of millions who have died. Yet in the body of the novel, with Ballard inside of 
Vaughan’s car, penetrating Vaughan himself in an act of anal sex, they are one body capable of 
seeing the future of all bodies mangled in the shells of smashed vehicles.7 
Crash (1996), David Cronenberg’s film adaptation, displays, as one would expect, many 
images of car accidents: two head-on collisions, a traffic jam of already-wrecked cars arranged 
on the highways of Toronto, a chase scene as foreplay that culminates in a car flipped on an 
island off an expressway, cars passing the stranded couple in the distance. The film, shot over the 
course of 10 weeks, closed highways, congested traffic, making out of fictional representation 
wholly real results—shooting the traffic jam at the film’s center caused actual traffic jams in 
Toronto. Film, according to Shohini Chaudhuri, depicts crashes better than literature, for it is 
“the movement of movements”; she writes, “in figuring the chance encounter, film has a stark 
hyperreality, to which literature can only gesture” (69). Cronenberg’s film layers the accidental 
and the directed upon one another in extending the doubling that the novel plays with in the 
name of its author and its narrator. Ballard, in both the film and the novel, directs car 
commercials. In the film he acts as a stand-in for both the author Ballard and the director, 
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Cronenberg. However, in the film Vaughan often acts as the lens through which we view the 
fictional world. While we sympathize most with Ballard, Vaughan frames the world of crash 
culture for both him and us. Cronenberg, then, also has a stand-in in Vaughan. This double 
doubling becomes most pertinent in the film’s depiction of a scene of a traffic accident—already 
a set within a set—which reveals that this accident was always and will always be a set. The 
traffic accident’s mise en abyme stems from Cronenberg using and arranging already crashed 
cars on the freeway, an extension of Ballard’s own atrocity exhibition. The viewer’s discovery 
that the film’s set has, in the diegesis, come about due to Vaughan’s accomplice, Seagrave, going 
through with a reenactment of Jayne Mansfield’s fatal car accident without Vaughan’s 
knowledge, furthers the effect of this mise en abyme. As a viewer, one watches a simulation in 
which characters discover that they inhabit a set, an accident that was planned, written. In this 
way, the accident that Vaughan, Ballard, and Ballard’s wife Catherine come upon is no accident, 
but an extension of Vaughan’s direction of accidents. Likewise, there are no accidents in 
Cronenberg’s direction, only intentions. In this way Cronenberg bests both Vaughan and Ballard 
at their own game: controlling the accident. 
Ballard (James Spader), driving Catherine (Deborah Kara Unger) and Vaughan (Elias 
Koteas) in Vaughan’s car, happens upon a highway accident. Immediately Vaughan tells him to 
slow and from nowhere produces a camera that the viewer must accept has, like Cronenberg’s 
camera, always been present, merely invisible. The flash of Vaughan’s camera illuminates a 
smashed station wagon. The subject of the photo that the flash illuminates comes into focus, 
while Vaughan and Ballard are blurred. In the background the lights of rescue workers illuminate 
the wreckage. But these lights also provide lighting for the film set (Figure 2). The key light in 
the image below is the flash of Vaughan’s camera. Cronenberg’s camera, mounted toward the 
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tail of the car peers over Vaughan, just as he leans over Ballard’s shoulder to get the shot. In 
focus for Vaughan is the wreckage, and the same is true for Cronenberg: throughout the scene 
his camera will predominantly focus on the subject of Vaughan’s camera.8  
 Cronenberg’s doubling—Ballard as director of car commercials driving the car, Vaughan 
as director of crashes shooting the accident that he authored—provides a similar reflexive 
authoring of the affective event that Massumi describes as Reagan’s awakening into conservative 
politics. The fantasy that Cronenberg critiques and that both Ballard and Vaughan project—first 
upon the accident, then upon Catherine’s body—is that of total control, a totalitarian politics that 
both feeds into and is produced by Vaughan’s total work of art, which emerges from the 
simulation of a total lack of control: the traffic accident. Both Cronenberg and Vaughan’s 
cameras follow not just Ballard’s Crash, but also his collection of condensed novels, The 
Atrocity Exhibition (1969). Earlier in the film, while riding in his Lincoln Continental, Vaughan 
states his desire to drive “a famous crash car,” Camus’s, or Jayne Mansfield’s, and Ballard asks 
if that is why he drives a car similar to the one in which Kennedy was assassinated. Vaughan 
replies with almost exactly these words from The Atrocity Exhibition: “It is clear that the car 
crash is seen as a fertilizing rather than a destructive experience, a liberation of sexual and 
machine libido, mediating the sexuality of those who have died with an erotic intensity 
impossible in any other form” (Ballard 157). Duffy reads Crash and the sex it depicts as 
allegorical for what he claims is the lack of vocabulary “for the various pleasures of speed” 
(Duffy 257). In the notes to “Crash,” the story from which these words are taken, Ballard writes, 
“the ultimate concept car will move so fast, even at rest, as to be invisible” (Ballard 158). The 
car then, can only be seen in the marks it leaves, the wrecked shapes of other vehicles and bodies 
that comprise the aftermath of its accident. In Duffy’s terms, the traffic jam of Ballard’s novel 
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represents “immense energy contorted into a pause” (Duffy 259). In the film Cronenberg creates 
this pause through doubling the cameras in the scene—his own filming Vaughan’s—and 
 
Figure 2. Shooting the accident in Crash. 
 
reminds the viewer that he watches a movie: the cars stop, but the camera continues rolling. The 
conceptual art of the car accident, the atrocity exhibition that Cronenberg curates and directs 
(Ballard, in the mid-sixties, was curator of a museum show of crashed cars), layers accident with 
intention. The accident cuts through to the substance of reality while remaining invisible. In this 
scene, we do not witness the accident that caused the pileup. Cronenberg has said that audiences 
want to see Crash in the same way that they see accidents (qtd. in Chaudhuri 63). We want to 
watch events overcome and surprise others.9 We want to feel what others feel through seeing. In 
this scene we experience only the aftermath, the fact that each car contains the potential to 
become the car crash.  
 The crash site is the set, the flash of the actor’s camera the key light in some shots; in 
others, the key light is that of the rescue workers, who are also actors (Figure 3). The concept of 
the crash site is one of static layers, of speed at twenty-four frames per second casting the 
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illusion that accident is intention, directed chaos. Vaughan makes the crash site the subject of his 
shots, just as he and the crash site are the subject of Cronenberg’s shots. Vaughan takes Ballard’s  
 
Figure 3. From Crash.  
 
wife’s hand and leads her to a car’s wreckage. He poses her, the light of his camera’s flash 
illuminates her, and Cronenberg uses it as the light that lights his scene. As Kauffman writes, “in 
a world of chance encounters, forensics has become a new form of performance art” (191). 
Vaughan gets a close-up, a head shot, while Cronenberg gets this two-shot, the car door framing 
Catherine’s torso, just as Vaughan’s camera frames her head. While Vaughan’s camera fixes on 
her face, Cronenberg’s is far more interested in the actors’ bodies (Figure 4). The way that 
Vaughan leans forward, and that Catherine, arms crossed, looks stoically at Vaughan, providing 
him with a casual, straight-on stare similar to that of Ballard in early scenes in the film, after he 
suffered his car accident, in which he sits on his and Catherine’s balcony, leg mutilated, staring 
at traffic. Cronenberg creates suspense not just through making one wait for the accident to 
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happen, the collision to occur, but also in promising such accidents, forcing the audience to 
wonder whose desire for the accident will first wane: their own, or that of the film’s characters.  
 
Figure 4. From Crash. 
 
Although Vaughan moves through the crash site like a director, he and the viewer do not 
initially realize that it is his own crash set. Moments earlier in the film, Vaughan showed Ballard 
images of his next project—story boards of a sort, notes for an historical recreation. In an insert 
shot, we see from Ballard’s point of view an image of Jayne Mansfield’s fatal accident, her scalp 
circled in red pen, a note stating: “JM SCALP” (Figure 5). We know that Seagrave (Peter 
MacNeill), the stunt driver and actor in Vaughan’s shows, was to play Jayne Mansfield. The two 
had just accomplished the performance of James Dean’s fatal accident and were moving on to a 
larger production. “I want big tits, so the audience can see them all cut up,” Seagrave tells 
Vaughan. Illuminated in the flash of Vaughan’s camera and from Vaughan’s point of view we 
see Seagrave, throat slit, head almost decapitated in a near perfect imitation of Mansfield’s death, 
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his prosthetic breasts big, though not cut. At this moment in the scene the viewer sees exactly 
what Vaughan sees, and immediately becomes distanced from Vaughan as he realizes that the 
 
Figure 5. Scrutinizing Jayne Mansfield’s fatal accident. 
 
accident he came upon is, for him, no accident; he authored it, Seagrave just started acting before 
he yelled action. The camera pans as we continue to see what Vaughan sees. Cronenberg’s 
camera replaces his eye, and it is the camera’s move that severs Seagrave’s head, removing it 
from the frame. At this moment, we see what Vaughan sees, and what Vaughan sees is what 
Cronenberg sees: an actor’s slit throat, body lying three-quarters prone in shards of glass, a posed 
imitation of Jayne Mansfield, virtually real (Figure 6). We see the Chihuahua, dead in this set 
just as it happened in Mansfield’s fatal accident. The camera continues to pan through the debris, 
deliberately, as Vaughan sees that this accident has gone according to plan. The light of 
Vaughan’s flash leaves the scene tinted blue, the debris in close up, like the photo Ballard held 
earlier. The audience watches from Vaughan’s vantage, one that now replicates the photographer 
of the original Mansfield crash and we see that the wig is a perfect replication of Mansfield’s 
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own wig (not her decapitated head—here the film corrects myth), nearly embedded in the 
windshield.10 
 
Figure 6. Seagrave plays Mansfield. 
 
Cronenberg’s film replicates the accidents that are described in Ballard’s 1973 novel and 
the “condensed novels” that comprise The Atrocity Exhibition. The conspiratorial history of 
planned accidents became real for ten weeks on the highways of Toronto. These planned 
accidents had the same effects upon the city as real accidents. Real men dressed as Jayne 
Mansfield really pretended to be dead in real wreckage. For the two head-on collisions in the 
film, Cronenberg actually crashed two cars, head-on. Cronenberg made the film for his and 
Ballard’s characters, which is to say that Crash, both film and novel, strove to provide 
spectacular authenticity and to provide “imaginary wounds and postures of the millions yet to 
die.” Yet such authenticity, as depicted in Crash, is nonetheless inauthentic. The film relies upon 
the direction of the accidental to shock and dismay its viewers and to titillate its characters. In 
Crash Cronenberg depicts the inability for the human to fuse with machine, while, as in the 
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scene above, he depicts the human through machines, crashing machines, melding together his 
eyes, the eyes of Vaughan, and the viewer’s eyes through the technology of the camera and the 
screen.  
The accident in Crash projects a politics of control that relies upon a confusion of 
accident and intention. Speed may provide a new pleasure and a new politics, but the accident, 
insofar as Crash is concerned, provides a politics that imagines control can never be 
relinquished. Our relationship with technology, the pleasures we take from the camera and the 
car, claims that in order to maintain control, or the illusion of control, one must sympathize more 
with machine than with human. To see the world through a camera that films filming is to 
embrace inauthentic authenticity—to realize the reality of fiction—and leads to seeing authorial 
intention where there is only accident, control where events remains wholly out of one’s control. 
Yet when one sees such self-conscious references, fiction’s spell is broken, and, cast back into 
reality, the viewer sees how such illusions are created and begins to distinguish reality from 
simulation.  
 
IV.  President Reagan’s Subject, or, Jack Gladney Wants to Believe  
  “Where were you when James Dean died?” Alfonse Stompanato asks a table of cultural 
studies professors at the fictional College-on-the-Hill (DeLillo 68). White Noise alters 
Winthrop’s meaning of the “City on the Hill,” and the meaning Kennedy deployed in 1961 and 
that Reagan used in his 1984 acceptance speech for reelection, in order to denote the campus as 
America in miniature, a place where the “professours” speak not for “God’s sake” but in the 
name of spectacle.11 At the College-on-the-Hill all eyes are not on God, but instead rest upon 
popular culture: “the most photographed barn in America,” cereal boxes, car crash films, Elvis, 
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Hitler.12 These objects of study, like Dean’s death and Reagan’s character’s loss of his legs in 
King’s Row, are treated as revelations. Michael Rogin, in Ronald Reagan the Movie (1988), 
writes of Reagan’s continued fascination with King’s Row into his Presidency: “Reagan still 
inhabits King’s Row. He made it the center of his autobiography, he watched it again and again 
with Jane Wyman and their guests, he watches it with Nancy Reagan, and he chose its music as 
the fanfare for his 1980 inauguration” (23). Such fascinations with accident and death provide an 
alternate history of the American century, one in which shared experiences of others’ tragedies 
constitutes the basis upon which one’s authentic national citizenship is based.13  
In Cronenberg’s Crash, the accident is reenacted so as to provide its audience, among 
whom Ballard is a member, with a semblance of authentic experience; a successful simulation of 
Dean’s accident leaves its drivers and passengers only injured, not dead. In White Noise, the 
story of Dean’s death is converted into cultural capital, an experience that anyone of a certain 
generation remembers and can use to authenticate their place in the culture and legitimate their 
role as critics of American culture. Stompanato continues, “The silver Porsche approaches an 
intersection, going like a streak. No time to brake for the Ford Sedan. Glass shatters, metal 
screams. Jimmy Dean sits in the driver’s seat with a broken neck, multiple fractures and 
lacerations. It is five forty-five in the afternoon Pacific Coast Time. Where is Nicholas Grappa, 
the jerk-off king of the Bronx?” (DeLillo 69). Everyone at the table, in playing this game, are 
masturbating to pop-culture porn; they experience not the accident, but recall memories of the 
accident—memories denoted in terms of the haptic, nostalgia that touches and affects speaker 
and listeners. One’s experience of the event does not matter—Stompanato is not interested in 
affect. Rather, one must have experienced hearing about this event, must have been in a specific 
place at five forty-five on the thirtieth of September, 1955, and recall the experience of learning 
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the news of Dean’s death. One must bear witness to bearing witness, and Grappa must tell of this 
accidental experience in order to bear witness to his own existence.  
In Crash, after Vaughan has emerged from the wreckage of the Dean crash reenactment, 
he testifies with similar words and rhythms as those of Stompanato: “Rolf Wütherich was thrown 
from the Porsche and spent a year in the hospital recovering from his injuries. Donald 
Turnupseed was found wandering around in a daze, basically unhurt. James Dean died of a 
broken neck and became immortal.”14 Both White Noise and Crash fixate upon the immortality 
that accidental death provides to celebrities.15 While the film offers a psychopathology of the 
sexualizing of car accidents, White Noise turns the lunchtime reminiscing into a course that, with 
Stompanato’s endorsement, Murray Jay Siskind teaches the following semester (DeLillo 149). 
Sharing one’s experience of learning about Dean’s death, or seeing Dean’s death reenacted, 
touches those who have the same experience of the event.  
 When Jack Gladney asks Siskind how his “car crash seminar is progressing?” Siskind 
says that he has shown numerous combinations of various vehicles colliding with one another. 
He claims that his students find these films prophetic, that “they mark the suicide wish of 
technology. The drive to suicide, the hurtling rush to suicide” (DeLillo 217-218). But Siskind 
offers his students an alternate reading of these accidents: “I tell my students not to look for 
apocalypse in such places. I see these car crashes as part of a long tradition of American 
optimism. They are positive events, full of the old ‘can-do’ spirit. Each car crash is meant to be 
better than the last” (218). Linda Kauffman notes DeLillo’s “enormous debt to Ballard” (160), so 
it is no surprise that like Vaughan, Siskind finds “a benevolent psychopathology” in the car 
crash. Siskind could easily speak these words of Vaughan’s: “the car crash is a fertilizing rather 
than a destructive event,” though his interpretation differs from the conclusion that Vaughan 
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draws, that the car crash is “a liberation of sexual energy that mediates the sexuality of those who 
have died with an intensity impossible in any other form.” While both want each crash to be 
better than the last, Vaughan’s desire drives toward suicide, each accident a little death that 
brings sexual gratification. Siskind tells his students what was quoted earlier in reference to 
Reagan: “it’s not decay they are seeing but innocence. The movie breaks away from complicated 
human passions to show us something elemental, something fiery and loud and head-on. It’s a 
conservative wish-fulfillment, a yearning for naïveté. We want to be artless again. We want to 
reverse the flow of experience, of worldliness and responsibilities” (DeLillo 218). For Siskind 
there is nothing radical about the crash film. The accident’s touch provides an insular experience, 
one that removes the immediacy of the world.  
Reading, as Siskind would, Vaughan’s “project” of living a psychopathology that finds 
pleasure in the accident reveals a desire for conservatism, a sadistic yearning for control, for 
dominance only in theory. If we “look past the violence,” as Siskind says to Jack, then we see “a 
wonderful brimming spirit of innocence and fun” (219). Jack has been stripped of such 
innocence and fun due to his experience of the airborne toxic event, itself the result of a railway 
accident. Reagan, remember, found his calling in politics, he claimed, only after playing the role 
of a victim of a railway accident, and a railway accident is an old fashioned kind of accident: it 
instills and begins to fulfill nostalgia. The experience of a real accident, rather than the 
representation of one, is more complicated than Siskind’s or his students’ theories. The airborne 
toxic event, via the auspices of government agencies, is recast not as actual accident, but as 
practice for an accident, a promise of control—the inauthentic veiling the horror of the authentic, 
the accident penetrating the body, and the government covering horror with irony and 
bureaucracy.16  
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 The airborne toxic event reminds DeLillo’s characters of traumatic political events, and 
furthermore, it shows how the novel marks some of its idiosyncratic facts through assigning 
them dates that correspond with other traumas. The railway accident that unleashes a toxic cloud 
of Nyodene D leads to a series of evacuations, the final of which is described in terms of the fall 
of Saigon, which transpired on April 30, 1975: “It was like the fall of a colonial capital to 
dedicated rebels. A great surging drama with elements of humiliation and guilt” (157). The novel 
emphasizes the lingering trauma of the 1960s through such allusions and direct references. For 
example, Jack Gladney “invented Hitler studies in North America in March of 1968,” a month in 
which nerve gas leaked from the U.S. Army Dugway Proving Ground near Skull Valley, Utah, 
and in which the My Lai Massacre occurred. “A history within history,” is one way that Siskind 
describes Hitler Studies, and White Noise provides a similar logic to the novel’s depiction of the 
historical (12). In this way the novel insists on what, in Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of 
Late Capitalism, Jameson called “a crisis in historicity” (22). DeLillo, unlike Doctorow in 
Jameson’s reading, insists upon writing the past into the present and thus historicizing the 
present. For Jameson, Doctorow is “the epic poet of the disappearance of the radical American 
past, of the suppression of older traditions and moments of the American radical tradition: no one 
with left sympathies can read these splendid novels without a poignant distress which is an 
authentic way of confronting our own current political dilemmas in the present” (23). The 
novel’s ability to cause a reader to affectively register poignant distress in no way allows for the 
reader to confront “current political dilemmas.” DeLillo, in the character of Jack Gladney, 
provides the reader with a depiction of the 1960s as a history of fascism, the decade in which 
neoconservative backlash spawned the novel’s present.  
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White Noise confronts the traumas of the 1960s and the left’s demise in portraying it as a 
period that can be read as the crystallization of American conservatism. Events from the 1960s 
proliferate and intersect with events of the 1980s, from the My Lai Massacre occurring in the 
same month that Jack invented Hitler Studies—which was pitched to a chancellor who, a 
foreboding figure, to say the least, “went on to serve as adviser to Nixon, Ford, and Carter before 
his death on a ski lift in Austria” (4)—to Siskind’s remedy for the overwhelming fear of death 
that Jack develops after his encounter with the airborne toxic event: “what you have to do is 
survive an assassination attempt. That would be an instant tonic. You would feel specially 
favored, you would grow in charisma” (286). It worked for Reagan, so why not for Jack? 
DeLillo, instead of providing an affective solution to political problems, portrays the present as 
containing the past within it. This history in a history denies authentic feeling as a political 
solution because accidental associations of one’s sense of history combine with words on a page 
to inspire these “authentic” feelings. These feelings are the same as those that Siskind identifies 
in the crash films he teaches: “a conservative wish-fulfillment, a yearning for naïveté. We want 
to be artless again. We want to reverse the flow of experience, of worldliness and 
responsibilities” (218). Even disillusioned with the myths of the Reagan era, Jack continues to 
yearn for these myths to become reality. He wants to believe in the state’s fiction, despite having 
experienced its failure to control accident. In White Noise’s depiction of life under President 
Reagan, everything takes on valences of affect; history becomes a kaleidoscopic reflection of a 
present completely out of one’s control.17  
In its portrayal of the accident, White Noise depicts characters that wish to control the 
accidental so as to not only exert authority over the past, but also to write their future. While 
Gladney asserts throughout the novel various iterations of the sentiment “all plots tend to move 
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deathward,” it is his first and fourth wife, Dana Breedlove, who “liked to plot” (DeLillo 26, 46). 
A CIA operative—each of his ex-wives was or is involved in the intelligence community, each a 
specter of the federal government’s extension into one’s everyday life—Breedlove “reviewed 
fiction for the CIA, mainly long serious novels with coded structures” (DeLillo 213). Yet reading 
these novels in an attempt to decipher “the code” and find, presumably, the political messages 
embedded in their structures, leads only to more reading, more decoding: “the people who sent 
[Dana] books to review wouldn’t leave her alone. Dana was getting big thick novels every day, 
writing reviews which she microfilmed and sent to a secret archive. She complained of jangled 
nerves, periods of deep spiritual fatigue. She told Steffie she was thinking of coming in from the 
cold” (275). The CIA’s reliance upon New Critical close reading is well documented, and here 
we see that the intentional fallacy has worn down Dana Breedlove.18 To find the political 
message in long complex novels is impossible—if one message was there it would not take 
rigorous decoding.19  
Such counterintuitive counterintelligence work proliferates in the lives of Gladney’s ex-
wives. Janet Savory, a parody of Joan Didion, tells Jack of the work of her current husband, 
Malcolm Hunt, who, when “he goes into deep cover, it’s as though he never existed. He 
disappears not only here and now but retroactively. No trace of the man remains. I sometimes 
wonder if the man I’m married to is in fact Malcolm Hunt or a completely different person who 
is himself operating under deep cover. [. . .] I don’t know which half of Malcolm’s life is real, 
which half is intelligence” (88-89). While Breedlove reads for plots, Malcolm actually plots, and 
when he does so, his existence disappears, like the Cigarette Smoking Man of the X-Files, which 
I discuss in the fourth chapter. He effectively becomes unreadable. Savory informs Jack that 
Malcolm is currently “working in deep cover, sponsoring a Communist revival” in Indonesia: 
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“It’s part of an elegant scheme designed to topple Castro” (86).20 The CIA plot in which 
Malcolm is involved is as convoluted as that of any long novel that Breedlove would attempt to 
decipher; which is to say that her attempt to read for authentic political plots in works of 
literature may only amount to acts of paranoid reading that result in the waning of affect.  
If the waning of affect is “perhaps best initially approached by way of the human figure,” 
then Malcolm Hunt’s existence as a body that can be wholly erased in the present and the past 
suggests an inability to possess any form of authentic self or sense of history (Jameson 61). In 
Malcolm Hunt “depth is replaced by surface, or by multiple surfaces (what is called 
Intertextuality in that sense no longer a matter of depth)” (Jameson 12), which is exactly what 
DeLillo participates in with his allusions to Didion’s characters in A Book of Common Prayer 
(1977), and possibly Democracy (1984). The authentic subject, in the case of both Malcolm Hunt 
and Dana Breedlove, is replaced with an inauthentic character that the government authors. 
Breedlove reads the plots, and Hunt is erased so that he may enact the convoluted plots that 
Breedlove may be reading for.  
After experiencing the airborne toxic event and being exposed to Nyodene D, Jack 
Gladney also embodies an affected subject who is a “blend of the ordinary everyday and the 
exemplary event,” effectively, “a walking amputee” whose body carries the traces of poison 
from the accident. However, the poison itself and the accident that lead to such contamination is 
the result of Jack’s interaction not with the experience of the accident, but the evacuation that 
follows, and, in its wake, the proceeding computerized bureaucracy. Jack’s experience of the 
airborne toxic event is not a mere encounter with an accident, but an experience of an accident as 
a subject of the Reagan administration. 
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 Jack Gladney, gazing through binoculars, sees the scene of the railroad accident as a film 
set similar to the highway accident scene in Crash: “I put the glasses to my face and peered 
through the gathering dark. Beneath the cloud of vaporized chemicals, the scene was one of 
urgency and operatic chaos. Floodlights swept across the switching yard. Army helicopters 
hovered at various points, shining additional lights down on the scene. Colored lights from police 
cruisers crisscrossed these wider beams” (115).21 The army helicopter, agent of the federal 
government, lights the accident from above. The federal government literally hovers over this 
scene, distantly lighting the disaster but never intervening for the benefit of the victims. The 
conservative government thus watches the disaster from above, calling attention to it, but 
providing no relief. Before looking through the binoculars at the scene of the accident Jack heard 
distant air-raid sirens (113), and shortly after seeing the above scene “air-raid sirens sounded 
again, this time so close to us that we were negatively affected, shaken to the point of avoiding 
each other’s eyes as a way of denying that something unusual was going on” (118). The air-raid 
sirens, which “hadn’t been tested in a decade or more,” now sound not as warning against 
thermonuclear war, but as a warning against the result of the railroad accident: the airborne toxic 
event (118).22 Gladney and his family’s evacuation appears to them like a film they are watching 
rather than an actual event they are experiencing. As a traffic accident slows their escape, Jack 
explains, “a helicopter sat just above us, shining a white beam down on the mass of collapsed 
metal” (122). The evacuation becomes spectacle, the airborne toxic event the main attraction:  
The whole thing was amazing. They seemed to be spotlighting the cloud for us as if it 
were part of a sound-and-light show, a bit of mood-setting mist drifting across a high 
battlement where a king had been slain. But this was not history we were witnessing. It 
was some secret festering thing, some dreamed emotion that accompanies the dreamer 
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out of sleep. Flares came swooning from the helicopters, creamy bursts of red and white 
light. Drivers sounded their horns and children crowded all the windows, faces tilted, 
pink hands pressed against the glass. (128). 
The airborne toxic event takes on the image of a fourth of July fireworks display, not an 
historical event, but a commemoration of history. The army helicopter, representative of the 
federal government, continues to light this display, which rather than appearing deadly, amazes 
Jack and all who attempt to flee from it. With the intervention of the federal government, the 
deathly real takes the shape of a film. The actor President, Ronald Reagan, governs through 
spectacle, through making everything take on the innocence of an act. “There never was a 
politician less interested in the past,” writes Edmund Morris in Dutch (1999), and this facet of 
life under Reagan appears in the above passage (394). The federal government intervenes in 
order to cast disaster in a patriotic glow. In not recognizing history, Jack and the other evacuees 
believe in fiction. Yet Jack’s experience of the airborne toxic event is just the beginning of the 
show. 
 Upon reaching shelter, Jack approaches a government official to report his exposure to 
Nyodene-D. The government official works for SIMUVAC, which he informs Jack is “short for 
simulated evacuation. A new state program they’re still battling over funds for” (DeLillo 139). 
SIMUVAC, a product of Reagan’s deregulation—hence its battling for funds—deals with 
disasters through acting them out. While Jack is astonished that SIMUVAC “saw a chance to use 
the real event in order to rehearse the simulation,” in the aftermath of the airborne toxic event, 
private industry, in a perfect instance of Reaganism, begins to replace government, though not 
SIMUVAC’s philosophy (139). The “private consulting firm” Advanced Disaster Management 
continues the rehearsal of accidents because “the more we rehearse disaster, the safer we’ll be 
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from the real thing,” and as Jack learns from his son Heinrich, who, along with his daughter 
Steffie, rehearse the disaster, “the more you practice something, the less likely it is to happen” 
(205, 207). The retreat of government and the continued creation of staged spectacles meant to 
prevent disaster are marked with the signature of Reagan, of whose 1966 election to the office of 
governor, Sean Wilentz writes: “when asked after the election what he would do, he replied with 
a quip that was both amusing and revelatory: ‘I don’t know. I’ve never played a governor’” 
(133). What better way to survive an accident than to play its victim? In the wake of the airborne 
toxic event the government, and eventually its citizens, become products of corporate America. 
Molded in the image of the actor-President, these citizen actors are devoted to magical thinking. 
They author and rehearse accidents in total denial and ignorance of the fact that an accident, by 
definition, is that which transpires despite one’s intentions. Yet acting the accident provides them 
with a sense of control over the accidents of their past and the illusion of immunity to those of 
their future.  
Ronald Reagan is mentioned by name only once in the entirety of White Noise. While 
Babette reads supermarket tabloids to a crowd of evacuees during the airborne toxic event she 
recites, among many, this passage: “From beyond the grave, dead living legend John Wayne will 
communicate telepathically with President Reagan to help frame U.S. foreign policy. Mellowed 
by death, the strapping actor will advocate a hopeful policy of peace and love” (146). While the 
first sentence states the impossible fiction “dead living legend,” the syntax of the last sentence 
blurs which actor is being discussed. While Wayne is literally dead, the sentence suggest also 
that death from various conflicts and disasters will “mellow” Reagan. John Wayne, the staunch 
Cold Warrior whose star power allowed him to remain active in both Hollywood and 
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conservative politics, played the role of cowboy on the screen that Reagan could play only in 
politics—his own Hollywood acting career long dead.  
When Wayne died in 1979, Reagan wrote a “biography” of him for the October issue of 
Reader’s Digest. Reagan concluded with these sentences: “Duke Wayne symbolized just this, the 
force of the American will to do what is right in the world. He could have left no greater legacy” 
(115). The tabloid in White Noise creates an instance in which Wayne communicates with 
Reagan telepathically—but Wayne does more: he tells Reagan how to act through his 
performance on the screen. Stagecraft translates to statecraft. “We’d become part of the public 
stuff of media disaster. The small audience of the old and blind recognized the predictions of the 
psychics as events so near to happening that they had to be shaped in advance to our needs and 
wishes. Out of some persistent sense of large-scale ruin, we kept inventing hope” (DeLillo 146-
147). Reality as film, life as an act, the accident as a script one only need follow in order to 
survive: conservative teleological fantasy. While Reagan asked, following a railroad accident, 
“where is the rest of me?” Jack Gladney, also following a railroad accident, wonders if reality 
will ever again feel authentic, or if life will continue to pass before him, each event registered as 
a projection upon a screen, a thin film always separating experience from reality, affect from 
history. 
The novel bears affection for a Reagan-era view of the 1950s in sending up Gladney’s 
desire for belief. Towards the novel’s end, after he has shot Mink—the man with whom his wife 
had an affair—Gladney takes Mink to a clinic run by nuns. While being treated, Gladney sees, 
hanging upon the wall, “a picture of Jack Kennedy holding hands with Pope John XXIII in 
heaven. Heaven was a partly cloudy place” (316). An image of an older order, Kennedy holding 
hands with the pope corresponds to John Wayne speaking to Reagan. Both Wayne and Pope 
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John XXIII died of stomach cancer, Pope John XXIII succumbing five months before Kennedy 
was assassinated. Reagan, of course, survived an assassination attempt. Like the army helicopter 
earlier, representation of governmental (and religious authority) hover above the scene, there 
only to be seen, not to intervene. Other than being the catalyst that leads the reader on a 
conspiratorial, paranoid reading of the scene, this image critiques just such reading, just such 
tabloid thinking. The tragedies of the 1960s can only be understood through careful historical 
analysis, not through conspiracy theory. Such coincidences easily lead to magical thinking, 
provoke a belief in the unseen, a faith in an overarching plan behind which lurks a talented 
author.  
These nuns, however, do not believe in Catholicism or any kind of theology. After 
Gladney discovers that that they play a role—are actors—because “the nonbelievers need 
believers”, he asks: “Why are you a nun anyway? Why do you have that picture on the wall?” 
the nun responds that they do this for others, not them:  
All the others. The others who spend their lives believing that we still believe. It is our 
task in the world to believe things no one else takes seriously. To abandon such beliefs 
completely, the human race would die. This is why we are here. A tiny minority. To 
embody old things, old beliefs. The devil, the angels, heaven, hell. If we did not pretend 
to believe these things, the world would collapse. (318) 
The nuns, agents of actor Pope John Paul II, feign belief so as to make others’ non-belief 
possible, and Gladney finds this unbelievable (DeLillo 319).23 The picture of Kennedy and Pope 
John XXIII hangs on the wall so that others can read the nuns as believing that accidents of 
history occur for a reason, that a great plan exists, that the past holds meaning and that the future 
contains the potential of narrative closure, revelation, meaning made from the meaningless.24 
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What Gladney discovers, however, is that the picture hangs on the wall as the symptom of the 
waning of affect, the disavowal of history, the belief in meaninglessness in the face of the 
accident. The politics of control derived from the accident here comes close to nihilism—appear 
to believe so that others need not believe; believe in nothing so history does not hurt, does not 
even register; believe that others need the illusion of your belief so that the future will appear as 
if it is something that just simply happens. Nevertheless, they believe that others need to believe, 
and Gladney’s horror at their lack of belief reveals that, at least in this case, they are absolutely 
right.  
 
V.  Accidents in the Dark: Setting The Intuitionist  
Like Jack Gladney, Lila Mae Watson, the protagonist of Colson Whitehead’s The 
Intuitionist, sees conspiracy where there is only accident. Her desire to reside at the center of a 
conspiracy compensates for her lack of control: Lila Mae is the first African American female 
elevator inspector, and an elevator accident will allow her to better understand history, rather 
than alienate her from it. Yet unlike Gladney or the characters of Crash, Lila Mae will author 
control from accident; she does not want to believe, she wants to create. 
Early in The Intuitionist, the mayor of the large northern city in which the novel is set—
New York City in all but name—addresses the press regarding an elevator accident that took 
place at the Fanny Briggs building.25 A reporter asks, “Do you think that a party or parties 
resistant to colored progress may be responsible?” and, before the mayor can answer, we are told 
that “Everyone thinks, as they must, of last summer’s riots, of how strange it was to live in a 
metropolis such as this (magnificent elevated trains, five daily newspapers, two baseball 
stadiums) and yet be too afraid to leave the house. How quickly things can fall into medieval 
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disorder” (23). The race riots referred to are those of 1964, which raged in cities such as 
Rochester, New York City, Philadelphia, Jersey City, Paterson, Elizabeth, and Chicago from July 
to August. The last race riots that took place in New York City prior to 1964 were those of 1943, 
a decade too early for the setting of this novel since both the film Guys and Dolls (1955) and the 
music of Buddy Holly (who died in 1959) are referenced (150, 145).26 As well, towards the end 
of the novel Lila Mae Watson notices, hanging on a wall, “a head shot of the famous reverend. 
The man so loud down south” (Whitehead 248). Martin Luther King Jr. goes unnamed, the 
headshot hanging on the wall a stark reminder of the assassin’s bullet that will kill him early in 
April 1968.  
 The Intuitionist obfuscates its chronological setting in order to emphasize the ways in 
which African American history and other struggles for equality are covered up, ignored, or 
forgotten but nevertheless shape our present. While the writings of Ballard and DeLillo, and 
Cronenberg’s film Crash, attempted to historicize their present through depicting it, The 
Intuitionist shows how the past must always be unearthed—especially in the face of historical 
revisions such as those constructed during Reagan’s presidency. History veiled nevertheless 
touches us. The novel depicts such events’ absence in the historical record: inside of the Fanny 
Briggs building, where the elevator accident transpired—an elevator that Lila Mae was the last to 
inspect—we see the interior of the building, everything in its place except, “the mural, however, 
[which] was not complete:”   
It started out jauntily enough to Lila Mae’s left. Cheerless Indians holding up a deerskin 
in front of a fire. The original tenants, sure. A galleon negotiating the tricky channels 
around the island. Two beaming Indians trading beads to a gang of white men—the 
infamous sale of the Island. Big moment, have to include that, the first of many dubious 
  93 
transactions in the city’s history. [. . .] The mural jumped to the Revolution then, she 
noticed, skipped over a lot of stuff. The painter seemed to be making it up as he went 
along, like the men who shaped the city. The Revolution scene was a nice setpiece—the 
colonist pulling down the statue of King George III. They melted it down for 
ammunition, if she remembers correctly. It’s always nice when a good mob comes 
together. The painting ended there. [. . .] Judging from the amount of wall space that 
remained to Lila Mae’s right, the mural would have to get even more brief in its chronicle 
of the city’s greatest hits. Either the painter had misjudged how much space he had or the 
intervening years weren’t that compelling to him. Just the broad strokes, please. (47-48) 
Among the ironies of this scene is the fact that this unfinished mural resides in the lobby of the 
Fanny Briggs building, which is named for “a slave who taught herself how to read” (12). 
Watson can see, painted on the wall, the exclusion of other struggles for rights (women’s rights, 
African American rights, etc.) in the mural. The mural excludes such history in order to deflect 
from events of the present. It shows founding struggles, condensing history until the recent past 
and present are invisible—in the mural, literally unfinished. In fact, the building itself is meant to 
serve the same suppressive purpose. Earlier, we are told how this building came to be named 
after Fanny Briggs. The mayor—yes, that same mayor—named the building for Briggs due to 
“an increasingly vocal colored population—who are not above staging tiresome demonstrations 
[. . .] or throwing tomatoes” (12). The mayor did this because he “is shrewd and understands that 
this city is not a Southern city, it is not an old money city or a new money city but the most 
famous city in the world, and the rules are different here. The new municipal building has been 
named the Fanny Briggs Memorial Building, and there have been fewer complaints, and fewer 
tomatoes” (12). The building was not named as a remembrance of the historical figure Fanny 
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Briggs, but as a means to appease the city’s present African American population—in order to 
keep them from acting upon the injustices of both their past and their present. The mural does not 
so much overwrite African American history as it simply excludes it. Lila Mae’s reading of the 
mural, within the building named for a slave who taught herself how to read, performs a method 
of interpretation that, when applied to Whitehead’s novel, leads to an understanding of its 
historical palimpsests. However, this form of reading only begins at the incomplete mural; it 
ends deeper in the Fanny Briggs building, in elevator Number Eleven (65). 
 The Intuitionist takes as its subject the suppression of history, and, form matching 
content, its narrative limits direct reference to the time and place in which it is set. The secrets of 
the past, in this novel, are reached only by accident. Like White Noise, and the Reagan era 
politics it depicts, the past becomes a refuge that covers up the problems of the present. The 
mural, like the building that houses it, whitewashes the past in order to appease political 
discontent in the present. Lila Mae Watson would not reflect on the mural, the Fanny Briggs 
Building, or discover the secret of James Fulton were it not for the elevator’s crash. Yet another 
nuance—the form the novel takes—depicts history as that which one must always be 
scrutinizing, studying, detecting. In its limiting information for the reader, The Intuitionist 
appropriately assumes characteristics of the genre of hardboiled detective fiction. The 
Intuitionist, like the detective story, as Sean McCann writes “articulates a tension basic to the 
classical liberal vision of society. It depicts a world in which the freedom of the individual 
creates an anarchic or a soulless society” (8). Lila Mae’s choice to act in the face of conspiracy 
leads her to be seen as an anarchic presence among Elevator Inspectors and leads her to discover 
many horrors of her historical moment. Setting the opening of Raymond Chandler’s story “Red 
Wind” (1938) alongside that of The Intuitionist draws out these texts’ shared features: 
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There was a desert wind blowing that night. It was one of those hot, dry Santa Anas that 
come down through the mountain passes and curl your hair and make your nerves jump 
and your skin itch. On nights like that every booze party ends in a fight. Meek little wives 
feel the edge of the carving knife and study their husbands’ necks. Anything can happen. 
You can even get a full glass of beer at a cocktail lounge. (368) 
Now the sentences that open The Intuitionist:  
It’s a new elevator, freshly pressed to the rails, and it’s not built to fall this fast. 
*** 
She doesn’t know what to do with her eyes. The front door of the building is too scarred 
and gouged to look at, and the street behind her is improbably empty, as if the city had 
been evacuated and she’s the only one who didn’t hear about it. There is always the game 
at moments like this to distract her. She opens her leather filed binder and props it on her 
chest. The game gets harder the further back she goes. (Whitehead 1) 
The rhythm, the deliberate denial of causation—why do the Santa Ana winds lead to violence, 
what does the falling elevator have to do with this woman?—obscures the relationship between 
the narrative’s withholding of information and its depiction of contingency. Both open with the 
statement of an event—the desert wind blowing, the elevator falling—followed by a description 
of actions that are only implicitly connected to the first event. A short declarative sentence is 
followed by a longer sentence that complicates the setting, providing information that informs 
one of little. The tone and mood are quite similar. The Intuitionist evokes the style of hard boiled 
detective fiction in order to translate to the page the “cynicism, pessimism, and darkness” of film 
noir which itself emerged, in large part, from adaptations of American hard boiled detective 
fiction (Schrader 53). The opening can also be read as a literary depiction of parallel editing, the 
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asterisks signifying a parallel edit, showing the reader that the elevator falls as Lila Mae stands at 
the building’s front door. The Intuitionist borrows from the genre of hardboiled detective fiction 
so as to adapt film noir to the page. Noir, according to Paul Schrader, “is not a genre. It is not 
defined, as are the western and gangster genres, by conventions of setting and conflict, but by the 
more subtle qualities of tone and mood” (53). Lila Mae fits the type of noir protagonist as 
adapted from hardboiled detective fiction, which Schrader describes as possessing the “‘tough,’ 
cynical way of acting and thinking which separated one from the world of everyday emotions—
romanticism with a protective shell [. . .] [these] protagonists lived out a narcissistic, defeatist 
code” (56). Moreover, the folding of form into content—the content of the form—comes to the 
fore with a reading of The Intuitionist as a literary adaptation of film noir in its use of setting: “A 
complex chronological order is frequently used to reinforce the feelings of hopelessness and lost 
time. [. . .] a convoluted time sequence [immerses] the viewer in a time-disoriented but highly 
stylized world. The manipulation of time, whether slight or complex, is often used to reinforce a 
noir principle: the how is always more important than the what” (Schrader 58). The how, 
intuition, a hunch, often leads the hardboiled detective to the what, the who of the who-dunnit.  
 In this way, The Intuitionist provides simulation as a means of understanding one’s 
historical situation. Lila Mae Watson resembles a character from film noir once she perceives a 
mystery, a conspiracy, for which she must discover the solution. As Robert Pippin writes of 
characters in noir, Lila Mae knows that “what [she] is undertaking is profoundly ill-advised, and 
[she] can admit to [herself] and others that there are no good reasons to do what [she is] doing 
and many very good reasons not to act as [she] propose[s]” (15). Believing that the Empiricist 
camp of the Elevator Inspectors Guild has sabotaged the elevator in order to defame both her and 
the Intuitionists—both camps are embroiled in a race for the presidency of the Guild—Lila Mae 
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believes that she lives at the center of a conspiracy that only she can solve. Like Oedipa Maas, 
Lila Mae believes that she lives “a form of life shadowed, as a matter of historical fact, by a 
growing, shared, heightened sense of fatalism and alienation” (Pippin 12). That a character must 
act despite believing that they lack agency, that there are greater forces conspiring against them, 
authoring their lives, Pippin claims, “is the most interesting aspect of noirs” (12). Lila Mae 
chooses to act, despite the historical moment—and more specifically American culture—placing 
restriction upon both her race and gender. She sees her task as hopeless, but nevertheless acts to 
unveil the conspiracy. 
  Yet there is no conspiracy, only a “catastrophic accident” (Whitehead 227). The 
catastrophic accident reveals more about those who are or would be affected by it than it does 
about the nature of the world. In The Intuitionist the catastrophic accident always reveals the 
substance of the characters that confront it with both narcissism and cynicism. First deployed as 
a description of the elevator accident that opens the novel, the catastrophic accident provides the 
reader with insight into Watson’s character. Throughout the novel Lila Mae has tried to prove 
that the elevator accident was not an oversight of her intuition, a failure on her part as elevator 
inspector, but an act of sabotage. Within the Fanny Briggs building, Lila Mae reads the elevator 
from within the shaft, beyond the mural with its incomplete history. Thus, beneath the surface of 
history, Lila Mae experiences the darkness of the shaft, a darkness that evokes film noir and its 
fatalism. She has made the mistake of imagining conspiracy when actually there is only the 
darkness of accident. This act of intuitionist reading manifests as darkness that veils the shapes 
and colors that we first see as manifestations of Lila Mae’s trade (6).  
Lila Mae reaches out into the darkness and presses the glass convexity of a button. [. . .] 
This is the wrong darkness. It is the darkness of this day and this time and this elevator 
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and Lila Mae needs that further-back darkness, the one she encountered on her first visit 
to Fanny Briggs. [. . .] She’s, she’s almost at that darkness now. It is a slow curtain 
dropping before this day’s darkness. (226) 
Beyond this darkness Lila Mae reads the colors: 
There. This new darkness is the old darkness of Number Eleven. She watches the sure 
and untroubled ascent of Number Eleven. The genies appear on cue, dragging themselves 
from the wings. The genie of velocity, the genie of the hoisting motor’s brute exertions, 
the red cone genie of the selector as it ticks off the entity’s progress through the shaft, the 
amber nonagon genie of the grip shoes as they skip frictionless up T-rails. All of them 
energetic and fastidious, describing seamless verticality to Lila Mae in her own mind’s 
tongue. (226) 
In the darkness of Fanny Briggs, named for a blind slave who taught herself how to read, beyond 
the incomplete history of the city, Lila Mae, blind, sees the colored shapes of her intuition, but 
ultimately sees “nothing” (227). She does not see the cause of the accident. Yet when she reads 
that which cannot be seen, she is touched. The accident reaches out, she feels the elevator move, 
she begins her inspection with the touch of a button, and everything she experiences feels 
wrong—even though the elevator operates correctly. In trying to feel the accident, its cause, she 
feels everything working correctly. She realizes that “this was a catastrophic accident [. . .] the 
things that emerge from the black, nether reaches of space and collide here, comets that connect 
with this frail world after countless unavailing ellipses. Emissaries from the unknowable. [. . .] 
What her discipline and Empiricism have in common: they cannot account for the catastrophic 
accident” (227). Lila Mae Watson discovers that the catastrophic accident has no meaning. The 
catastrophic accident constitutes the “what” of the novel, but its meaning remains elusive, 
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covered in the darkness of an elevator shaft and in the darkness that marks one as African 
American. 
 James Fulton, author of Theoretical Elevators, the founder of Intuitionism, embodies the 
darkness of the catastrophic accident. Lila Mae, having discovered that James Fulton passed for 
white from a very young age throughout his entire adult life, realizes that “He was the perfect liar 
the world made him, mouthing a supreme fiction the world accepted as truth. [. . .] In constant 
fear of the shadow, the shadow of the catastrophic accident that would reveal him for what he 
was. The shadow that envelopes [sic] and makes him dark” (232). Lila Mae reads his fear of 
being discovered as African American as a fear of the catastrophic accident. She interprets the 
consequences of Fulton’s sister visiting him after many years apart as the moment of recognition: 
“He sits in the chair Lila Mae sat in, hands kneading the armrests. It is the moment he has feared 
since he left his town. When he will be revealed for who he is, the catastrophic accident. But his 
sister does not expose him. She did not make him crash. He was saved” (237). Passive, we do not 
know what saved James Fulton other than the fact that the catastrophic accident never happened: 
no one ever discovered his race. The secret identity of James Fulton shapes the form of The 
Intuitionist, justifies and catalyzes the secret history that the novel’s narrative withholds, and 
justifies its adaptation of film noir to the page. What Fulton is—an African American passing for 
white—causes us to comprehend his invention of Intuitionism: the realization that what is veiled 
in darkness can be seen, but such a glimpse happens only by accident—not through sight, but 
through touch, the authentic experience of history that can only be understood by living a fiction. 
The revelation of his substance as being African American could only be inscribed with the 
catastrophic meaning of those carrying the worst prejudices of the time.  
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 Using her intuition within the darkness of an elevator shaft, behind a wall covered in an 
abbreviated history, within a building named for a slave who taught herself how to read, Lila 
Mae Watson reads for the cause of an accident, and in doing so reads nothing; yet in this nothing 
she sees that James Fulton invented Intuitionism as a joke no one but her has understood: “A 
joke has no purpose if you cannot share it with anyone. [. . .] Intuitionism is communication. 
That simple. Communication with what is not-you” (241). There is nothing more serious than a 
joke. Lila Mae, at the end of the punch line, sees history as others see it, life as those who wish to 
view the world empirically, for what they can see, and those who see a world beyond this one, 
intuit it, write it, and make it come to be: a catastrophic accident, existing for itself, a joke no one 
gets.  
 “How quickly things can fall into medieval disorder” we are told earlier in the novel (23). 
As the novel ends, Lila Mae prepares to thrust the profession of elevator inspection further into 
medieval disorder. She will write the third volume of Theoretical Elevators, assuming Fulton’s 
name. She will provide an apocryphal manuscript, a forgery that she believes will become 
doctrine. Most importantly, she will be mistaken for Fulton, just as St. Roland the Carpenter, the 
patron saint of elevator inspectors was mistaken: “The peasants had mistaken his procession for 
that of another holy man who had died the very same night” (197). Like the nuns in White Noise, 
Lila Mae, knowing the truth, believes that others need to believe. She will write the future, and in 
doing so overwrite the catastrophic accident. She will pass for Fulton, and, as Fulton, will pass 
along doctrine. The accident has become an event that creates the opportunity for agency, radical 
self-authorship, and the potential to write history that passes for elevator inspection.  
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VI. The Accident that Does Not Happen 
The act of experiencing historical fiction via narrative differs from the experience of 
playing through a fictional history. The adventure game Grand Theft Auto: San Andreas is a 
slightly veiled fictional history that provides the player with direct involvement in the Ramparts 
scandal and the Los Angeles riots of 1992.27 This videogame adapts historical events to the 
medium of the videogame, but unlike films or traditional novels, the game allows the player to 
make decisions as to whether or not they will follow the narrative arc to the telos that the authors 
of the game intended. The player of a videogame feels his or her way through the fictional world, 
inhabiting another body, responding to that which threatens it, suturing it to one’s own. In 
reading Grand Theft Auto: San Andreas alongside the film Crash and the novels White Noise and 
The Intuitionist, one can see that the medium specificity of the videogame provides an 
experience of the accident that the other mediums cannot achieve: namely, that the simulated 
control of a character places a vast amount of agency upon the player, providing him with a 
larger sense of control, so that when accident does occur, the player confronts the depicted 
history and his present as the collision of past and present, fiction and reality.  
San Andreas opens when Carl Johnson (Young Maylay)—the player’s character—returns 
to a Los Angeles that, in the game, is renamed Los Santos. Like Los Angeles of the early 90s, 
Los Santos is reeling from Reagan era cuts to welfare and other social systems. The crime-ridden 
city of the game is comprised of poverty-stricken minorities, criminals, and rappers. Johnson, or 
CJ, has returned because of his mother’s death. Upon his arrival, Officers Tenpenny (Samuel L. 
Jackson) and Pulaski (Chris Penn), members of a special unit of the police department, welcome 
him with the threat of being framed for the murder of a police officer, should he not perform jobs 
for them. Nick Dyer-Witherford and Greig de Peuter note, “it was suggested that allowing white 
  102 
players to virtually occupy the shoes of the United States’ most feared racialized other was 
educative” (166).28 However, others criticized that this role reinforced stereotypes. This feedback 
loop—playing the other while remaining alienated—allows the player to return to reality with an 
experience of racial alienation. In this way, the player falls into a detective’s role—
understanding one’s historical situation through working one’s way through it. CJ, like Lila Mae 
Watson, fits the role of hardboiled detective. Initially he tries to solve the mystery of his 
mother’s murder, all the while trying to fit in with the members of his neighborhood—his own 
brother among them—who feel that he betrayed them when he left Los Santos.29  
The gameplay allows the player to move about an open world. As Barry Atkins writes, 
“the player plays the game in the full knowledge that it is a game, and that life is not so 
conveniently organised according to the principles of narrative telling” (139). The player need 
not complete any of the game’s objectives in order to play the game. However, the player must 
meet certain objectives in order to experience plot points and thus progress the game’s narrative. 
The game’s player, unlike a novel’s reader or a film’s viewer, must actively move through the 
fictional world in order to experience narrative. Should one make a mistake—experience a car 
accident say, or fail to complete a task—the punishment comes as a lack of narrative 
progression. While many videogames are similarly structured, San Andreas depicts historical 
events as the consequences of the player’s actions—and moreover “[invited] players to 
participate in a performance of race, mobilizing a whole set of assumptions about race” (Dyer-
Witherford 167). The plot point that directly pertains to my argument is that of Officer 
Tenpenny’s indictment for a number of crimes and his acquittal due to a lack of evidences and 
witnesses.  
  103 
 
Figure 7. Loss of control in Grand Theft Auto. 
 
This acquittal results in public outrage that catalyzes the Los Angeles Riots. During these 
riots CJ and his brother drive through the streets of Los Santos, as Tenpenny attempts to flee in a 
fire truck. The game cuts away to the fire truck crashing from an overpass, landing directly in 
front of CJ’s family home (Figure 7). The game brings CJ to his home, and the player home to 
narrative resolution. CJ, his brother, sister, and soon to be brother-in-law approach the wreckage 
and an injured Officer Tenpenny. CJ pulls his gun, but his brother tells him not to shoot, that 
Officer Tenpenny “killed hisself in a traffic accident” (Figure 8). Tenpenny becomes the first 
character in the game to die that CJ does not kill; neither does the player, whose agency has here 
been removed, kill him in any sense. The game’s narrative denies the player any choice in 
Tenpenny’s fate, carrying the player toward its close. A car accident resolves the narrative of San 
Andreas, a game in which the player has had to build cars, race cars, chase and escape from a 
number of enemies—yet, this accident has transpired completely outside of the player’s control. 
Like the fault line that the game is named for, the game resolves with disaster outside of any 
individuals’ agency. In assuming a force of nature, the game’s narrative stresses the fact that the 
accident constitutes that which defies one’s intentions. This final car accident brings the player to 
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the game’s final piece of narration. Unlike the elevator accident in The Intuitionist, the airborne 
toxic event in White Noise, or the traffic jam in Crash, narrative resolution comes from control 
being taken away from the player, rather than from the character assuming some sense of control 
over his or her life and environment. In this way the accident that ends Grand Theft Auto: San 
Andreas is an accident that does not happen. It is the teleology of the game. With the game 
taking control away from the player in depicting Tenpenny’s fatal accident, the player loses 
control for the sake of narrative resolution. In Crash each accident propels the narrative forward 
to the next accident. Even its final scene, in which Ballard chases his wife in a high-speed 
 
Figure 8. Grand Theft Auto: San Andreas. 
 
pursuit, culminates in a car accident, then an act of sex, implying that these two characters will 
continue to act out car crashes until their deaths—hence Catherine’s disappointment at surviving 
the crash without harm, and Ballard consoling, “Maybe the next one darling . . . maybe the next 
one.” Here the accident provides no narrative resolution. As Mikita Brottman writes, Crash is 
“an elliptical interiorized film with no final narrative release, only dissolution and disintegration” 
(129).30 Ballard and Catherine, engaging in intercourse, fantasize about how the next accident 
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may be that which ends their lives. Yet one cannot call their crash an accident, their intention in 
the pursuit being not to die but merely to approach death. Meaning to crash, they take pleasure in 
a future loss of control. 
 Similarly, both White Noise and The Intuitionist end with accidents that do not happen. 
Following her revelation that nullifies all meaning behind the accident, Lila Mae Watson begins 
to drive aimlessly. And while her mind wanders, her attention elsewhere, a peculiar event 
occurs—or more precisely, does not occur:  
She does not hear the car horn, let alone the urgency of the car horn. She drifts into the 
right lane and almost sideswipes the mock wood paneling of the station wagon. The kids 
in the backseat scream, pink lungs heaving, father’s hands grip the steering wheel, but for 
all the commotion of this few seconds there is no accident. Lila Mae’s automobile and the 
family’s automobile do not crash. (231) 
Given this strange detail, the description of the potential accident, the accident that does not 
happen, the reader sees the author in total control (Belletto 26). Here, nothing comes from 
nothing. No cause, no effect—at least no effect on Lila Mae Watson. Her body remains intact. 
While a character such as Oedipa Maas at least has the awareness of the near accidents she 
experiences, Lila Mae, despite all her intuition, remains oblivious many of the risks that surround 
her. She still has no control, but she is not injured for it, barely even brought to attention by this 
near miss. Instead of having an effect on the character, or even the narrative itself, the effect of 
the accident that does not happen falls upon the reader. In The Sense of an Ending (1966), Frank 
Kermode addresses this, the “double-take,” in his larger discussion of the kinds of memories that 
are exercised in reading narrative fiction:  
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The second of these memories—registration of what we fail to ‘take in’—is an essential 
tool of narrative fiction. It is familiar from the ‘double-take’ of the music-hall, and many 
literary kinds, from poems which catch up words and ideas into new significance, to 
complicated plots like that of Tom Jones, depend on it [. . .] it is based on an initial 
deviation of attention which causes a temporal gap between the original apprehension of 
what the situation signifies and the final understanding that its significance was other. 
(53) 
The accident that does not happen is a double-take in the above instance because the reader sees 
what Lila Mae does not (which creates dramatic irony), but also surprises the reader in that what 
we have anticipated—an accident—does not happen. In The Intuitionist the accident that does 
not happen reasserts the plot of the narrative; there was no conspiracy, no plot against Lila Mae, 
but only accident—accident that of course was no accident at all in being, like every event in the 
novel, the deliberate work of the author.  
 Jack Gladney’s story also ends with a direct confrontation with pure accident. The final 
chapter of White Noise depicts a near-crash when Wilder, the youngest of Jack Gladney’s 
children, decides to ride his tricycle across the expressway: 
The boy [. . .] began to pedal across the highway, mystically charged. The drivers could 
not quite comprehend. In their knotted posture, belted in, they knew this picture did not 
belong to the hurtling consciousness of the highway, the broad-ribboned modernist 
stream. In speed there was sense. In signs, in patterns, in split-second lives. What did it 
mean, this little rotary blur? Some force in the world had gone awry. (322-323) 
Accidents that do not happen are the turn—the true catastrophe—that ends Crash, White Noise, 
The Intuitionist, and Grand Theft Auto: San Andreas, all of which make accidents their subject.31 
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In DeLillo, as in Whitehead, this accident affects the reader more than the character because, as 
Steven Belletto has written, the reader has “trouble distinguishing the narrative from the laws of 
the universe” (340). It affects the reader because it provides an element of surprise while 
reminding one that the potential for accident is constantly present. Both of these narratives raise 
an expectation in the reader for an accident, for a plot that moves toward death. When these 
expectations are not met, the reader experiences, instead, an accident of reading. The accident 
that does not happen reminds the reader that the author is in total control. The management of the 
accident is the management of the event that leads us to the next plot point or the next beautiful 
description. The accident that does not happen is mystical, as Gladney describes Wilder’s charge 
across the highway. It is an intuition. The accident that does not happen is outside the stream of 
modernist and postmodernist life. 
 The only figure who can bring about this event is the author. And when the author 
describes an accident that does not happen, he or she is in total control—not only of the 
narrative, but of the reader. The accident that does not happen stuns the reader as it stuns Wilder. 
We are left wondering what this “little rotary blur” means. As Mitchum Huehls writes: 
If we think of Wilder’s aleatory ride across the highway as analogous to Gary Saul 
Morson’s real-time model of reading, then Wilder represents the failure of that model: the 
ostensibly very knowing Wilder reveals that suppressing the unavoidable fact of 
knowledge and knowingness for the sake of surprise necessarily renders the reading 
experience incommunicable. . . . Rather than offering some form of redemptive passage 
beyond the ideological loopiness of reality, Wilder actually teaches us that we will have 
to figure out how to read despite knowledge. (52-53)  
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What the “little rotary blur” means is not nothing, as Lila Mae Watson believes to be the 
meaning of the accident. Rather, the accident that does not happen is one of the most 
authoritative forms of addressing the reader, of calling the reader’s attention to plot, to narrative, 
to life. This is not the author who calls for evacuation but an author who demands that we remain 
situated in the event. The accident that does not happen shows that the accident is an event that, 
being everything, is always happening. As Lauren Berlant writes of The Intuitionist, “the narrator 
notes that a catastrophe is ‘just what happens when you subtract what happens all the time’ 
(230). A traumatic event does then, organize The Intuitionist,” as well as the other novels 
discussed, “but this event does not change everything. It threatens to subtend what Lila Mae 
knows about life, and how she knows it. It induces and reveals a shared history of crisis within 
the ordinary whose terms the powers that be want to control” (852). By definition the accident 
not only subtends, but also reveals that which is beneath life. The repetition of the accident in 
these novels reveals a particularly postmodern fascination with the infinite horizon of narrative 
in the face of the accumulation of risks that could end all life and thus all narrative. The politics 
that emerge, as authors represent the accident as that which inspires a desire for total control, can 
be defined as a politics of reading the meanings made from accidents as a product of their 
historical moment.  
 Accidents provide the perfect fictional event through which authors can show the dangers 
of finding meaning in the consequences of chance. The representation of such accidents, when 
read for what they are—not accidents whatsoever, but the products of pure human intention—
demand that the reader historicize, separating fiction from reality. To read the accident otherwise 
is to fictionalize reality, make a lie of truth. This can lead to a dangerous politics: one in which 
the past can be rewritten to fit a “proper” narrative, one in which the future can be authored as 
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having emerged only from speech acts and actors’ speeches—not from actual events. Under 
Reagan and in his wake, inauthentic authenticity crystallizes as a narrative trap. While a careful 
reading can bring the reader into touch with history, reading in the manner of the characters 
depicted in these works, paranoically leads to seeing history as fiction. Inauthentic authenticity 
prevails when fiction touches the reader so as to overwrite reality. Viewing history without the 
ability to historicize is to see the past as fiction. Reagan, in his farewell address, warned, “for 
those who create the popular culture, well-grounded patriotism is no longer the style. [. . .] If we 
forget what we did, we don’t know who we are. I am warning of an eradication of that—of the 
American memory that could result, ultimately, in the erosion of the American spirit” (Reagan, 
“Farewell Address”). Yet Reagan, like many of the characters discussed in this chapter, 
embodies an American memory forged in fictional beliefs of control over that which cannot be 
controlled—the accident—and in being such, remembers a past that never existed. The best 
makers of culture over the course of the Reagan Era depicted the American spirit as history 
touched through—not in spite of—experiencing fictions. The realization that neither conspiracy 
nor teleology constitutes historical reality allows one to be in touch with American history rather 
than American fantasy. This touch of history through reading and experiencing fictions reveals 
inauthentic authenticity as the façade of a fated history censored for the sake of a politics of 
control, rather than history as that into which accident thrusts one. Understanding accident as the 
driver of history restores agency to the subject—fictional or actual—and inspires this agent to 










1 His legs, however, were not lost to the train, but to a sadistic doctor seeking revenge for Reagan’s character, Drake, 
courting his daughter. In The President Electric (2009) Timothy Raphael reads the opening of Where’s the Rest of 
Me? as representing Reagan “as a seasoned veteran of the culture industry poised to claim his missing parts in the 
political sphere. [. . .] The actor’s performance strategy as president is prefigured in the narrative of his birth: the 
deployment of mass-mediated cultural forms to represent an idealized America through the performative evocation 
of a mythic past, a bodying forth of an American identity that is animated vocally” (59). 
 
2 For an extensive treatment of Reagan’s rise to political power as a reaction against the sixties, particularly Lyndon 
Johnson’s Great Society, see Bernard von Bothmer’s Framing the Sixties: The Use and Abuse of a Decade from 
Ronald Reagan to George W. Bush (2010), especially his second chapter, “Blaming ‘the Sixties’: The Rise of 
Ronald Reagan.” 
 
3 For most thorough study of literature and the Reagan era, see Joseph Dewey’s Novels From Reagan’s America: A 
New Realism (1999). Dewey reads a range of texts from the 1980s—though only nods at DeLillo—as “seek[ing] 
nothing less than to transfer the understandable need for spectacle to the realm of the immediate” (27). For Dewey 
the “spectacle realism” that emerged in this period expresses the logic of “a decade when we so neatly veered away 
from any confrontation with the immediate because it was apparently known and so apparently thin.” He continues, 
“these narratives fetch us back into the immediate and dare us to participate in the imperfect, to feel its rushing 
urgency, to face full-front our own immediate world and there to touch, if even for a moment, the complex magic of 
spectacle” (33). 
 
4 It is Reagan who describes himself as a “semi-automaton” (Reagan 6). 
 
5 As Linda Kauffmann notes, “Nelson Doubleday’s helicopter was used to quell a Vietnam War protest at the 
University of California, Berkeley, which occurred when Ronald Reagan was governor,” implying that Doubleday’s 
own conservative politics and sympathies with Reagan had a large role in the novel being censored (167). 
 
6 As Oliver Sacks writes of aphasiacs’ and agnosiacs’ response to Reagan in “The President’s Speech” (part of The 
Man Who Mistook His Wife For a Hat (1998): “We normal—aided, doubtless, by our wish to be fooled, were indeed 
well and truly fooled (‘Populus vult decipi, ergo decipiatur’). And so cunningly was deceptive word-use combined 
with deceptive tone, that only the brain-damaged remained intact, undeceived” (84). 
 
7 For an extensive treatment of masochism in Crash, see Anthony McCosker’s essay, “A Vision of Masochism in 
the Affective Pain of Crash”.  
 
8 For a discussion of the ironic viewing experience in Crash see Roberta Jill Craven’s “Ironic Empathy in Crash” 
(193).  
 
9 As Chaudhuri notes, “Cronenberg’s film keeps the moment of impact ever beyond our grasp—that missed reality 
that James is trying to recover” (68). However, we do witness two head-on collisions. The impact is denied the 
viewer because we only see it on the screen, we do not feel it. Our affective response then places us in a similar 
subject position as Ballard and the film’s other characters. We are curious and disturbed at wanting to feel the 
impact of a crash. 
 
10 See Mikita Brottman’s essay “The End of the Road: David Cronenberg’s Crash and the Fading of the West” for a 
reading of this scene and its correcting the Mansfield myth (130). 
 
11 For a brief discussion of the construction of America in White Noise through the setting of the College-on-the-Hill 
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12 In Technology and Postmodern Subjectivity in Don DeLillo’s Novels (2010), Randy Laist writes that “Jack’s 
Hitler is a uniquely American figure from the Golden Age of Hollywood, so it is fitting that Jack’s office at the 
College-on-the-Hill is housed in the American studies building” (83). While he does not draw a comparison between 
Reagan’s rise in the same age of Hollywood, and while this chapter does not treat Hitler and Reagan in relation to 
one another, I will note that neither directly appear in the novel, and instead appear through various media. 
 
13 Mark Conroy treats the representation of authority in his essay “From Tombstone to Tabloid: Authority Figured in 
White Noise”. While the essay discusses mass media and its creation of cult figures, the essay does not mention the 
influence of Reagan in the novel or over the crystallization of media’s role in the culture. See Timothy Parrish’s 
From the Civil War to the Apocalypse (2008) for a discussion of Ronald Reagan’s use of mass media in relation to 
DeLillo’s representation of mediation in Underworld (217-219). 
 
14 See Jeremy Green’s “Disaster Footage: Spectacles of Violence in Don DeLillo’s Fiction” for a discussion of 
DeLillo’s representation of large-scale disasters and the depiction of celebrity disaster. For a discussion of the novel 
as a mock-disaster film, see “White Noise as Disaster Movie” by Valerie Wee and John Whalen-Bridge. 
 
15 See Michael Hardin’s “Postmodernism’s Desire for Simulated Death: Andy Warhol’s Car Crashes, J. G. 
Ballard’s Crash, and Don DeLillo’s White Noise” for a discussion of representations of death and disaster as 
simulation and the relationship between popular culture and death as subject and simulacrum.  
 
16 Colin Hutchinson, in Reaganism, Thatcherism and the Social Novel (2008) writes of Gladney’s exposure to the 
airborne toxic event as “suggesting that the political quietism of the subservient liberal does not necessarily confer 
protection from the outcomes of consumerist capitalism, whether environmental or otherwise. White Noise makes it 
evident that the American middle classes have been betrayed: that a deal has been broken” (70). 
 
17 In A Pinnacle of Feeling: American Literature and Presidential Government (2008), Sean McCann writes that 
while “the Regan administration renewed the United States’ aggressive stance in the Cold War, and as 
neoconservative intellectuals, journalists, and pop culture producers began to press for a reassessment of the war in 
Vietnam, more self-consciously literary artists sometimes marked their dissent from the Reagan revolution by 
affirming their commitment to the chastened, sentimental nationalism that flourished in the literature and film of the 
seventies” (166). While McCann rightly claims that “the most ambitious and elaborate example of [this] trend came 
[. . .] in DeLillo’s Libra,” White Noise, I argue, also examines “the rise of the politics of personality that exploited 
mass media to expand presidential prestige at the expense of the parties and representative democracy” (McCann 
167).  
 
18 See The Literary Cold War, 1945 to Vietnam by Adam Piette and Arthur Redding’s review of Piette’s monograph, 
“‘A Wilderness of Mirrors’: Writing and Reading the Cold War” for a sample of the literature on this topic. 
 
19 In Technology and Postmodern Subjectivity Laist reads Breedlove’s job as suggesting “an epistemic parallelism 
between the esoteric priesthood of 80’s literary theory and the complexities of international espionage” (87). Jack’s 
skepticism of the ability for systems of signs to mean extends beyond both new critical and poststructuralist reading 
practices toward a pure language, such as, as Laist points out, Wilder’s sounds—each meaning what he feels, but 
often beyond the intelligibility of those who possess control over language. In other words, Gladney longs for a pure 
language. 
 
20 Much like the Peter Pinguid Society of Pynchon’s The Crying of Lot 49, the members of which oppose capitalism 
because it inevitably leads to Marxism (48-50). 
 
21 At a distance and through binoculars, Jack experiences the airborne toxic event almost as a television broadcast—
and is simultaneously experiencing it as it is reported on the radio. As John Frow, in “The Last Things Before the 
Last: Notes on White Noise” writes, “It is only in movies, only through cultural mediation, that a vision of 
nonmediation is possible—and therefore absurd” (184).  
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22 A product of the Federal Civil Defense Administration, the air-raid siren was introduced during World War II to 
warn against air-raids, and was then adapted in the 1950s in order to warn against nuclear strikes. 
 
23 See the chapter “Actors” in John Lewis Gaddis’s The Cold War: A New History (2006) for an analysis of the role 
Reagan and Pope John Paul the II’s acting background played in their political performances.  
 
24 In Postmodern Belief Amy Hungerford reads the nuns disbelief as “one more satirical joke in white suburbia” 
(xx). However, this satire implicates, as I argue, a desire for belief for itself. Tom LeClair, writing In The Loop 
(1987), claims that DeLillo treats America as religious, writing “not that its citizens are conventionally religious, but 
that its essential religious qualities are beyond rational comprehension. They are, like the sacred, mysterious” (14). 
John McClure’s Partial Faiths (2007) provides a thorough treatment of magic and religion in DeLillo’s oeuvre, in 
which he argues that the weakening of religious practices are replaced with new forms of socialization (87-93). 
 
25 In an interview with The Atlantic Colson Whitehead states that The Intuitionist is set in an alternate New York. 
 
26 Ramón Saldivar, in “The Second Elevation of the Novel: Race, Form and the Postrace Aesthetic in Contemporary 
Narrative” reads The Intuitionist as a form of “Afrofuturism, or simply black speculative fiction, offering an 
alternate Americana of a past that was not quite this one but is linked to an historical future that can never quite 
come to be” (7).  
 
27 For an anatomy of various games and their narrative structures, see Espen Aarseth’s essay “Quest Games as Post-
Narrative Discourse” (361-365). For an analysis of videogames and narrative in relation to reading practices, see 
Scott Brendan Cassidy’s essay “The Video Game as Narrative.” In this piece Cassidy articulates the particular 
quality of interactivity with narrative, “which implies that their narrative is not fixed” (294). 
 
28 See Kiri Miller’s essay “Jacking the Dial: Radio, Race, and Place in Grand Theft Auto” for a more developed 
analysis of how the game “offer[s] players the opportunity to explore iconic American cities at particular historical 
moments from a criminal underclass perspective” (403). 
 
29 For a narratological analysis of the gameplay experience of Grand Theft Auto: San Andreas see Kiri Miller’s 
essay “Grove Street Grimm: Grand Theft Auto and Digital Folklore”. 
 
30 In “Ironic Empathy in Crash” Roberta Jill Craven writes that Crash represents and critiques how “all interactions, 
even the most private, have already been preprogrammed by the media. The resulting inability to distinguish oneself 
and to connect in any authentic way increases the sense of isolation, which further refuels the desire for communion 
with an other” (188). In this way the film makes a case for finding authenticity in the inauthentic.  
 
31 For a reading of Wilder’s ride as “modernist narrative gone awry,” as well as a discussion of media saturation and 
intertextuality in White Noise, see Laura Barret’s “‘How the Dead Speak to the Living’: Intertextuality and the 
Postmodern Sublime in White Noise” (esp. 109). 
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Chapter 2 
 
End of the Cold War, End of the Future: Failed Suicide as Accident at the Cold War’s End 
 
—He didn’t kill himself, it was an accident. 
—An accident! He ties a rope around his neck and climbs out a window, but the rope breaks and 
he falls forty-six stories, so it’s an accident?  
–William Gaddis, The Recognitions (1955) 
I. Passing on Postmodernism 
As I mentioned in closing the last chapter, in bidding farewell on January 11, 1989, 
Ronald Reagan warned the nation not to let their pride in the United States wane. He noted that 
before the turmoil of the 1960s such feeling was cultivated through family, community, 
educational institutions, “And if all else failed you could get a sense of patriotism from the 
popular culture” (Reagan “Farewell Address). Encouraging his fellow citizens to model their 
future on the past and not the values portrayed in current popular culture, he continued: 
But now, we're about to enter the nineties, and some things have changed [. . .] for those 
who create the popular culture, well-grounded patriotism is no longer the style. Our spirit 
is back, but we haven't reinstitutionalized it. We've got to do a better job of getting across 
that America is freedom—freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom of enterprise. 
And freedom is special and rare. It's fragile; it needs production [protection]. (Reagan) 
Freedom needs production. This slip reveals an anxiety toward futurity that proliferated in the 
final years of the Cold War. The future, like freedom, needs to be produced. Throughout the 
Cold War the future contained the possibility of ending since full-scale nuclear war possessed the 
potential to eliminate humankind, and with it, any experience of futurity; one would think that 
after the Cold War’s end the future would immediately be something that American culture 
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would embrace. However, as the words of Reagan demonstrate, in the early 1990s the future 
became more difficult to imagine without the familiar Soviet threat. The continued fear of being 
futureless derives from what Tony Jackson has called the Cold War sense of an ending, which 
contributed greatly to mid-to-late twentieth century developments in narrative and our 
understanding of narrative, as well as to postmodernism (324-325). The novels Leviathan (1992), 
by Paul Auster, The Virgin Suicides (1993), by Jeffrey Eugenides, and “Musings of a Cigarette 
Smoking Man” (1996), an episode of Fox Broadcasting Company’s television series The X-Files 
(1993-2002), exhibit the American culture’s inability to imagine a future through depicting 
characters who wish to foreclose their futurity through suicide. However, in each of these texts 
suicide attempts initially or wholly fail, signifying that one lacks agency over one’s role in a 
future that will continue to happen, whether one wants it to or not—a representation of failed 
suicide attempts that manifests the Cold War anxiety of accidental nuclear annihilation, or 
inadvertence.  
Jackson emphasizes the difference between nuclear risk and everyday risk: “Needless to 
say, all humans confront chance regularly in life, but the idea of chance in relation to a nuclear 
ending was different because it was the chance of an epic catastrophe, it was known to so many 
people, and it was a product of human invention” (332). This chapter and the next look at this 
period of transition from two different points of view: first, how literary and televisual texts 
represented narrative’s inability to describe the future through representing characters who feel 
trapped in the present; the next chapter explores how this period of transition was represented in 
poetry and novels through exploring a deep history that would potentially restore a sense of 
history on the long-term, but that nevertheless presents humankind as inevitably disappearing—
as running out of time. Like the texts of the first chapter, those of this one employ the technique 
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of inauthentic authenticity, particularly in the ways that their narratives’ conclusions undermine 
the novelistic form. In these texts narrative itself becomes a failed means of controlling history 
and the future that emerges from it. The failures of narrative contribute to an overwhelming fear 
of what the future may bring, if it brings anything at all. The future cannot be contained within 
the novel, the narrative extending beyond the pages, earning its own historicity in the direct 
implication of the reader/viewer as a subject complicit in carrying the story from the present into 
the future.  
While the Cold War wound down from 1989 to its end in 1992, so too, according to 
recent accounts, did postmodernism. For lack of a better term, or perhaps as a symptom of 
postmodernism itself, “post-postmodernism” began to emerge in this period, partially because a 
new generation of authors, such as Eugenides, influenced by the establishing figures of 
postmodernism, found their own voice in complement and contrast to those who came before. A 
divergence from postmodern aesthetics also emerged due to calls from authors of this generation, 
such as David Foster Wallace, for authors to return to sincerity—which, was less a call to 
actually return to sincerity than it was to do something new. In this way post-postmodernism has 
yet to shed that which postmodernism attempted to break from: modernism’s fetish for the new.1 
Of course, Pound didn’t declare “make it new” until 1934, well after the heyday of high 
modernism, which is to say that one could read each of these aesthetic forms as overlapping, 
intersecting moments of authentic inauthenticity, pushed and pursued by a culture industry that 
earns its keep through constantly making “it” new by doing the same old same old. A history of 
transitions is one way of paring away the fetish for the new, the event, the moment that it all 
changed. So while Auster and Eugenides owe much to modernist authors, they are also indebted 
to postmodernist authors such as Gaddis, Barth, Pynchon, DeLillo, and Acker.2 While Leviathan, 
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and The Virgin Suicides were published in late postmodernism or post-postmodernism, this 
chapter studies this moment as one characterized by historical and aesthetic transition. While 
some, like Minsoo Kang, argue that the death of postmodernism can be traced to a specific date, 
others, like Andrew Hoberek, claim that the end of postmodernism can be read as a series of 
transitions. Kang, for example, makes a case that June 18, 1993, the day Last Action Hero 
appeared in theaters, was the moment when mass culture began to fully embrace and produce 
postmodernist aesthetics, and is thus the moment of postmodernism’s demise (Hoberek 233); 
Hoberek, on the other hand, contends that “if contemporary fiction is indeed post-postmodern, 
this does not exemplify some singular, dramatic, readily visible cultural transformation—the 
search for which in fact constitutes a postmodern preoccupation—but grows out of a range of 
uneven, tentative, local shifts” (241). Postmodernism, in its transition from modernism, seems to 
have inherited modernism’s preoccupation with determining the moment everything changed.3 
The interpretation of history via crisis moments is not new to the moment of modernism. 
However, many significant figures of modernism placed emphasis upon specific dates, a legacy 
passed on to their postmodern heirs. Not only do you have, in 1934, Ezra Pound retroactively 
declaring “make it new” when his aesthetic had grown cold, but in 1924 Woolf states: “On or 
about December 1910 human character changed” (qtd. in Bell 122). And of course, we have 
James Joyce to thank for placing so much emphasis on June 16, 1904—a date that is of much 
importance in The Virgin Suicides. As well, critics of literature are to blame for popularizing and 
misquoting such statements like Woolf’s. As Daniel Bell notes in “Modernism Mummified,” 
Irving Howe, among many others, replace “character” with “nature,” misconstruing and 
extrapolating a statement that may always have revealed more about Woolf’s biography than 
about human “character” more generally (122).4 Woolf discusses how relations between 
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individuals shifted, in a year in which she began to take up feminist causes, bathed nude with 
Rupert Brooke, and championed Roger Fry’s “Post-Impressionist Exhibition,” which is to say 
that in that year it is safe to say that much changed for Woolf (Bell 131n1). Leviathan, The 
Virgin Suicides, and The X-Files episode “Musings of a Cigarette Smoking Man” likewise 
attempt to identify the moment that everything changed for their characters and American 
history—but nevertheless knowingly fail. Such modernist and postmodernist means of 
fetishizing a particular event as a break with the past, an opening into the future, are found 
nowhere in these texts. Instead they present the reader with a series of transitions, of stories told 
and retold, contradicted, a history troubled with the past, present, and future. Such inauthentic 
authenticity forces the reader to identify history not as a series of revolutionary events—as the 
end of the Cold War appeared—but, in retrospect, as a series of evolutionary processes that build 
over time until something happens: a state collapses, ideologies shift, a new age appears to take 
shape from nothing. However, through deploying inauthentic authenticity, these texts also 
remind the reader that history continues as a process that shapes the present. In other words, 
while the Cold War ended, history did not. 
These texts’ representations of the failure of suicide attempts—the failure of one’s 
intentions—are symptomatic of a larger doubt that pervaded American culture: that while the 
threat of full-scale nuclear war waned it remained difficult to imagine a future without this threat. 
So while control over intentional or accidental nuclear war remains a determining factor in the 
state of American culture’s representations of the future, it points to a failure of imagination.  
“The certainty of destruction and the uncertainty of whether destruction will actually happen 
made the idea of chance more generally and potently present for more people than ever before,” 
writes Jackson (332).  The future remains out of bounds in these texts, a place and space that 
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cannot possibly be reached but which also cannot be foreclosed. 
In what follows I read failed suicide attempts in Leviathan, The Virgin Suicides, and 
“Musings of a Cigarette Smoking Man” in the context of the unexpected, seemingly accidental 
end of the Cold War. Rather than expressing an open future, the above texts show how American 
culture continued to obsess over the possible end of the future well into the 1990s, despite the 
Cold War having ended. With Soviet Communism defeated, the United States appeared to 
possess the agency to author its own future without contest. However, in works such as 
Leviathan, The Virgin Suicides, and The X-Files, characters’ beliefs in absolute agency emerge 
alongside the realization that absolute agency does not make one immune to absolute chance, i.e. 
accident. This chapter argues that these characters’ suicide attempts provide not only examples 
of accident ironically undermining personal agency, but also warning of one’s lack of control 
over larger historical events. Each of these texts depicts characters obsessed with narrating 
history as a way to assert agency over past events and thus control their own present and future, 
exhibiting the anxiety in American culture regarding its own future during and after the end of 
the Cold War—an anxiety that manifests, in these texts, as failed attempts at suicide, the inability 
to end futurity in spite of one’s intentions. 
The texts I discuss below demonstrate that with the Cold War ending, Americans had 
only begun to comprehend what a world without the threat of nuclear contingency would look 
like, which the cultural artifacts I discuss comment upon through open-ended narratives and 
metafictional strategies similar to, but slightly nuanced from, those which arose during the Cold 
War. Modernist and postmodernist means of fetishizing a particular event as a break with the 
past, an opening into the future, are found nowhere in these texts. Instead they present the reader 
with a series of transitions, of stories told, retold, and contradicted, a history troubled with the 
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past, present, and future. In the following I look at this period of transition through an 
investigation of how literary and televisual texts represented narrative’s inability to describe the 
future through representing characters that feel trapped in the present. In these texts narrative 
itself becomes a failed means of controlling history and the future that emerges from it. The 
failures of narrative contribute to an overwhelming fear of what the future may bring, if it brings 
anything at all. The future cannot be contained within the novel or television episode, their 
narratives extending beyond the pages and frames, earning its own historicity in the direct 
implication of the reader/viewer as a subject complicit in carrying the story from the present into 
the future, the texts themselves having deliberately made the reader/viewer aware of their own 
lack of narrative closure.  
Andrew Hoberek points out that this shift can only be determined through attention to the 
nuances of history and aesthetics, the shifts in the culture and the culture’s response to such 
shifts. He writes of the development of literature after postmodernism in his introduction to the 
Twentieth Century Literature special issue After Postmodernism: Form and History in 
Contemporary American Fiction that there is “a continuity with the postmodern project as it 
works its way back and forth between production and criticism of fiction: postmodern fiction’s 
openness to mass culture begets not only the opening of the canon but also the expansion of what 
counts as literature in the present” (239).5 Leviathan, The Virgin Suicides, and The X-Files 
episode “Musings of a Cigarette Smoking Man” knowingly fails to identify the moment that 
everything changed for their characters and American history, producing, as Reagan asked, an 
attention to American history, while also critiquing that very history.  
Adam Kelly nuances Hoberek’s reading of literature after postmodernism in his essay 
“Moments of Decision in Contemporary American Fiction.” Writing of Eugenides’s The Virgin 
  120 
Suicides and Auster’s Leviathan (along with Philip Roth), Kelly argues that “what these novels 
dramatize most powerfully in the struggles of the narrator to comprehend the hero’s decision is a 
contemporary (one might even say post-theoretical) awareness of the impossibility of mastery: 
mastery not only of the truth of the event, but of the means of representation of that truth” (326). 
For Kelly, the desire for control, and any politics of control, can only be demonstrated as a 
failure. When he writes of Derrida’s attempts to “move beyond a certain postmodernism, to think 
that which the postmodern cannot reconcile, namely the relation of the moment of decision to a 
radical and undecidable futurity beyond mastery or revelation” he identifies the indefiniteness of 
the future as that which poisons these texts’ present (327).  
While a contingent future troubles the present of texts from the early 1990s in Kelly’s 
account, Samuel Cohen, in After the End of History (2009), identifies a trend in novels 
published, predominantly, in 1997, to turn to the past. He argues, “Against the hailing of the end 
of history inspired by the Cold War’s end, these novels [. . .] construct their own histories, 
exploring the national past to investigate whereby what happened has become history” (3). 
Looking at texts that were composed and published/broadcast as the Cold War was ending—
from 1989-1992—one sees that the view of American history depicted in texts such as 
Pynchon’s Mason & Dixon (1997), which Cohen discusses at length, was far less determinate. 
The historical impetus for the texts discussed in this essay, and that this essay shares with Kelly’s 
piece, is the end of the Cold War marking not an end to futurity—the extinction of humankind—
but the opening of this future and the overwhelming feeling of impotence that proliferated 
throughout the culture: it would have been easier for the world to blow up. While Kelly 
concludes that The Virgin Suicides and Leviathan are not “clear examples of post-postmodernist 
texts, if only because these novels still cleave to an attempt to directly represent the moment of 
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decision” when it cannot be represented, they do signal an aesthetic transition from 
postmodernism to whatever, one day, we will name what follows (328). However, that these 
texts meditate upon the moment of decision—the failed suicide and the difficulty of representing 
accident in narrative—points to a cautious aesthetic, one in which the strategies of both 
modernism and postmodernism are both represented and deployed.  
While narrative experimentation and difficulty were the answer to modernist and 
postmodernist aesthetics, that method is, in Leviathan, The Virgin Suicides, and The X-Files, 
turned on its ear. These texts provide narrative difficulty through saying that their narratives can 
never convey an event as it happened, then sincerely depicting said event. They wrap back to the 
present, foreclosing the future, looking for a new form of expression and deliberately falling 
short to inspire in the reader ways of feeling historically. From the beginning they mark their 
texts as inauthentic histories, and in doing so authenticate their authors’ narrative control and the 
reader’s indeterminate role in making sense of any kind of narrative history. 
 
II.  Passing on the Future 
 Paul Auster’s Leviathan begins with the making of history and the unmaking of a body: 
“Six days ago, a man blew himself up by the side of a road in northern Wisconsin. There were no 
witnesses, but it appears that he was sitting on the grass next to his parked car when the bomb he 
was building accidentally went off” (1). In Leviathan history forecloses futurity, which the 
narrative represents in its ending, extending the past into the future that consists of the reader’s 
present. Leviathan’s narrator, author Peter Aaron, writes the novel’s opening on July 4, 1990 
after reading the news of the roadside explosion, for he immediately thought of his friend and 
fellow writer, Benjamin Sachs, whom he hadn’t seen since June of 1989 (3). Both men met “as 
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chance would have it” in or around 1975 (11).6 The novel portrays Benjamin Sachs as 
embodying the American century, from the beginning of the nuclear age to the Cold War’s end. 
Sachs was born on August 6, 1945 and refers to himself as “America’s first Hiroshima baby,” 
“the original bomb child,” “the first white man to draw breath in the nuclear age,” even going so 
far as to “claim that the doctor had delivered him at the precise moment Fat Man was released 
from the bowels of the Enola Gay” (25). Aaron informs the reader: “in fifteen years, Sachs 
traveled from one end of himself to the other, and by the time he came to that last place, I doubt 
he even knew who he was anymore” (15). Sachs, as the embodiment of American Cold War 
history, wanes in the post-Vietnam period, and after the Cold War’s end, unable to imagine a 
future without the Cold War, destroys himself by accident with a bomb of his own design.  
 Aaron believes that Sachs’s accidentally blowing himself up is related to his perception 
of the threat of thermonuclear war: “Sachs was hardly the first person to come up with this idea, 
but considering what happened to him nine days ago, there’s a certain eeriness to the obsession, 
as if it were a kind of deadly pun, a mixed-up word that took root inside him and proliferated 
beyond control” (27). The pun, the mixed up word that means by accident, is that Sachs managed 
to survive the Cold War but died by his own bomb.7 As the embodiment of the American 
century, Sachs, without any enemies beyond the state, turns on himself, just as the culture wars 
presented an insular fragmentation in the years following the end of the Cold War. Sachs 
interprets reality as if it were authored (49), knowingly reading the world in this way:  
Sachs loved these ironies, the vast follies and contradictions of history, the way in which 
facts were constantly turning themselves on their head. By gorging himself on those 
facts, he was able to read the world as though it were a work of the imagination, turning 
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documented events into literary symbols, tropes that pointed to some dark, complex 
pattern embedded in the real. (27)  
For Sachs, a paranoid reading of history provides one with the ability to read his own birth in this 
very manner. Sachs believes that “once we acquired the power to destroy ourselves, the very 
notion of human life had been altered; even the air we breathed was contaminated with the 
stench of death” (27). For Sachs the mere existence of the bomb taints the present, turning it and 
the future into foregone extinction for humankind. 
The narrative of Leviathan hinges on the accident that radically alters Ben Sachs, and the 
accident itself can be understood through reading the political moment in which it occurs. “The 
era of Ronald Reagan began,” opens the chapter in which Sachs suffers his accidental fall from a 
fourth floor fire escape. “By pure chance” he falls on “July 4, 1986, the one hundredth 
anniversary of the statue of liberty” (120). Aaron notes the effect that Reagan’s presidency had 
on Sachs: “Almost imperceptibly, Sachs came to be seen as a throwback, as someone out of step 
with the spirit of the time. The world had changed around him, and in the present climate of 
selfishness and intolerance, of moronic, chest-pounding Americanism, his opinions sounded 
curiously harsh and moralistic” (116). Sachs holds fast to the ideals of the 1960s while around 
him liberalism wanes, appearing to have no future. Aaron continues, “It was bad enough that the 
Right was everywhere in the ascendant, but even more disturbing to him was the collapse of any 
effective opposition to it. The Democratic Party had caved in; the Left had all but disappeared; 
the press was mute” (116-117). The fall of liberalism to Reaganism precedes Sachs’s own fall. A 
tepid political present forecloses any hopes for liberalism in the future, for progress, and it seems 
that only radicalism remains. Benjamin Sachs, in one breath, understands his fall from a fire 
escape as an accident, and in the next demands that he was, at least initially, in control—that he 
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merely failed in a suicide attempt. For Sachs, the experience of the accident correlates with 
history having no end, which, however skewed, in his perception means that the future is 
comprised of a series of accidents. 
 Of the accident, Aaron says that a woman named Agnes Darwin tripped into Maria 
Turner, who in turn fell into Sachs who was sitting on the edge of the fire escape’s rail. Agnes 
Darwin, meaning “holy Darwin,” plays on the idea that this was a mistake, the culmination of a 
series of random events, rather than the design of a divine hand. Auster here reminds the reader 
that while in life there is no divine author, the author always serves as God in the novel. Aaron 
continues: “There is no question that Sachs could have been killed. Given that he was four 
stories off the ground, it seems almost a miracle that he wasn’t.” (119). Sachs plummets but is 
saved through narrative machination passing as chance. First he lands on a clothesline, which 
snaps, but “bathmats, blankets, and towels” cushion Sachs’s landing (119). While pathetic, there 
is little improbable about a clothesline breaking his fall. And though Sachs’s body recovers from 
the fall, his psyche does not: “he was never the same after that. In those few seconds before he 
hit the ground, it was as if Sachs lost everything. His entire life flew apart in midair, and from 
that moment until his death four years later, he never put it back together again” (120). Here 
Sachs loses the language to describe the accident, his history, and his future. And with language 
lost, Sachs retreats into solitude and emerges as a man who makes history, a domestic terrorist. 
The accident reveals something hidden about Sachs, and discovering what was revealed about 
Sachs is “the thing” that Aaron, in writing Leviathan, struggles “to come to terms with, the 
mystery [he’s] still trying to solve” (118-119, 120). While Aaron can trace Sachs’s decline to the 
decline of liberal politics, his disdain for Reaganism, he cannot understand why Sachs 
deteriorated so radically after his fall. The disintegration of liberalism in American culture during 
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the Reagan era emerges as the mystery at the heart of Leviathan. The novel, in attempting to 
imagine the future of the United States after the Cold War and its state as the supreme political 
and military force in the world, fixates upon a fear of a future of relentless conservatism.  
While Sachs may rage against the machine, his lifestyle has become that of the yuppie. 
Aaron, and the rest of the characters in Leviathan, whether they like it or not, have benefited 
from Reagan’s presidency, which is why Sachs cannot understand his fall as an accident. Sachs 
confesses to Aaron that he was on the fire escape because he wanted Maria Turner to touch him. 
However, Sachs had sworn to himself and his wife that he would no longer commit infidelities. 
Since he couldn’t bring himself to touch Maria’s leg, he decided that he would let her pursue 
him. Sachs interprets his accident as deliberate self-punishment for not taking matters into his 
own hands and actively pursuing Maria. Upon hearing this, Aaron asks, “Are you telling me you 
jumped?” Ben responds: “No, nothing as simple as that. I ran a stupid risk, that’s all. I did 
something unforgivable because I was too ashamed to admit to myself that I wanted to touch 
Maria Turner’s leg” (128-129). Aaron does not understand why Sachs fixates upon his 
interaction with Maria, but understands that “In Sachs’s mind [. . .] there was a direct connection. 
The one thing had caused the other, which meant that he didn’t see the fall as an accident or a 
piece of bad luck so much as some grotesque form of punishment” (131).  
Yet, this grotesque form of punishment quickly shifts in Sachs’s perception to a 
deliberate attempt at suicide: “I had put myself in a position to fall, I realized, and I had done it 
on purpose. That was my discovery, the unassaiblable conclusion that rose up out of my silence. 
I learned that I didn’t want to live. For reasons that are still impenetrable to me, I climbed onto 
the railing that night in order to kill myself” (135). Sachs rewrites the accident so as to assert 
control over his life, over history. Catching the change in Sachs’s account of his fall, Aaron 
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points out that “You told me you fell because you were too afraid to touch Maria’s leg. Now you 
change your story and tell me that you fell on purpose. You can’t have it both ways. It’s got to be 
one or the other” (135-136). First Sachs falls by accident, and then falls because he 
unconsciously punishes himself for desiring Maria Turner, and finally he falls because he 
chooses to kill himself. Sachs’s narrative reconstruction of the event changes each time so as to 
provide him with more control, moving from a totally passive to totally active state over the 
course of his story. He thus erases the accident and replaces it with intention.8  
Sachs refuses to accept that he could not simultaneously have fallen accidentally, 
unconsciously, and consciously. He tells Aaron, “It’s both. The one thing led to the other, and 
they can’t be separated. I’m not saying I understand it, I’m just telling you how it was, what I 
know to be true. I was ready to do away with myself that night. I can still feel it in my gut, and it 
scares the hell out of me to walk around with that feeling” (136). This logic of having it both 
ways permeated American culture during Reagan’s Presidency, most famously in Reagan’s 
deployment of language in response to the Iran-Contra affair. Reagan first claimed on November 
13, 1986: “Our government has a firm policy not to capitulate to terrorist demands. [. . .] we did 
not, repeat, did not trade weapons or anything else for hostages, nor will we” (Reagan). On 
March 4, 1987 Reagan said, “a few months ago I told the American people I did not trade arms 
for hostages. My heart and best intentions still tell me that’s true, but the facts and the evidence 
tell me it’s not” (Reagan). Clearly, Reagan, like Sachs, wants it both ways. His heart and “best 
intentions,” like Sachs’s “gut [. . .] feeling,” somehow balance against evidence, the truth. Sachs 
has become a man of his time, his reasoning the same as the neoconservative politics he so 
reviles. 
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Unable to continue living the bourgeois yuppie life, Sachs retreats from his marriage, his 
friends, New York City, like his hero Thoreau, into the woods, and there tries to live the politics 
that he promotes. However, this retreat is not enough. That Sachs finds some kind of peace in 
moving from a literary-political project to acts of political terrorism in the final years of the Cold 
War and beyond reveals the kind of future that Leviathan imagines for the United States. 
Without a foreign threat Sachs falls apart, becomes a domestic terrorist. Likewise, the 
international problems of the United States wane, and what follows is a turn inward, an uneasy 
sense of peace that stirs unrest within the nation.9 The inability to imagine the future—any 
future—culminates in the novel’s final paragraph when Harris, an FBI agent arrives and asks 
about Sachs. At this final moment the narrative breaks from its chronotope, which throughout the 
novel has been one of Aaron’s first person present account of his friendship with Ben Sachs: 
“Then I pointed to the studio, and without saying another word I led Harris across the yard in the 
hot afternoon sun. We walked up the stairs together, and once we were inside, I handed him the 
pages of this book” (275). Obviously, it is impossible for Aaron to have handed Harris the literal 
pages of Leviathan; he could not have written its final sentences had he done so. But, unlike 
Sachs, we can interpret this event both ways. Leviathan’s narrative resists staying true to its 
word, insisting to the reader that the book just finished is the book that Harris was handed. The 
future is paradoxically left both open and foreclosed. The words of Leviathan are always the 
same, yet insist that they can be changed, that accident can alter teleology, open the future, even 
if only to deny the transmission of its own historical narrative. While the formal features of 
Leviathan insist that the text is at once both opened and closed, The Virgin Suicides, through its 
second person plural narrator casts doubt upon the veracity of the events it represents. 
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III.  Pasts Always Present 
 Amidst the turmoil of the Cold War’s end, a novelist a generation removed from Auster 
had been composing his own narrative of failed and successful suicide set within an American 
crisis. It was in March 1993, three months after the publication of Leviathan, that Jeffrey 
Eugenides made his debut as a novelist with The Virgin Suicides. Set from June 1973 to July of 
1974 and told in the first person plural, the novel’s narrators—obsessed neighborhood boys 
grown into middle-aged men—attempt to solve the mysterious suicides of the six Lisbon sisters: 
Cecilia, age 13; Lux, age 14; Bonnie, age 15; Mary, age 16; and Therese, age 17. Debra Shostak, 
in “‘A Story We Could Live With’: Narrative Voice, The Reader, and Jeffrey Eugenides’s The 
Virgin Suicides” describes the novel’s first person plural narration as “‘impossible’ in its 
counterintuitive proposition of a group speaking as one, [which] offers Eugenides a rich resource 
to probe cultural conditions, psychological effects, and the reading process” (808). This 
impossible narrative voice corresponds to Leviathan’s impossible ending, in which both the 
future and the past are left open. The story, at the end, is neither over, nor satisfyingly resolved.10 
Like Peter Aaron, the narrators of The Virgin Suicides, despite their efforts, “never find the 
pieces to put them back together” (249).  
Like Colson Whitehead’s veiling of time period in The Intuitionist, discussed in the 
previous chapter, The Virgin Suicides demands careful reading if one wants to know the dates in 
which it is set. In a few throwaway details regarding baseball, the novel tells the reader that it is 
set in 1973—the year of the oil crisis, of Watergate, of in the estimation of many, the end of the 
1960s.11 Mr. Lisbon, the girls’ father, insists that he wants to trade Tigers’ relief pitcher Bob 
Miller, who played for Detroit only in 1973 (49). Further detail allows for one to construct a 
reliable chronology of the novel’s events: “Exhibit #3, however, a photograph taken by Mr. 
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Buell, shows Chase ready to swing his new Louisville Slugger, and in the background the Lisbon 
house has all its shutters open (we find a magnifying glass helpful). The photo was taken on 
October 13, Chase’s birthday and the opening of the World Series” (89). The magnifying glass is 
indeed helpful: the only World Series of the 1970s that began on October 13 took place in 
1973.12  
 The fact that the novel is set from June 1973 to July 1974 uncovers the meaning of the 
Lisbon sisters’ suicides as an expression of American anxiety toward both its present and the 
future—namely the results of the Watergate scandal. This anxiety toward the future, just as 
palpable in 1993, if not more so, than in 1973-74, arises from national crisis. The boys who 
narrate the story about the dissolution of the Lisbon sisters represent a Cold War America that is 
fascinated with Soviet Russia and that has experienced Vietnam. Eugenides thus telegraphs the 
confusion that followed the end of mid-70s America onto mid-90s America. Through the boys, 
Cold War paranoids who go to great lengths to spy on the Lisbon sisters, we are told, “We knew 
that the girls were our twins, and that they knew everything about us though we couldn’t fathom 
them at all [. . .] our job was to create the noise that seemed to fascinate them” (43-44). After 
Cecelia kills herself by jumping out a second story window onto a wrought iron fence in her 
parents’ front yard, neighborhood men come together to remove the fence. Watching the men 
struggle in a genuine act of community to remove the fence results in the narrators musing, “for a 
moment our century was noble again” (54). However, the fence proves too much for the men 
alone, so they have a truck tear it out. Once the truck has torn the fence from the ground 
“Everyone felt a lot better, as though the lake had been cleaned up, or the air, or the other side’s 
bombs destroyed. There wasn’t much you could do to save us, but at least the fence was gone” 
(55). From environmental pollution—a threat already present—the boys shift to thoughts of 
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thermonuclear arms and their foreclosed future. For a moment the Cold War has ended, or at 
least their Cold War feelings have disappeared. The irony here is that these feelings remain 
present, just under the surface, since feeling like the Cold War has ended is very much a Cold 
War feeling. 
To open the future, the narrators of The Virgin Suicides suspend the present as a way of 
comprehending the traumas of the past twenty years of their lives. The boys are trapped in an 
eternal present, as Trip Fontaine, the one person to have dated a Lisbon sister, tells them years 
later of the first time he saw Lux:  
In the orange light the students’ heads looked like sea anemones, undulating quietly, and 
the silence of the room was that of the ocean floor. “Every second is eternal,” Trip told 
us, describing how as he sat in his desk the girl in front of him, for no apparent reason, 
had turned around and looked at him. He couldn’t say she was beautiful because all he 
could see were her eyes. [. . .] the two blue eyes lifted him on a sea wave and held him 
suspended. “She was the still point of the turning world,” he told us, quoting Eliot, whose 
Collected Poems he had found on the shelf of the detoxification center. (78) 
While burnt out Trip quotes from “Burnt Norton” (1936), the narrators allude to the conclusion 
of “The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock” (1920) with their references to the silence of the ocean 
floor and the sea suspending him—“We have lingered in the chambers of the sea / By sea girls 
wreathed with seaweed red and brown / Till human voices wake us and we drown” (129-131). 
Both of Eliot’s poems speak of being trapped in an interminable present. Daniel Grausam has 
written of the lines from “Burnt Norton” that Trip cites and alludes to—“What might have been 
and what has been / Point to one end which is always present”—as they are deployed in Richard 
Powers’s novel Prisoner’s Dilemma (1988) (Eliot 9-10). Grausam argues: “These lines from T.S. 
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Eliot’s ‘Burnt Norton’ are especially apt, gesturing as they do both to the history that produced 
the present and the possibility of other histories creating other presents; like Prisoner’s Dilemma, 
Four Quartets wants to believe that history isn’t teleology” (146). Eliot’s poetry provokes a 
similar meaning in Eugenides’s novel. The Virgin Suicides also wants to believe that history is 
not teleological, going so far as to depict the boys compiling piece after piece of mundane debris 
from the wreckage of the Lisbon sisters. The novel takes the textual form of the case study, a 
gathering of interviews and various exhibits, only some of which we see. This results in the 
convergence of numerous conflicting narratives regarding the Lisbon sisters and the 
impossibility of ever understanding them as anything but a textual construction, the subject of a 
frustrated narrative that obfuscates history for the sake of historicity. 
 While Leviathan presents Sachs’s three simultaneous reasons for his fall, The Virgin 
Suicides provides an even more complex narrative and series of reasons for the Lisbon sisters’ 
suicides. On June 16th Cecelia Lisbon slits her wrists in a failed suicide attempt.13 Cecelia’s 
attempted suicide, however, is not referred to as a suicide; rather, Mrs. Lisbon euphemistically 
calls the event “Cecelia’s Accident” (Eugenides 15). The “we” that stands in for the group of 
boys attempts to gather the real story from various witnesses, themselves included. For instance, 
two neighbors of the Lisbons, Mrs. Buell and Mrs. Scheer, take a Bundt cake “in sympathy” to 
the family (17). When interviewed years later, Mrs. Buell claims that Mrs. Lisbon sent her 
daughters upstairs and put the Bundt cake in the refrigerator, denying the neighbors their wish 
that all should share a piece right then, while the cake was still warm. But the narrator reports, 
“Mrs. Scheer remembered it differently” (18). She claims instead that “The truth is, Mrs. Lisbon 
thanked us quite graciously. Nothing seemed wrong at all. I started to wonder if maybe it was 
true that the girl had only fallen and cut herself. Mrs. Lisbon invited us out to the sun room and 
  132 
we each had a piece of cake” (18). These contradictory narratives open the reported events to 
interpretation, allowing the narrative of The Virgin Suicides, as in Leviathan, to deny the reader 
narrative closure and thus critique teleology. Again, the lack of a coherent past denies the 
narrators the ability to move on, to enter the present and the future. The novel plays with 
accidents and intention, for from this event our narrators are given evidence that allows them to 
present two contradictory stories that leave the reader teasing meaning from the residual silence 
that is left when the narrators will not or cannot say what happened. Either Mrs. Lisbon invited 
Mrs. Buell and Mrs. Scheer in, or she did not. However, Eugenides’s characters accomplish what 
Benjamin Sachs could not, but Peter Aaron could with Leviathan’s conclusion—they make both 
stories happen; the reader is left with impressions from both, despite their being mutually 
exclusive.  
 In revising Cecelia’s suicide attempt, Mrs. Lisbon embraces accident, which she 
correlates with a lack of intentionality or fate. The neighbors’ readings of Mrs. Lisbon’s twist on 
Cecelia’s suicide attempt demonstrate an accident of reading. Herein lies the brilliance of The 
Virgin Suicides’ first-person plural narration. The novel represents a community of readers who 
have compiled gossip and rumor for two decades. The sisters of the novel cannot tell their own 
story, and the middle-aged male narrators know that they can never tell the story of the Lisbon 
sisters in its entirety. Yet this does not stop them from telling the story of the Lisbon sisters as an 
accident that forever changed the way that they tell their own story. The trauma of the sisters’ 
suicides haunts the boys, which is why they attempt to tell the story, to pass it on, to make it past, 
to fill the silence with some sound, any sound, even if it does not sound right. In telling and 
retelling this story—which is merely an exercise in trying to get their story straight—the man-
child narrators suspend history, stranding themselves in the past and present, foreclosing the 
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future.14 This calls to the reader’s attention the problems of understanding the past as a series of 
coherent events, for in their incoherence, the events of The Virgin Suicides lead not to telling, to 
the passing on of history, but, instead, to silence. 
 Leviathan and The Virgin Suicides are stories that present the future as an empty, 
uninhabitable space. Neither of these novels, mired in telling and retelling past events, has any 
space for the future. The inability to narrate history destroys one’s access to the future, stranding 
one in the present, like the reader at the end of Leviathan experiencing the paradox of having 
finished a novel that cannot, if taken at its word, be over. The Virgin Suicides makes a similar 
gesture in its ending, one that leaves the story we have just experienced untold, impossible to 
speak, a series of fragments from the past. The first-person plural narrator makes a closing 
remark that signals the passage of time both in its use of the plural pronoun and in its invocation 
of the numerous times that an attempt has been made to tell the story through piecing it together 
and, each time, has failed to tell the whole story. The narrator moves from a reflection upon the 
Lisbon sisters’ suicides to how these suicides shaped the rest of the narrators’ lives: 
They made us participate in their own madness, because we couldn’t help but retrace 
their steps, rethink their thoughts, and see that none of them led to us. We couldn’t 
imagine the emptiness of a creature who put a razor to her wrists and opened her veins, 
the emptiness and the calm. And we had to smear our muzzles in their last traces, of mud 
marks on the floor, trunks kicked out from under them, we had to breathe forever the air 
of the rooms in which they killed themselves. (Eugenides 248-249) 
There is no teleology—the story of the Lisbon sisters did not have to lead to the boys’ attempt to 
tell their story. The sisters remain a destination that cannot be reached, a treasure that cannot be 
possessed. In other words, they are preserved in the realm of romantic cliché and pubescent 
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fantasy. They were never seen for who they were, merely for whom the boys fantasized them to 
be, which is why the boys “retrace their steps, rethink their thoughts” and find no end, no 
culmination of history. In their manhood, the boys chase down witnesses and try to take away 
subjective bias by adopting the methodology of the case study. Nevertheless, this methodological 
retracing and rethinking—this retelling of the story that is The Virgin Suicides—continues the 
men’s teenage paralysis, their fixation upon the sisters’ paths. The narrators have no future. They 
will never grow up.  
In both of the above cases, some characters possess an identity that others silence and 
overwrite. Even the project of preserving these identities and producing a context in which they 
could be heard only further overwrites the characters and undermines the larger political project 
of imagining their future beyond the Cold War. While these characters speak through the 
accident, no one can know if what they said was what we heard, if what they did was what we 
saw them do, if these things carry meaning, if they even occurred. We must learn to settle then 
into the fictions that they inhabit, into making what we have seen, what we have read, into 
something that it is not. Only through embracing the accident in these texts can we see what 
future waits beneath the accidents of our present, those futures we fight both for and against. The 
reader must accept, defying logic and teleology, that none of these events happened—they are, of 
course, fiction. However, they demand that we be affected as if they did transpire. While Ben 
Sachs cannot have it both ways, the readers of fiction can, and must.  
 
IV.  The X-Files, Fighting the Future through Reconstructing the Past 
 Like the Lisbon sisters, Samantha Mulder, sister of FBI Agent Fox Mulder (David 
Duchovny), disappears during the turmoil of the Watergate scandal. Samantha vanishes on 
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November 27, 1973, the day that the United States Senate confirmed Gerald Ford as Vice 
President of the United States. Her disappearance occurs as she and Mulder talk while, in the 
background, a television news program reports on the missing eighteen-and-a-half minutes of the 
Nixon tapes.15 That Samantha disappears while the eighteen-and-a-half minute gap is being 
reported—what Alexander Haig, positing his “devil theories,” asserted could have been the work 
of “some sinister force”—directly connects the disappearance of Mulder’s sister with 
government conspiracy (Lardner). Mulder becomes convinced that Samantha was abducted, and, 
like the characters in the novels discussed above, understands this event as having occurred for 
several different reasons over the course of the series: he first believes that aliens took her, then, 
later in the series, that it was the government alone, then the government working with aliens, 
who abducted her, and finally that she fell victim to a serial killer. No matter the cause, 
Samantha’s disappearance results in Mulder’s obsession with the paranormal, leading to his 
working the X-Files, in which he believes the answer to his sister’s disappearance and other 
conspiracies await to be unveiled if only he can put the case studies that comprise the X-files 
together and, from scant, fragmentary evidence, write history.  
  In this way, The X-Files engages with Cold War history and postmodern aesthetics more 
explicitly than Leviathan and The Virgin Suicides.16 In its season four episode, “Musings of a 
Cigarette Smoking Man” (1996), the series explores a conspiracy theory that purportedly reveals 
the origins of its most sinister figure, the Cigarette Smoking Man (William B. Davis).17 CSM, a 
member of the shadow government known as the Syndicate, acts throughout the series as a foil, 
and sometime ally, for Agents Mulder and Scully in their attempts to “fight the future,” which is 
to say to fight against the teleological plots of government and alien conspirators. The episode 
focuses on the Cigarette Smoking Man’s role in world events before Mulder begins to work the 
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X-files. In it the viewer is presented with a conspiratorial history of the assassinations of 
President John Kennedy, Martin Luther King Jr., the Cold War’s end, and the existence of alien 
life. The first line of dialogue in the episode is “. . . elaborate and dark conspiracy.” Subject 
established, the episode consists of Melvin Frohike (Tom Braidwood), a member of the 
conspiracy theorist group The Lone Gunmen, telling his colleagues John Fitzgerald Byers (Bruce 
Harwood) and Richard Langley (Dean Haglund), as well as Mulder and Scully, of what he 
believes may be the history of the Cigarette Smoking Man. None of the show’s protagonists are 
seen (except for Frohike at the episode’s end); instead, the viewer watches the Cigarette 
Smoking Man listen to this conversation with the aid of surveillance technology, interspersed 
with flashbacks, both in color and in black and white.  
While the episode depicts no literal act of suicide, the Cigarette Smoking Man gives up 
his existence in order to author the future. The Cigarette Smoking Man undoes himself, with the 
aid of the government, in order to control history, to become, like the CIA conspirators in 
DeLillo’s Libra, a man “who believed history was in [his] care” (127). The show’s creators, in 
revealing the purported history of the Cigarette Smoking Man, explore the creation of convoluted 
narratives that stem from events that are interpreted both as teleological and as the effects of 
chance. Like Auster, and Eugenides, the creators of “Musings of a Cigarette Smoking Man”—
and The X-Files as a whole—imagine a character that is at once a subject of history and the 
author of that same history. His desire for control, his role in authoring history, comes to pass as 
nothing less than a desire to author a future that remains, despite all efforts, indeterminate, left to 
chance, which the series insists can be fought and conquered.  
 The episode focuses upon the Cigarette Smoking Man’s desire to be an author, whether 
in his role as author of history or in his failure to become a successful author of Cold War 
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science fiction spy thrillers. In its representation of various texts—The Manchurian Candidate 
(1959); the titular character’s novel, Take A Chance: A Jack Colquitt Adventure, written under 
the nom de plume Raul Bloodworth; the magazine Roman à Clef that the novel is serialized in; 
and, finally, the magazine from which Frohike has discovered this possible history of the 
Cigarette Smoking Man—the representation of fictions-become-history expresses a post Cold 
War desire for a complete understanding of the past that allows one to author a riskless future.18  
On October 30, 1962, mere days after the Cuban Missile Crisis, the first of the episode’s 
flashbacks begins. We see the Cigarette Smoking Man reading a copy of The Manchurian 
Candidate. Bill Mulder, father of Fox and Samantha, asks: “Why don’t you just go see the 
movie,” to which CSM replies, “I’d rather read the worst novel ever written than sit through the 
best movie ever made.” The episode, from its beginning, ironically privileges the written word 
over visual representation. CSM reads the kind of fiction that he wishes to write while living as a 
member of the shadow government, an author of conspiracy. Bill Mulder shows CSM a photo of 
a one-year old Fox, telling him that Fox just spoke his first word: “J.F.K.” Of course, J.F.K. is 
not so much a word as it is an abbreviation. The episode comments upon condensing signifier for 
signified then proceeds to illustrate the dangers of understanding one’s present and future as 
developing from a belief in condensed, simplified, conspiracy theories of history. The episode 
returns to shots similar to that above, either of the Cigarette Smoking Man reading or writing. 
Here he holds the cover of The Manchurian Candidate to the reader, so that the act of televisual 
viewing and reading combine through allusion (Figure 1). The viewer is told to carefully watch 
as others read and write. 
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Figure 1. Cigarette Smoking Man Reads The Manchurian Candidate 
 
Later called before a group of government officials, the Cigarette Smoking Man is told, 
“There are extraordinary men . . . those who must identify . . . comprehend, and ultimately 
shoulder the responsibility for not only their own existence, but their country’s, and the world’s 
as well.” This statement becomes an offer: the Cigarette Smoking Man can accept his assignment 
to assassinate President Kennedy and become one of history’s extraordinary men, but, the cost of 
accepting this assignment is nothing less than the total erasure of his personal history. In order 
for history to be written, the author must disappear via an act of symbolic suicide. He accepts 
and kills Kennedy. We next see CSM on April 30, 1967 as he sits at a typewriter, completing a 
novel (Figure 2). On the radio Martin Luther King Jr. delivers his speech “It’s a Dark Day in Our 
Nation.” The Cigarette Smoking Man speaks and types, “I can kill you whenever I please . . . but 
not today,” then stares at the page, reading his words. Reading the Cigarette Smoking Man read, 
the viewer notices that the medium close-up and shallow focus forces one to meditate upon the 
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Cigarette Smoking Man’s act of reading his own writing—until the medium of the radio breaks 
into the scene, interrupting our viewing and his reading/writing. Immediately upon finishing his 
novel, King’s words disturb him: “This had driven many to feel that only Marxism has the 
revolutionary spirit. Therefore Communism is a judgment against our failure to make democracy 
real and follow through with the revolution we initiate. Our only hope today lies in our ability to 
recapture the revolution.” As CSM completes his novel he realizes that King must be 
assassinated, implying that the two events connect. As a roman à clef, his novel thinly veils his 
own history, one that he cannot complete because he must continue to author world events. 
 
Figure 2. “I can kill you whenever I please . . .”  
 
Shortly after he assassinates King, CSM receives a rejection letter for his novel, which, in part, 
reads: “I felt the plot of TAKE A CHANCE to be preposterous, the characters unbelievable, the 
ending lame, and the writing, frankly, crap.” The letter, signed Albert Goodwinkle, serves as an 
overt “wink” to the audience from the episode’s creators acknowledging the generic features of 
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the episode, its reliance upon clichéd conspiracy theory, its all too simple history of the Cigarette 
Smoking Man (Figure 3). The Cigarette Smoking Man’s aspirations for the future are  
 
Figure 3. A God Wink. 
 
extinguished due to the intervention of the show’s creators. This reading, however, is 
complicated when, immediately after the viewer and CSM has read the rejection letter, we watch 
CSM watch Robert Kennedy on television, speaking of the assassination of King and quoting 
Aeschylus: “Even in our sleep, pain which cannot forget falls drop by drop upon the heart until 
in our own despair and against our will comes wisdom through the awful grace of god.” The 
Cigarette Smoking Man recites these lines with Kennedy, having just played god in authoring 
history, yet having had his authorial hopes dashed by Goodwinkle. A master at authoring 
conspiracies in history, CSM cannot succeed in becoming a published author of conspiracy 
thrillers. 
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However, when the Cold War ends it appears that he has successfully authored the 
history of the American century. One would imagine that with the conflict’s end CSM would no 
longer have to fight the future. Finally, he could relinquish his role as author of history. It is 
December 24, 1991 when we next see him. He sits in a boardroom being briefed on the progress 
of his plots by a group of men who inform him that no one seems interested in Anita Hill, that 
the Rodney King Trial has been moved to Simi Valley—Saddam Hussein calls, is told to call 
back. Then they learn that Gorbachev has resigned. The Cold War is nearly over. As one of the 
men states: “There’s no more enemies.” CSM hands out Christmas gifts to his colleagues—
matching ties, marking a tying up of the plots of history, the resolution of the Cold War. It seems 
that the end of history is the happy ending that CSM has authored over four decades.  
In his apartment that night the Cigarette Smoking Man types: “Jack Colquitt, alone in his 
apartment at Christmas. He believed in sacrifice. Yet some nights he longed for a second 
chance” (Figure 4). This desire for chance signals that the Cigarette Smoking Man 
retrospectively wishes that he lacked control over history. His desire for success as an author 
here becomes apparent as a yearning for chance, a new life in which the only plots he devises are 
pure fiction, not the orchestration of historical events. Nevertheless, his writing is interrupted 
when the phone rings and he is called away to witness the crash-site of an alien vessel and the 
murder of its survivor. Again, the viewer must watch from the other side of the typewriter as 
history calls the Cigarette Smoking Man away from his act of writing into the authorship of 
world events. With his fellow conspirator, known as Deep Throat—the moniker Mark Felt used 
to distribute information about Watergate to Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein—and here 
called Ronald, CSM asks: “How many historic events have only the two of us witnessed 
together, Ronald? How often did we make or change history? And our names can never grace 
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any pages of record. No monument will ever bear our image. And yet once again, tonight, the 
course of human history will be set by two unknown men standing in the shadows.” After 
voicing his longing to be acknowledged as an author of history, Ronald tells him to kill the alien,  
  
Figure 4. Longing for a second chance. 
 
to which, enigmatically, CSM responds: “I’ve never killed anybody [. . .] I have a chance to go 
an entire lifetime without killing anybody or anything.” This statement brings into doubt all that 
the episode has presented. The history that the episode has depicted begins to unravel, its 
authenticity doubtful. Both the episode and the Cigarette Smoking Man want it both ways. The 
viewer is here asked to take a chance on this possible history.  
Frohike’s words toward the end of episode raise further doubts about the history we have 
just watched. He quotes from Thoreau, “The mass of men lead lives of quiet desperation,” then, 
speaking of the Cigarette Smoking Man, continues, “His life has been anything but quiet, yet I 
believe nothing but desperate. He’s the most dangerous man alive, not so much because he 
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believes in his actions, but because he believes his actions are all which life allows him. And yet, 
the only person that can never escape him is himself.” Frohike reads the Cigarette Smoking Man 
as lacking agency, a victim of historical pressure, the author of a text that resists his control as he 
resists chance, but nevertheless is wholly subject to chance. The episode ends with the Cigarette 
Smoking Man, his sight fixed on Frohike as he emerges from the offices of the Lone Gunmen, 
speaking the concluding lines of his novel: “I can kill you whenever I please . . . but not today.” 
However, Frohike, before emerging, has placed the integrity of the entire history of the Cigarette 
Smoking Man into question, calling into doubt any information that the episode may have 
conveyed, when he says: “So far, this is based on a story I read in one of my weekly 
subscriptions that rang a bell. I’m going to check out the private hacker source that has been 
working on tracking a few leads that can produce definitive proof, and then we’ll have him 
nailed.” Has Frohike taken this history from Roman à Clef—has he read CSM’s novel and 
believed it, or has it been disseminated through other channels? Has the entire episode been a 
fiction crafted by one, or several, of its characters? Is the episode the ending CSM did not 
author?  
The episode literally emerges from the pages of a conspiracy theory. The history depicted 
is not conclusive, possibly something from the pages of Take A Chance, possibly the fabrication 
of a conspiracy theorist. Recorded history resembles fiction, and like the characters in fiction—
the Cigarette Smoking Man, the Lone Gunmen, Mulder and Scully—their actions are not left to 
chance but to authorial design. The episode reflects upon authorship, as the Cigarette Smoking 
Man looks for the issue of Roman á Clef that holds his story; he stares at two magazines that 
point to the episode’s privileging of textuality: Writer’s Block and End Credits—both of which 
promise to help the reader produce writing—literally showing one how to write in the future and 
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into one’s future (Figures 5 and 6). In presenting a linear history, a series of conspiracy theories, 
the episode inspires paranoid thinking among the viewers. This reminds the reader that they are 
watching a fiction, and that history itself, when read as a fiction, can leave one stranded in the 
present with no sense of the future. 
 
Figure 5. Writer’s Block and End Credits. 
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Figure 6. “Warm up to the Cold War Barnburner ‘Second Chance!’” 
 
Likewise, chance intervenes in the publication of the novel Take A Chance. We see CSM 
in his apartment, opening a letter accepting his novel for publication. The content of his novel, 
we discover, is that of alien assassinations, and it will be serialized in the magazine Roman à 
Clef. CSM voices his wish for the artwork to have a “Tom Clancy-ish kind of look,” again 
pointing to the type of writing he wishes to author. However, upon reading his published novel 
he discovers that the ending has been changed, that it is not “ the ending that I wrote. It’s all 
wrong.” After the Cigarette Smoking Man has read the ending that he didn’t write, after he has 
stared at the magazines promising to cure writer’s block, the televisual alludes beyond the 
writerly to the filmic with a parody of the much parodied “Life is like a box of chocolates” scene 
from Forrest Gump (1994) (Figure 7). While the Cigarette Smoking Man’s monologue is little 
better than a bitter parody of Gump’s, the episode comments on itself as a parody of the 
underground history of the American century. While Forrest Gump placed Tom Hanks, as 
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Gump, in a variety of historical moments—shaking hands with Kennedy, being honored by 
Johnson, among other events—in order to reflect upon the turmoil and triumph of the American 
century, “Musings of a Cigarette Smoking Man” provides a shadow history, placing its titular 
character in some of the most traumatic moments of the twentieth century and revealing a history 
that no one can see—a history that, when published, has the “wrong” ending in the pages of a 
pulp magazine—and pointing, perhaps, to another film from 1994, one that lost the best picture 
Academy award to Forrest Gump: Pulp Fiction. The Cigarette Smoking Man is the author of a 
pulp and pulped history, one of the underground detritus of the American century. The episode’s  
 
Figure 7. “Life is like a box of chocolates . . .” 
 
own content builds upon a series of clichés and tired parodies that come together to make a claim 
for the end of the Cold War blocking one’s ability to both author the future and literature that is 
“new.” 
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V. Looking Forward to Nothing 
Leviathan, The Virgin Suicides, and The X-Files insist upon an indeterminate future in 
their open endings. In defying narrative closure, these texts rupture with the past and leave the 
future open to chance. In depicting authorship as having lost the ability to control accident, these 
texts examine a cultural anxiety that, without the Cold War, the future was open, but under threat 
of replicating the same patterns of Cold War life. In other words, it was feared that American 
culture would not produce a new future. These texts show that as the Cold War ended American 
culture struggled to imagine a future beyond that conflict.  
However, the turmoil of this moment and the anxiety that this lack of futurity caused 
resulted in the beginning of a shift away from modernist and postmodern aesthetic practices 
toward an reflexive aesthetic that questions the integrity of narratives, especially in reflecting 
upon the role the United States played in the history of the twentieth century. While critics such 
as Samuel Cohen have identified American fiction’s reflective and retrospective mood as 
emerging in the mid-1990s in texts such as DeLillo’s Underworld (1997), Roth’s American 
Pastoral (1997), and Morrison’s Paradise (1997), one can see in reading Leviathan, The Virgin 
Suicides, and “Musings of a Cigarette Smoking Man,” that this impulse developed from anxieties 
toward the future that were prevalent in the culture and the culture’s texts before the mid-90s. 
The sense of closure and retrospection depicted in these texts emerged from serious doubts that 
the United States had lost its ability to produce a future that could reassure American culture that 
the half-century long conflict was finished, although the nation had evaded full-scale nuclear war 
and emerged triumphant from the Cold War. While this was the happier ending, like the ending 
of Take A Chance, it felt “all wrong.” Despite this being the ending that allowed for a future over 
which the nation now possessed sole authorship, the years that followed saw the culture produce 
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the future through looking back at the Cold War. Having it both ways, looking back in order to 
imagine the future, American society began to long for that time when the enemies were 
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Notes 
1 In “E Unibus Pluram: Television and U.S. Fiction” Wallace writes “irony, poker-faced silence, and fear of ridicule 
are distinctive of those features of contemporary U.S. culture (of which cutting-edge fiction is part) that enjoy any 
significant relation to the television whose weird pretty hand has my generation by the throat” (49) and, writing of 
irony and postmodern maximalist metafiction: “how have irony, irreverence, and rebellion come to be not liberating 
but enfeebling in the culture today’s avant-garde tries to write about? One clue’s to be found in the fact that irony is 
still around, bigger than ever after 30 long years as the dominant mode of hip expression” (67). One could argue 
today that after 50 long years, irony remains as “the dominant mode of hip expression.” Stephen Burn, in Jonathan 
Franzen at the End of Postmodernism, writes “a fascination with the new beginnings to be found in endings seems 
to have been deeply etched into the core of postmodernism” which is but one of many examples from Burn’s study 
in which he describes postmodernism as doing the exact same thing as post-postmodernism in order to prove that 
post-postmodernism is different from its predecessor. Moreover, one could argue that such a statement also places 
postmodernism much closer to modernism (14). Burn admits, “Post-postmodernism explicitly looks back to, or 
dramatizes its roots within postmodernism. As such it is a development from rather than an explicit rejection of, the 
preceding movement, and so—just as modernist works have affinities with postmodernist works—post 
postmodernist novels betray [. . .] a family resemblance to the previous generation’s work” (19) and later goes on to 
say that “Post-postmodernist novels are informed by the postmodernist critique of the naïve realist belief that 
language can be a true mirror of reality, and yet they are suspicious of the logical climax of this critique: Derrida’s 
famous statement that ‘there is nothing outside the text’” (20). According to Burn, this results in younger novelists 
writing less metafiction and “more obviously address[ing] the idea of a real world beyond the problems raised by 
nonreferential systems of discourse” (20-21). In other words, it’s modernist postmodernism—which is to say, it’s 
postmodernism. In “Tribal Politics and the Postmodern Product” Timothy Parrish provides a similar critique of 
Burn: “nearly all of the qualities he identifies as post-postmodernist are exactly what Hutcheon and Jameson 
describe as postmodernist” (651). 
 
2 Paul Auster, after receiving his Master’s from Columbia, traveled to Paris and spent time with Beckett. For an 
extended discussion of Beckett’s influence upon Auster, see “Beckett and Auster: Fathers and Sons and the 
Creativity of Misreading” by Julie Campbell. Eugenides has spoken at length in interviews about the influences of 
both modernist and postmodernist authors, which I quote below. 
 
3 However, at least as early as Pynchon’s V. the texts of postmodernism have played with this idea of rupture. Benny 
Profane experiences no Joycean epiphany when asked what he’s learned at the novel’s end; instead he replies, “I 
haven’t learned a goddamn thing” (491). Of course, in Ulysses Joyce anticipated this in ending each episode with an 
anti-epiphany. For the relationship between DeLillo’s writing and modernism see Philip Nel’s essay “DeLillo and 
Modernism” in The Cambridge Companion to Don DeLillo. Needless to say, there is more work to be done on 
reading modernism, postmodernism, and that which follows postmodernism through their similarities and transitions 
from one to the others rather than through continuing to find difference and rupture. 
 
4 The problem of periodization—in this case modernism to postmodernism to post-postmodernism is well illustrated 
in the journal Modernism/modernity—the mouthpiece of new modernist studies—and its fascination with David 
Foster Wallace in total disregard for nearly any other author of his generation. Modernism/modernity began 
publication in 1994, two years after the journal Contemporary Literature began publishing only articles that treated 
literature published after 1945. The last essay strictly on modernist figures dealt with Dora Marsden and Ezra Pound, 
and was published in 1992. The early nineties then are a time when, institutionally, the fields of modernist studies 
and contemporary literature studies were separated in the pages of publications and contemporary literature began to 
be distinguished as post-45, something separate from modernism proper. 
 
5 In this same issue Timothy Bewes argues, “Paul Auster, the most ‘postmodern’ of contemporary authors, is 
revealed by Lukács’s The Theory of the Novel to be also the most novelistic of writers” (294). For an extended 
discussion of Auster’s, for lack of a better term, “postmodern realism,” see “‘Another History’: Alternative 
Americas in Paul Auster’s Fiction” by Jesús Ángel González. 
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6 Aaron’s narration is composed over the course of two months, from July 4, 1990 to September 5, 1990 (3, 272). 
For a brief discussion of chance in Auster’s oeuvre, see Steven E. Alford’s “Chance in Contemporary Narrative: The 
Example of Paul Auster,” and Debra Shostak’s “In the Country of Missing Persons: Paul Auster’s Narratives of 
Trauma.” In No Accident, Comrade (2011) Steven Belletto links Auster’s representations of chance to the Cold War: 
“Auster’s work is a vestige of Cold War attitudes about narrative insofar as it is uneasy about the nature of its own 
design, an anxiety made visible through its abiding interest in narrative chance” (135). 
 
7 Although the Cold War, by many accounts was still winding down in 1990, Aaron reports late in the novel, “the 
Cold War suddenly stopped. But Sachs was still out there, a solitary speck in the American night, hurtling toward 
his destruction in a stolen car” (266). Jonathan Culler, in On Puns: The Foundations of Letters writes that in the pun 
lies “an opposition that we find difficult to evade or overcome: between accident or meaningless convergence and 
substance or meaningful relation. (16). Belletto reads this passage in No Accident, Comrade, extending Culler’s 
discussion of puns to a reading of narrative chance in the works of Nabokov (62-64). 
 
8 While Emma Hegerty, in her essay “The Practice of Solitude: Agency and the Postmodern Novelist in Paul 
Auster’s Leviathan,” reads this scene differently, stating, “Sachs concentrates upon the part he played in the turn of 
events” (855), I read Sachs as being unable to decide what to concentrate upon, which leads to him desiring a state 
of passivity, one in which he can have it “both ways.”  
 
9 In “Portraits in Absentia: Repetition Compulsion and the Postmodern Uncanny in Paul Auster’s Leviathan” Scott 
A. Dimovitz writes, “Leviathan rejects postmodern notions of identity as subjectivity, suggesting that identity could 
be defined not merely as an intersection of institutions, society or language, but rather as the meeting place of 
subjects and objects—the old humanist division between the individual and the world”—which we see in Sachs’s 
fixation upon his birth coinciding with the dropping of the bomb (447). For an extended reading of Sachs as author 
of literature and terror, see Brendan Martin’s chapter, “The Authority of Authorship: The Ambiguities of Life-
Writing in Leviathan” in his monograph, Paul Auster’s Postmodernity. 
 
10 For an extended discussion of narrative voice in The Virgin Suicides and Middlesex (2002) see Claudia Ioana 
Doroholschi’s essay “Viewing Trip: Point of View and Meaning in the Novels of Jeffrey Eugenides.”  
 
11 In 1973 Nervous Breakdown Andreas Killen provides an extensive study of that year as “a cultural watershed, a 
moment of major realignments and shifts in American politics, culture, and society. This year marked not just the 
end of the sixties but the onset of a debate, one that continues to this day, about the legacy of that turbulent decade” 
(3). Both The Virgin Suicides and The X-Files treat this year in the manner Killen describes.  
 
12 In “‘Why Don’t You Just Leave It Up To Nature’: an Adaptationist Reading of the Novels of Jeffrey Eugenides,” 
Kenneth Womack and Amy Mallory-Kani claim that the novel extends into August of 1974. Rachel McLennan, in 
“Chasing After the Wind: The Adolescent Aporias of Jeffrey Eugenides” reads The Virgin Suicides as a coming of 
age story for both the narrators—who never mature—and for the United States, agreeing with Kenneth Millard’s 
claims regarding the novel in Coming of Age in Contemporary American Fiction, emphasizing, however, that “the 
disappearing female adolescents in Eugenides’s novels illustrate that narratives of female adolescents, authored and 
authorized by themselves, would seemingly not be possible” in “Eugenides’s novels, in which teleological narrative 
development, and the male subject position it validates, is dominant in the American societies depicted” (35). 
However, the novel’s narrative—the boys’ narrative—reaches no teleological end. Resolution could only be reached 
if the Lisbon sisters could tell their own stories. In “Running Out of Gas: The Energy Crisis in 1970s Suburban 
Narratives” Christian Long historicizes the turmoil of Eugenides’s novel to 1973, writing “The Virgin Suicides 
accepts the volatility of oil and energy crises as facts of life, which in turn give force to the Lisbon girls’ inexorable 
movement toward suicide as a refutation of the suburban form, a cry against the suburban development pattern’s 
larger self-destructive logic” (357). Each of these readings accept that the domestic politics of the novel’s setting 
bleed into the characters’ actions, which in turn allow the reader to historicize both the present of the novel’s setting 
and the present of its publication. 
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13 The date of Cecelia’s suicide attempt corresponds to Bloomsday, June 16th, the day on which Joyce’s Ulysses 
(1922) is set. Eugenides discusses modernism’s influence upon him in an interview with James Schiff that his 
generation read “backwards,” beginning with experimental works—avant-garde modernism and postmodernism—
then moved back to “realist” works (103). More directly, Eugenides discusses in the same interview Faulkner’s “A 
Rose For Emily,” in regard to its first person plural narrator, as an indirect, he says “unconscious” influence upon 
The Virgin Suicides—“unconscious” because he claims not to have remembered “A Rose for Emily” until finishing 
The Virgin Suicides (105). Eugenides directly addresses the influence of modernism when he states: “Ezra Pound’s 
dictum to ‘make it new’ is still something I think about” (106). Finally, in regard to the influence of modernism 
upon Eugenides, he states that Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man “technically changed [his] life” (116). 
Eugenides shares these same sentiments in an interview with Jonathan Safran Foer (76). 
 
14 Shostak writes of the novel’s conclusion: “Perhaps ‘history’ is what has been most repressed in the narrative [the 
narrators] construct because history would require insertion of the girls’ uncontextualized voices” (826). Like the 
Reagan of the prior chapter, history is repressed and forgotten. However, it is significant that in The Virgin Suicides 
this history is that of the Cold War. 
 
15 This information is relayed in the tenth episode of the fourth season, “Paper Hearts,” which was written by Vince 
Gilligan, creator of Breaking Bad (2008-2013). Ilsa J. Bick, in “The Trauma Is Out There: Historical Disjunctions 
and The Posttraumatic Narrative as Process in The X-Files” writes of Samantha Mulder’s disappearance as 
“articulated into an overtly paranoid construction as [Mulder] and fellow Special Agent Dana Scully (Gillian 
Anderson) uncover government conspiracies and retroactive denials of these conspiracies. This one highly personal 
event, of which Mulder possesses only fragmentary memories, is the nexus about which he organizes the world and 
is the rupture in his history to which the series ritualistically returns” (321). Mulder’s paranoid reading of the X-
Files, based upon the traumatic loss of his sister, very much parallels the investigation of The Virgin Suicides 
narrators—both stemming from the loss of girls during Watergate, recovered through case studies and witness 
testimony. In “Alien Assassinations: The X-Files and the Paranoid Structure of History” Robert Markley writes: “At 
the beginning of every episode, viewers of The X-Files are confronted by the paradoxical mantras of post-Watergate 
consciousness: white capital letters appear against menacing backgrounds warning us to ‘Trust No One’ and 
declaring that ‘The Truth Is Out There.’ The episodes that follow these injunctions fascinate us [. . .] because we 
respond viscerally as well as intellectually to weekly suggestions that we are trapped in a history that we have not 
made and no longer trust” (77). 
 
16 Sherry R. Truffin, in “Trying to Tell ‘The Truth’: Metafiction and Historiographic Metafiction in The X-Files,” 
writes “The X-Files may be the most popular form of historiographic metafiction ever produced. The show is [. . .] 
an extended meditation on the inescapability and elusiveness of history, both personal and public” (249). For a more 
general discussion of postmodernism and The X-Files, see Doug Mann’s “Truth, The X-Files, and the Postmodern 
Condition” and Douglas Kellner’s “The X-Files and the Aesthetics and Politics of Postmodern Pop,” which reads the 
series as imploding genre, performing pastiche, and undermining the conventions of both modernist and 
postmodernist aesthetics (161, 164). Christy L. Burns, in “Erasure: Alienation, Paranoia, and Loss of Memory in 
The X-Files” writes “While still participating in this construction of American paranoia, The X-Files also effectively 
deconstructs American conspiracy theories and the same paranoia.” (199). 
 
17 In this episode Chris Owens plays the young cigarette smoking man.  
 
18 Markley writes that this episode “may be the most typical, or archetypical, of any aired during the first four 
seasons of the series because [. . .] the Cancer Man is driven by his alienation from the very Truth to which he 
presumably holds the key. As his desire to become a pulp novelist, to reveal the Truth in, and only in fictional form 
suggests, he becomes a stand-in for a Symbolic Order (the “government”) structured around the injunction engraved 
on his lighter ‘Trust No One’” (84-85). He also writes of the Cigarette Smoking Man’s desire: “to step out of the 
shadows of history and into print is, in some measure, to compensate for his lack of a name, to confirm his ‘second 
chance’ as Raul Bloodworth” (93). 
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Chapter 3 
From Split Atoms to Spliced Genes: the Evolution of Cold War Fear  
Only by an ingenious economy, an accident of evolution, does the organ of ingestion sometimes 
get to be used for song. 
–J. M. Coetzee, Elizabeth Costello (2003) 
I. Looking Back in Order to Look Forward 
“A Colloquy of Ancient Men,” from the beginning of Richard Kenney’s collection The 
Invention of the Zero (1993) diplays a problem of writing historical poetry that is aware of its 
representation of contingency:  
1 
In the beginning was the 
Word comes weird. . . . After 
2 
AE: world. . . . The Lord God does not play dice with the 
JRO: worlds. . . . We waited until the blast had passed, walked out  
of the shelter and then it was extremely solemn. We knew the 
world would not be the same. I remembered the line from the 
Hindu scripture, the Bhagavad-Gita: Vishnu is trying to per- 
suade the Prince that he should do his duty and to impress him 
he takes on his multi-armed form and says Now I am become 
Death, the destroyer of 
CD: World monkeys; and from the latter, at a remote period, Man, 
the wonder and glory of the universe, proceeded. . . . The  
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Simiadae then branched off into two great stems, the New 
World and the Old (Kenney 7)  
The initials stand for Albert Einstein, J. Robert Oppenheimer, and Charles Darwin. In the above 
passage, the atomic bomb becomes capable of reducing life to zero through physical violence. 
The fears that the bomb created and perpetuated, however, may be, on the level of ideas, no more 
violent than the Darwinian revolution’s reduction of man to a “world monkey.” While 
humankind may be a world monkey, it is also a word monkey, capable of language, and a weird 
monkey, in part because of this use of language. In his use of the phrase weird—meaning fated—
monkey, Kenney ascribes significance to humanity’s ability to understand its historical situation 
through its being born into and use of language. The text brings together words, weirds, and 
worlds, twisting about in search for an origin of, if not human being then the beginning of 
modern human being. The force of Kenney’s poetry emerges from its play on the alphabetic 
similarity between these three words and therefore hinges upon the accidents of the English 
language’s development. It is from this accidental similarity that the poem proceeds to spin 
meaning, all the while telling a story of how origin stories are always told after. “In the 
beginning was the / Word” expresses its meaning through enjambment. How can the word exist 
before that which it signifies?1 This transposition, or hysteron proteron, continues with the 
proverb “after word comes weird,” which performs a meaning similar to that of the passage cited 
above—expressing the ease of reading history as teleological while denying a linear teleological 
reading. Kenney thus undermines teleology, twists the words, makes them weird, and in doing so 
reveals the search for origins as often being a veiled search for an explanation that history moves 
toward a final cause. The mention of the word and weird leads to a transposed series of voices 
expressing the state of humankind over the course of the twentieth century—while the passage 
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clutches for a beginning it leads to new voices already ancient, going back to Newton and others 
for some kind of grounding in the modern.  
The search for a zero, a beginning, is also a nothing, an absence. It is an invention 
through language, through the study of history. This study and invention is, in Kenney’s poem, a 
search for something that can be traced back ad infinitum. Hence the origin, the zero, must be 
invented. When read with this meaning, The Invention of the Zero complicates origin’s 
relationship with telos, which is to say that there may be no relationship between the two. In 
other words, if one wishes to find an origin and if one wishes to find a telos, Kenney’s poem 
posits that one may be just as fictional as the other. Kenney writes into his poem the systematic 
search for order in the universe via the study of physics. Einstein’s line, from a letter to Max 
Born written in 1926 (Einstein 91), discusses quantum physics, a bifurcation of the field of 
physics that invented a need for a theory of everything, or, as some call it, a final theory.2 Here 
the poem begins to meditate upon unification through bifurcation, taking a story of fate, of the 
weird, and expressing it as a denial of chance, which was refuted in the original correspondence 
(though eighteen years later) when Max Born wrote, “you have to throw dice in your 
deterministic world” (Born 152).   
Kenney throws us forward to a seminal moment in twentieth century physics, one that 
shifts from the throwing of two dice to the splitting of the atom—both images of an event 
emerging from either combination or bifurcation—one coming from two, two coming from one. 
Kenney most likely found the words of Oppenheimer in The Making of the Atomic Bomb (1986) 
by Richard Rhodes, in which the zero is the ground zero of the first detonation, where 
Oppenheimer is described as “the theoretical physicist who was also a poet, who found physics, 
as Bethe says, ‘the best way to do philosophy’” (Rhodes 676). Kenney’s poetry, a reordering of 
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found words, famous quotations of famous quotations, moving a word here, a phrase there, 
making the language weird, making it, as Pound commanded, new, reflects not only upon the 
new sciences of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but also demonstrates a doubt that 
shudders through the language. This shudder comes to be expressed in the culture when this 
language becomes a common form of expression—with these words, the throwing of dice and 
the destruction of worlds become common sayings in an all too uncommon world.  
Dice that are said to not be thrown and a bomb that was certainly exploded lead us 
forward in the poem, backward in time, to Darwin’s words from The Descent of Man (1871), the 
denotation of which was historically a greater detonation than that of Oppenheimer’s bomb. 
Kenney has reversed Darwin’s words in his poem; the original reads, “The Simiadae then 
branched off into two great stems, the New World and Old World Monkeys, and from the latter, 
at a remote period, Man, the wonder and glory of the Universe, proceeded” (Darwin 193). Kenny 
constructs origin through the use of hysteron proteron, the latter coming prior, the after coming 
first. His writing of origins is based upon making words weird, as when he adds “world” into the 
opening words of Einstein. Doing so binds form and content, and allows him to show the 
bifurcation of physics into quantum physics—expressing the competition between fields—which 
leads to the description of the splitting of the atom. Moving beyond physics, we read the third 
speaker, Darwin, and his detailing of the bifurcation of two kinds of monkey that leads to the 
human, who somehow exists at the center of a universe that, as the descent from other animal 
species designates, man only imagined himself inhabiting. From this invented center humankind 
nonetheless has inquired into the secrets of the atom, split them, parsed them, and thrown the 
dice.  
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God may or may not play dice, but man is a gambler, and as this chapter will 
demonstrate, the early 1990s were a time where man looked back at the history of the twentieth 
century and wondered at all of the chances that were taken in the name of science, in the name of 
humanity. While I argued in the last chapter that American culture suffered from an inability to 
imagine futurity, this chapter examines how American culture at the same time turned to deep 
history for a sense of the past at the end of the Cold War. Kenney’s verse reflects upon one of the 
great concerns of twentieth century science, namely the cultural dominance that two sciences 
held over culture in the twentieth century: physics and biology. In the first half of the century 
physics was the dominant field in its captivation of the producers and consumers of culture, but 
by the 1950s the two sciences were in competition. At the end of the century, biology had 
emerged as the science that popular culture fixated upon.  
This chapter examines the way that two texts from the final years of the Cold War reflect 
upon the relationship between biology and literature, particularly in regard to how the cultural 
imagination shifted from a fear of the consequences of splitting atoms to the consequences of 
splicing genes. In this chapter I read The Gold Bug Variations (1991) and the novel Jurassic 
Park (1990) by Michael Crichton as well as Kenney’s poetry. In reading novels alongside poetry, 
this chapter shows how evolutionary scale penetrated and permeated the culture. Reading these 
texts alongside the evolutionary biology that they use to explore the various scales of human 
existence—scales of time and space, scales of affect ranging from apathy to sympathy—I 
examine the way that these texts represent, through their use of science, the ideological shifts 
regarding the end of the Cold War. Moreover, Cricthon’s and Powers’s novels each represent 
evolution as a series of accidents without teleology, a series of changes that occur due to a 
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changing environment. In turning to evolutionary scales of time, a deep history, both texts 
examine how events occur without intentionality and instead occur by accident. 
Reading these texts allows one to see the waning of the initial fears that emerged and 
played out over the first thirty years of the Cold War and also reveals how and why the culture 
invented and indulged in a fear of genetic manipulation—a fear that was not wholly new but 
instead mutated and emerged from the great fear of the Cold War, nuclear annihilation. While 
nuclear annihilation was the great physical fear of the Cold War, the great ideological fear was 
communism’s defeat of capitalism. Although this chapter begins with a reading of the 
relationship between the fear of nuclear annihilation and the fear of genetic manipulation, it turns 
to a discussion of the power of capital—particularly after the end of the Cold War—to be spent 
upon the manipulation of genes. In this regard, the representation of genetic manipulation 
becomes a metaphor for the manipulation of economic markets, which is an expression of the 
fears of the ends of history and the ends of humanity. Genetic manipulation also stands in for 
authorship over that which cannot be authored. Both texts warn that chance cannot be controlled 
at the level of DNA—and demonstrate that accidents will occur, no matter how much control 
human subjects believe themselves to have. 
 
II. Scale, Extinction, and the Cold War Imagination 
The cultural impact of such texts as Kubrick’s Dr. Strangelove (1964), Pynchon’s 
Gravity’s Rainbow (1973), Nevil Shute’s novel, and its film adaptation, On the Beach (1957, 
1959), or the TV movie The Day After (1983) demonstrate thermonuclear war as the foremost 
threat of the Cold War. The aforementioned texts comprise part of a large array of works that 
explicitly or implicitly depict nuclear war as the horror that reigned over and ended not only the 
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historical period, but human civilization as well. Yet the utter obliteration of life that 
thermonuclear war threatened was but the most blatant of numerous threats. The specter of 
genetic mutation due to exposure to nuclear radiation (e.g. Godzilla, or any number of comic 
book characters) also produced a fear that continues to inform our recollections of the Cold War.  
These two fears share an intimate relationship. If the first—total thermonuclear war—
doesn’t get you, the second—mutation due to exposure—certainly will. Mutation functioned 
imaginatively, of course, as a fantastic alternative to a more horrifying reality, death due to 
radiation. Nevertheless, this relationship was only complicated in 1973 with the first successful 
genetically modified bacteria, which presented a new threat—the scientific altering of living 
material. This new threat represented an attempt to control the act of mutation—in melodramatic 
science fictional parlance, to play god. And while the consequences of playing god is the subject 
of much earlier literature, from Shelley’s Frankenstein (1818) to Wells’ The Island of Doctor 
Moreau (1896), it was nevertheless in the final years of the Cold War that the fear of genetic 
manipulation began to take the place of thermonuclear annihilation as American culture’s 
dominant fear, namely in that the fiction of genetic manipulation had become reality.  
This shift from fear of nuclear war to that of genetic manipulation manifested anxieties 
about deep time in the final decade of the Cold War. The collapse of the Soviet Union produced 
angst from victory, which arose in debates about the end of history. The texts I discuss—Michael 
Crichton’s Jurassic Park (1990) and Richard Powers’s The Gold Bug Variations (1991)—situate 
American culture and its fears on varying scales of time, looking both back at the Cold War and 
forward to an uncertain future. Mark McGurl has termed the literary historian’s interest in deep 
time “the posthuman comedy, a critical fiction meant to draw together a number of modern 
literary works in which scientific knowledge of the spatiotemporal vastness and numerousness of 
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the nonhuman world becomes visible as a formal, representational, and finally existential 
problem” (537). Jurassic Park and The Gold Bug Variations explore such formal, 
representational, and existential problems through an interrogation of how the shift in the 
predominant fear of thermonuclear war to genetic manipulation shaped imagined scales of time; 
examining these texts in the context of the Cold War’s end demonstrates this conflict’s 
continuing power over the contemporary American imagination. In reading Jurassic Park and 
Gold Bug I demonstrate how the renaissance in Cold War studies can effectively change our 
understanding of old and new technologies’ influence over shifting American anxieties, and in 
doing so, show how attention to the representation of emerging technologies in interstitial texts 
can productively add to Cold War studies. 
While Bruno Latour has called Richard Powers “the master of scientifiction,” and 
Crichton was, since the publication of The Andromeda Strain (1969) considered a master of 
Science Fiction, they both deploy hard science in their novels while also moving freely into the 
realms of the speculative (Latour x).3 Although Powers has stated that reading Jurassic Park 
with Gold Bug “wasn’t a juxtaposition that would have naturally occurred to me,” I argue that 
when read together these two novels provide insight into the final years of the Cold War and the 
conflicts that followed (Tortorello). In “Chaos and Complexity in Richard Powers’s The Gold 
Bug Variations,” Scott Hermanson compares Crichton and Powers: “Although other writers 
(Michael Crichton, William Gibson) may make reference to chaos theory and its components, 
they rarely go beyond creative metaphors and quirky plot twists. Powers, on the other hand, 
creates a world based on nonlinear dynamics” (38). While I agree with Hermanson’s 
comparison, in looking beyond the bounds of genre and the distinctions between “middlebrow” 
and “highbrow,” one comes to see these two novels express a cultural anxiety about the end of 
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the Cold War that exhibits popular understandings of time scales. These novels depict this 
anxiety in their representation of the threat of genetic contamination stemming from nuclear 
fallout or rapid evolution, using scale and metaphor to examine the accidental origin of all life 
and the potential for all life to accidentally end. Crichton and Powers, while not alone in 
representing these anxieties, provide a very similar take on the end of the Cold War from two 
different perspectives in the culture, and together, these novels demonstrate the penetration of 
one particular set of fears throughout late 1980s and early 1990s American culture. This fear of 
biological transformation due to radiation can be traced to a much earlier period of the conflict, 
yet it permeated the culture well into the 1990s and still continues to shape America’s 
contemporary anxieties and domestic and foreign policies.  
The 1980s were a period in which the atomic and the biologic and their two different 
scales of time collided and coalesced, each changing the other. In focusing on the varying scales 
of the evolutionary and the nuclear, both novels explore the proliferating fears that sprang from 
the belief that science can control nature, and, if science can control nature, then it can control 
accident. Fredric Jameson, in Archaeologies of the Future (2005), writes that over the last half of 
the twentieth century “the paradigm shift[ed] in modern science itself from physics to the life 
sciences” (67). This change and the problems of depicting it in narrative are played out in the 
pages of Gold Bug and Jurassic Park. Jameson continues, “it seems likely that today the 
complexities of biology and the genetic, indeed bio-power itself, offer a content and a raw 
material far more recalcitrant to plot formation than even Einsteinian cosmology and the 
undecidability of atomic sub-particles” (67). This shift signaled anxieties of the biological as 
replacing those of the nuclear. A particularly emblematic example is the image of a mushroom 
cloud comprised of dinosaurs, which concludes the summer 1984 Diacritics issue “Nuclear 
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Criticism” (see Figure 1). Zoë Sophia’s rubber stamp piece, from her series Extinction Sux, 
constructs a relationship between the extinction of the dinosaurs and the possibility of man-made 
extinction. She depicts the fear of human extinction as analogous to the extinction of the 
dinosaurs. This anachronistic nuclear apocalypse made of extinct bodies shows the viewer that 
human history can end, just as these creatures much larger and older than us were obliterated. 
Jurassic Park and The Gold Bug Variations, when read together, provide details of the culture’s 
displacement of its anxieties regarding extinction from the imagination of thermonuclear war to 
genetic engineering. Integral to this shift is the turning of the discoveries of science from their 
use as weapons in an ideological struggle with the Soviet Union to the sole purposes of capital, a 
displacement that emerged from the disappearance of thermonuclear war as an immediate threat.  
With the United States the only remaining superpower, the nuclear no longer threatened to 
obliterate futurity; thus the biological would be allowed to proliferate. Both Gold Bug and 
Jurassic Park are products of the cultural imagination of this period and shaped the way the 
culture responded to these new hopes and threats. In this transition the dinosaur plays a 
prominent role, as the Sophia piece and Jurassic Park demonstrate; in the former the dinosaur 
represents the continued fear of nuclear annihilation, while in the latter, it presents a burgeoning 
fear of genetic manipulation. Reading geneticist Erwin Chargaff’s 1976 letter to Science, “On the 
Dangers of Genetic Meddling” (a text that The Gold Bug Variations and Jurassic Park share), 
one begins to see how all three of these texts express a cultural transition from the dominant fear 
of nuclear annihilation to that of genetic manipulation. “You cannot recall a new form of life” 
reads the second epigraph of Jurassic Park; this is taken from a longer passage in Chargaff’s 
letter that pleads: “You can stop splitting the atom; you can stop visiting the moon; you can stop 
using aerosols; you may even decide not to kill entire populations by the use of a few bombs. But 
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Figure 1. From Extinction Sux, rubber-stamp by Zoë Sophia. 
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you cannot recall a new form of life” (938). This passage conflates genetic manipulation and the 
dangers of the nuclear; the dinosaurs of Jurassic Park are the new forms of life that cannot be 
recalled, and are, in Crichton’s novel, a far graver threat than the thermonuclear.  
 Gold Bug presents genetic manipulation in a similar manner. Jan O’Deigh narrates a trip 
to the country with Franklin Todd and geneticist Stuart Ressler. Todd and Ressler argue about 
the benefits and hindrances of genetic engineering and Ressler cites Chargaff (mistaking the 
source as Nature rather than Science): “Check out Chargaff’s piece in Nature. Half-dozen years 
old. ‘Have we the right to counteract, irreversibly, the evolutionary wisdom of millions of years . 
. . ? The world is given to us on loan. We come and we go. . . .’ This, from the fellow who first 
revealed the base rations of DNA” (410-411). The rest of the passage Ressler recites comes from 
the end of Chargaff’s letter, which continues: “and after a time we leave earth and air and water 
to others who come after us. My generation or perhaps the one preceding mine, has been the first 
to engage, under the leadership of the exact sciences, in a destructive colonial warfare against 
nature. The future will curse us for it” (940). Chargaff calls the reader’s attention to the 4 billion 
year old history of life on earth and the minuteness of human significance in this process, a long 
history and a long futurity with which both Gold Bug and Jurassic Park engage. Powers and 
Crichton, by referring to Chargaff, call attention to the immense power that humankind has come 
to possess and to a larger sense of being in the world, a sense of science not only colonizing 
nature, but also colonizing the future. Nevertheless, both authors, through quoting Chargaff 
invoke contingency and insist that accidents will happen. Nature plays dice, via natural selection, 
but they show that humankind wants to load the dice. 
The representation of historical events through such juxtaposed scales pushes the reader 
to the limits of the sensible, extending metaphor to the point that it carries meaninglessness as its 
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most prominent meaning.4 This act is political in that it forces the reader to question the passage 
of history, to imagine events on a larger scale and consider what could have happened had 
different events occurred; in other words, it demands a reader acknowledge that the history we 
know could be fiction, the fiction we know could be history. While one could claim that this is 
merely an effect of historical fiction, these two novels stand out in their exploration of the 
accidents of the recent past. The interest in scale that these novels depict reorients the typical 
vision of witnessing history firsthand as a chain of events. They represent, through their use of 
scale, one single catastrophe: capital unfolding without control, engineering life with its only end 
the proliferation of more capital. Through deploying evolutionary and nuclear scales, both 
authors remove telos from the story of the human, placing the human within the natural world 
and emphasizing the dangers of humans embracing teleological thought.5 Description of varying 
scales, especially through the use of metaphor, presents what Bruce Robbins has identified as 
two possible ways for the American novel to address events at a global, rather than national, 
scale: a “confession of the novel’s inability to tell meaningful stories of identity and relationship 
at the global scale [. . .] reflecting back to us the world’s true meaninglessness,” and “reading the 
distant world with sympathy and accuracy, or at least a good-faith effort to make it as familiar as 
the streets where we work or live” (1097). Though Robbins is discussing more recent novels, 
texts like Jurassic Park and Gold Bug, through their exploration of scale, place the United 
States’ role in the world within a longer, more encompassing timeframe. Rather than situating 
the United States, or even the human, at the peak of a hierarchy, Powers and Crichton represent 
the human on an evolutionary scale, placing our species on a continuum amongst all other forms 
of life. Moreover, in depicting evolutionary scale alongside nuclear scale, these novels examine 
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how the culture’s imaginings of the evolutionary originate in the threat of thermonuclear war, 
mass extinction, and the conflict between American capitalism and Soviet Communism. 
The threat of genetic manipulation with which these novels are concerned is the act of 
turning the discoveries of science to the uses of capital. Stuart Ressler makes explicit the fears of 
Jurassic Park when he responds to Todd’s question, “So what bothers you about genetic 
engineering?”:  
“It’s not science. Science is not about control. It is about cultivating a perpetual condition 
of wonder in the face of something that forever grows one step richer and subtler than our 
latest theory about it. It is about reverence, not mastery. It might, from time to time, spin 
off an occasional miracle cure of the kind you dream about. The world we would know, 
the living, interlocked world, is a lot more complex than any market. The market is a 
poor simulation of the ecosystem; market models will never more than parody the 
increasingly complex web of interdependent nature. All these plates in the air, and we 
want to flail at them. ‘Genetic engineering’ is full of attempts to replace a dense, 
diversified, heterogeneous assortment of strains with one superior one. Something about 
us is in love with whittling down: we want the one solution that will drive out all others. 
Take our miracle superstrains, magnificent on the surface, but unlike the messy 
populations of nature, deceptive, thin, susceptible. One bug. One blight. . . . No; the 
human marketplace has about as much chance of improving on the work of natural 
selection as a per diem typist has of improving Bartlett’s Familiar Quotations.” (Powers 
411-412) 
 According to Ressler, pure science is not about telos but about the pursuit of discovery without 
intended ends. He favors, as a form of emergence, accident over pre-determination, emphasizing 
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that history, both ancient and recent, is far too complex for anyone to understand.6 Just as 
capitalist markets fluctuate based off of chance events, so too does life.7 To attempt to exact 
control is only to manufacture telos—a narrative, in this case—from chance. Genetic engineering 
attempts to exert control over something that has never been controlled. At the very least a 
hubristic endeavor, such meddling recalls the desire to split the atom. Neither was undertaken for 
the sake of discovery alone, but instead for a greater cause—the first, war and the second, 
capital. In either case, tragedy emerges from a semantic difference: deploying science to inflict 
death or control life. Ressler wants a science that does not answer to capitalism, a model not 
based upon the market, something that he imagines as more natural, that cannot be authored, but 
must emerge. We see that he desires the free pursuit of science, but he does not want science on 
the free market.  
 
III. A Prehistoric End of History   
 While in Gold Bug we do not get to see the ramifications of science on the free market, 
Jurassic Park depicts the horrifying ramifications of science for profit: the attempt to control life 
inflicts death, and the potential for scientific breakthroughs is accompanied by the potential for 
destruction. Making history come to life literally means risking the end of life. The novel 
emphasizes the initial problems of imagining an end to history by using evolution as a means to 
describe scale and the problems of historicizing. If Francis Fukuyama’s “The End of History,” 
which appeared in the same summer as the events of Crichton’s novel, also became a story of the 
last man, then Jurassic Park can be productively read as a conceit for what kind of life comes 
after history. The novel resists the essay “The End of History,” in which Fukuyama asserts that 
the twentieth century presented two threats to liberalism: fascism and communism. Crichton’s 
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text instead explores the potential problems of the invisible hand guiding genetic research, 
positing that there is a third challenge to liberalism: capitalism.8 The following instance of 
Jurassic Park representing scale—in this case, in the words of mathematician and chaos theorist 
Ian Malcolm—illustrates capitalism’s conflict with liberalism:  
And now chaos theory proves that unpredictability is built into our daily lives. It is as 
mundane as the rainstorm we cannot predict. And so the grand vision of science, 
hundreds of years old—the dream of total control—has died in our century. And with it 
much of the justification, the rationale for science to do what it does. And for us to listen 
to it. Science has always said that it may not know everything now but it will know, 
eventually. But now we see that isn’t true. It is an idle boast. (313) 
Ian Malcolm, like Stuart Ressler in Gold Bug, sees the pursuit of science as a non-teleological 
endeavor. Yet while Ressler opposes corporatizing science, Malcolm’s philosophy is more 
complicated; he rejects the capitalist pursuit of science and also denies teleology through 
rebutting Stalin’s defense of science in Dialectical and Historical Materialism, which reads: 
“social life, the history of society, ceases to be an agglomeration of ‘accidents’, for the history of 
society becomes a development of society according to regular laws, and the study of the history 
of society becomes a science” (19). For Stalin there are no accidents, only events without 
understood causes, “things which are as yet not known, but which will be disclosed and made 
known by the efforts of science and practice” (17). Both Malcolm and Ressler understand 
science as a constant pursuit of chance, of happenstance, which allows them to both deploy the 
pursuit of science as a pursuit of happiness—thus signed as an American endeavor, one that, at 
the end of history, takes on the resonance of a purely capitalist venture. Malcolm continues:  
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We are witnessing the end of the scientific era. Science, like other outmoded systems, is 
destroying itself. As it gains in power, it proves itself incapable of handling the power. 
Because things are going very fast now. Fifty years ago, everyone was gaga over the 
atomic bomb. That was power. No one could imagine anything more. Yet, a bare decade 
after the bomb, we began to have genetic power. And genetic power is far more potent 
than atomic power. And it will be in everyone’s hands. It will be in kits for backyard 
gardeners. Experiments for schoolchildren. Cheap labs for terrorists and dictators. And 
that will force everyone to ask the same question—What should I do with my power?—
which is the very questions science says it cannot answer. (Crichton 313) 
Once again Malcolm and Ressler are in agreement, locating the threat of genetics in its ability to 
be sold on the free market.9 Malcolm views scientific breakthroughs like genetic manipulation as 
paradigm shifts that will radically alter the world. A caricature and mouthpiece for the frenzy 
over chaos theory in late 1980s and early 1990s, he believes that such science must be regulated, 
not available to just anyone who can afford it.10 Here and throughout the novel, he differs from 
Hammond, the dreamer and entrepreneur behind the nightmare that is Jurassic Park, who doubts 
the threats that genetics presents to the world. Unlike Malcolm, who calls for regulation, 
Hammond believes that capitalism will always balance itself out. The novel thus appears to 
present two characters that embody the clashing ideologies of the post-45 period: Hammond the 
capitalist versus Malcolm the Marxist. Malcolm, however, voices a theory of history that 
counters Marxist telos. He actually believes that genetic research on the free market presents a 
threat to the market itself, to the liberalism that allows it to exist. In other words, to save 
capitalism, Malcolm believes that capitalism must be regulated. This theory goes beyond Marxist 
ideology in that he does not believe that one can foresee an end to history. For Malcolm, telos 
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can only be invented after the fact and history’s end cannot be foreseen because the singularities 
and sensitive dependences of chaos theory, as he would have it, express the unreliability of 
fictions about the future. These passages express an anxiety about the ability for narrative to ever 
fully convey the intentions of its author. Postmodern theory and aesthetics critiqued the 
technocratic “dream of total control” that Malcolm speaks of, while in Gold Bug Powers states: 
“science is not about control. That is technology” (128-129).11 Chaos, chance, or accident, is 
here that for which a cause is beyond human knowledge. One cannot read the signs correctly, 
and therefore the effect appears accidental. 
Malcolm, then, reflects on the postmodern critique of science and of historical narrative 
while exploring the ends of science and history as products of the enlightenment.12 At the time of 
Jurassic Park’s publication Soviet Communism was falling apart. The Soviet Union, as a system 
of power, was based upon a teleological view of history.13 In a sense, the isolated world behind 
the iron curtain very much paralleled the controlled environment of Jurassic Park, one that, in the 
words of Malcolm, “is not the real world. It is intended to be an adapted environment that only 
imitates a natural environment. In that sense, it’s a true park, rather like a Japanese formal 
garden. Nature manipulated to be more natural than the real thing” (133).14 The novel’s 
representation of nature as more real than the natural elaborates upon the problem of evolution as 
metaphor. In Jurassic Park creatures that evolved in an environment 65 million years past cannot 
possibly be wholly adapted to the contemporary world. The novel introduces the prehistoric into 
the contemporary, playing on a different end of history, one in which the past exists in the 
present, simultaneously interacting with and making history—a fantasy in which nothing 
evolves, nothing changes. Yet the dinosaurs of Jurassic Park are but modified versions of this 
past; they represent a capitalist attempt to turn history into commodity, dangerous in suggesting 
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that history can be manufactured, authored, rather than emerge from contingent events. The 
commodification of history that Jurassic Park critiques also critiques teleology in showing that 
such a use of history forecloses the possibility of other outcomes. 
The Gold Bug Variations cuts even deeper into the wound of the Cold War’s end and the 
trauma this inflicted by revealing a desire within triumphant capitalism for the resurrection of 
communism. The novel explicitly depicts capital’s struggle with itself and with socialism. 
Working together as computer programmers, Franklin Todd and Stuart Ressler decide that they 
should give their co-worker “Uncle Jimmy[,] a raise” after putting him through a grueling 
amount of overtime at work due to an error (458). Todd says, “We could penny-shave him. Take 
every salary we handle. Round the fractional cents down, pitch the remainder into Jimmy’s 
account. No one is out more than a partial cent, and Jimmy is [. . .] lots richer” (458). However, 
the programmers make another error when moving this capital, one that results in Jimmy’s 
paycheck not deducting a monthly fee for health insurance. After being removed from the 
insurance policy, Jimmy voices concern over his lack of insurance to both the insurance 
company and Todd and Ressler. Though his friends tell him not to worry, that he will go back on 
the group insurance policy after the deduction from his next paycheck is processed, Jimmy’s 
questions to the insurance company “awakened a sleepy corporate hierarchy,” one that anguishes 
Jimmy both mentally and physically (537). He is questioned about his knowledge of the source 
of the “computer irregularity” and, we are told, “already nursing accumulated anxiety over his 
inadvertent failure to meet a premium, [Jimmy] was so bewildered by the probe [. . .] that he 
ruptured an aneurysm that had been hiding an inherited deficiency, secret and soft in his cerebral 
arteries. He apoplexed on the examination carpet, proclaiming innocence while going into a 
coma” (Powers 537-538). The large amount of money that Jimmy receives leads to his loss of 
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insurance, and his attempt to regain coverage leads to his illness. Had the state provided him with 
healthcare, there would not have been such a conflict between capital and health. Here capital 
itself conflicts with liberalism.  
Jurassic Park also portrays capitalism as a source of conflict with the liberalism that 
allows it to exist and sustain itself in a deliberately horrifying manner. The dinosaurs are 
themselves capitalist creations that threaten liberalism. Paleontologist, evolutionary biologist, 
and historian of science Stephen J. Gould reviews both the novel and Steven Spielberg’s film 
adaptation of Jurassic Park in “Dinomania” (1993), which interprets the park’s carnivores as  
postmodernists of another type. The big old fearsome standard, Tyrannosaurus rex, 
presides over Jurassic Park in all her glory [. . .] But the mantle of carnivorous heroism 
has clearly passed to the much smaller Velociraptor [. . .] Downsizing and diversity are 
in; constrained hugeness has become a tragic flaw. Velociraptor is everything that 
modern corporate life values in a tough competitor—mean, lean, lithe, and intelligent. (2) 
The velociraptors, read as the products and agents of capital, provide an ominous twist to life on 
the island. They not only breed, overcoming an unnatural double-failsafe programmed into their 
DNA to prevent reproduction, but manage to escape the island, disappearing into the natural 
world and becoming part of it. The raptors adapt, one could say, to all environments, to all 
markets, and exceed the scale of life that was modeled for them upon the island and within the 
park. Their escape conforms to the warning of Erwin Chargaff discussed earlier: “You cannot 
recall a new form of life.” Jurassic Park attempts to balance its moral between two beliefs in the 
scale of time. The first is that a new form of life can endanger all life currently on the planet, 
representing the immediate consequences of a present in which life from the past has returned, 
and in so doing made a great evolutionary leap and threatened an end to history. The second is 
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that the existence of all the planet’s current life is, on the grand scale, inconsequential and 
incidental. History cannot end, but humanity’s perception and understanding of history can 
disappear.  
 Jurassic Park represents, through dinosaurs’ return to life, Gould’s and Niles Eldredge’s 
concept of punctuated equilibrium, that evolutionary change can occur rapidly; in doing so, the 
novel makes an argument against such change, not in the terms of evolution, but in the terms of 
the historical-political. In 1992 Gould traveled to Russia and witnessed the aftermath of the 
Soviet Union’s collapse. He wrote about this trip in his “This View of Life” column in Natural 
History that same year. The article, “Life in a punctuation,” applies punctuated equilibrium to 
Marxism. Gould summarizes his theory of punctuated equilibrium, writing: “Most species are 
stable for most of their geological lifetimes, often lasting many millions of years—the 
equilibrium—and that change does not usually occur by imperceptibly gradual alteration of 
entire species but rather by isolation of small populations and their geologically instantaneous 
transformation to new species—the punctuation” (4). Jurassic Park provides just such an 
environment: the dinosaurs are isolated in a small population, they are brought back 
instantaneously, and they evolve independently (though far more rapidly than Gould theorizes). 
In this article Gould discusses a piece by the economist David Warsh, which appeared in the 
Boston Globe earlier that year and which applies the theory of punctuated equilibrium to the 
legacy of Marx. Gould responds, turning his own theory of evolution into a bad metaphor for 
Marxist political theory. The application of his theory, just like the consequences of the life 
created in Jurassic Park, holds no consequences to the overall history of life. Instead, Gould 
focuses far more on the punctuation than the equilibrium, and in doing so makes a false 
assertion: that if something can happen, then it will happen. 
  173 
Gould’s language is Crichton’s language, for he sees his theory as “the proper scaling of 
ordinary events into the vastness of geological time” (4). During his visit to Russia Gould 
witnessed first hand the failure of the communist state. Gould turns to Warsh on this failure, 
summarizing the climax of Warsh’s “ironic theme: just as Russia displays abject failure of the 
largest experiment in Marx’s particular economic theory, the growth of punctuational thinking 
validates his broader views on the nature of change” (5). He continues, claiming Warsh “missed 
the most ironic point of all,” that Gould witnessed a great success of Marx’s theory in the failure 
of the Soviet Union. This success is the application of punctuated equilibrium, his own theory, to 
the political, “in a most eerie and striking manner, the second component of Marx’s thesis: the 
validity of the larger model of punctuational change” (5). While the sudden end of the Soviet 
Union signaled the failure of the Marxist state, nevertheless this failure of Marxist theory 
provided a success, for from such a rapid change came the triumph for Marx’s theory of 
revolution.15 In Jurassic Park, the rapid change that the raptors represent threatens to destroy all 
life on the island, and, if let into the world, lead to an apocalypse beyond the thermonuclear—
genetically engineered life destroying natural life. In Jurassic Park the artificial destroys the 
natural, which parallels the understanding of Soviet communism as annihilating laissez-faire 
capitalism.  
Of course, evolution is not revolution.16 Punctuated equilibrium has been disputed since 
Gould and Eldridge published their article in 1972, not because it is unfeasible, but because of a 
common misunderstanding. It is thought of as instantaneous, an event, as revolutions are often 
thought to happen—as in fact, it is represented as happening in Jurassic Park. Punctuated 
equilibrium, in Gould’s application of it to the disintegration of the Soviet Union, is represented 
as a moment of kairos: change that comes in a burst. However, this does not adhere to his initial 
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definition of punctuated equilibrium. Punctuated equilibrium, rather than a break from Darwin, 
fits into Darwin’s theory of natural selection over time through adaptation.17 As philosopher of 
science Daniel Dennett explains, punctuated equilibrium can appear to be instantaneous when 
diagrammed in a certain way, “but that is just a misleading artifact of the huge vertical scale 
adopted, which shows millions of years to the inch. The sideways motion is not really 
instantaneous. It is only geologically instantaneous” (285). What we have, then, is an issue of 
scale.18 One will see something very different depending on how one looks at evolution or 
revolution, on a scale of minutes, as opposed to a scale of millions of years. This returns us to the 
earlier statement: evolution, as it happens, is an accidental event based upon life’s adaptation to 
its current environment and the changes that have transpired in that environment. The dinosaurs 
in Jurassic Park grew in a lab but evolved in a different environment; this is how they come to 
threaten devastation. The environment, the world itself, has evolved without them and cannot 
evolve quickly enough to keep up with them. Chance, in the end, has more effect upon the life of 
the dinosaurs in the park than any human authorship. 
Gould’s application of punctuated equilibrium to the collapse of the Soviet Union not 
only misrepresents evolution through the metaphor, but also upholds a fantasy that political 
events transpire instantaneously rather than through the gradual toil of human and other agents. 
Such a view of history makes inauthentic the authentic struggles of individuals over not just a 
generation, but generations. This is precisely what we see in Jurassic Park: a punctuated 
equilibrium—at the level of evolution’s representation in the novel—in which the newly created 
dinosaurs, at the end of history, evolve as if there were no history any longer, no large time scale 
or minor events. W. J. T. Mitchell, in The Last Dinosaur Book, addresses both Dennett and 
Gould, writing: “Stephen Jay Gould’s theory of ‘punctuated equilibrium’ is probably the best-
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known attempt to restore catastrophism to evolutionary theory in terms of chance and accident” 
(213). However, the restoration of catastrophism was merely a popular misconception, which 
Jurassic Park borrowed from and contributed to. In doing so, punctuated equilibrium becomes, 
in the pages of Crichton’s novel, an instance of inauthentic authenticity—a commentary upon a 
culture that believes that evolution proceeds in a teleological manner. In other words, the idea 
that evolution must proceed to the current moment is represented in Jurassic Park and critiqued 
in the misconceptions of a character such as Wu.  
Richard Dawkins contextualizes such a misrepresentation of punctuated equilibrium 
when he writes that “the punctuationists aren’t talking about jumps in evolution, they are talking 
about episodes of relatively rapid evolution” (346). This issue of scale, when applied to 
something like human revolutions, is at best a way of saying that some political events reach a 
point, as they did in the Soviet Union, where it seems that everything falls apart. But this 
appearance is not the case: revolutions, on a short scale of time, a human scale, may seem to 
happen instantaneously, but, historically, a political event such as a revolution occurs over long 
periods of time due to numerous causes. We see, in Jurassic Park, dinosaurs changing at a rate 
that is relatively as fast as the post-war world was changing due to the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. The desire to witness rapid change represents nostalgia for the waning possibility of 
nuclear war. Such an immense and immediate danger to all life actually gave life meaning. 
Without the threat of full-scale thermonuclear war, life lost the significance ascribed to it over 
the conflict. Thus the desire to see life change rapidly is tied to the desire to see all life disappear 
in a flash. In Jurassic Park, a genetic entertainment complex replaces the military industrial 
complex that kept Americans enthralled with fear and the suspense of life ending. These 
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dinosaurs as weapons of mass destruction, as an extension of capital, reflect nostalgia for the 
conflicts of the Cold War.19  
 Jurassic Park addresses the problem of depicting an instantaneous change in history 
rather than change through the accumulation of gradual events by questioning the authenticity of 
the cloned dinosaurs and their place in history. Born from such evolutionary and revolutionary 
punctuation as Gould discusses, they are thought of as potentially not even being dinosaurs, but a 
wholly new life form (Crichton 334). Wu, the head geneticist at Jurassic Park, thinks of himself 
as William Paley’s watchmaker: an argument for God as designer and creator of life that 
postulates if one discovers a complex object, a watch, then one must conclude that “the watch 
must have had a maker” (Gould 8). Wu, however, does not create life but recreates it in the 
manner of Dawkins’ blind watchmaker, natural selection, described as “blind because it does not 
see ahead, does not plan consequences, has no purpose in view” (29). Wu only has a purpose 
through creating telos; he grows the DNA, discovering what kind of dinosaur he has recreated, 
engineering the dinosaur so that it can survive. Wu gradually adapts them, at the level of the 
DNA, through trial and error in a manner similar to that of an author writing through drafts of a 
novel; in short, he constructs a narrative (Crichton 334). These are gradual steps, not a 
punctuated equilibrium, but, on an evolutionary timescale, they constitute rapid advances in the 
DNA.  
Yet despite Wu’s role as the dinosaurs’ apparent author he begins to doubt his work: 
“And the limits of his science had left him with a mysterious feeling about the dinosaurs in the 
park. He was never sure, never really sure at all, whether the behavior of the animals was 
historically accurate or not. Were they behaving as they really had in the past? It was an open 
question, ultimately unanswerable” (334). Wu fails to understand that these dinosaurs are not any 
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dinosaurs that have lived before, but a life utterly new, built from the remains of the old. The 
prehistoric haunting the end of history, more ghost than alive, this new form of life has emerged 
from capital and has broken the limits of its engineered genes, moved beyond being synthetic life 
produced in an artificial environment. The dinosaurs adapt to their surroundings, evolving: 
“though Wu would never admit it, the discovery that the dinosaurs were breeding represented a 
tremendous validation of his work. A breeding animal was demonstrably effective in a 
fundamental way; it implied that Wu had put all the pieces together correctly. He had re-created 
an animal millions of years old, with such precision that the creature could even reproduce itself” 
(334). The accident—his error, their DNA—also continues reproducing. These dinosaurs have 
become authentic life but inauthentic dinosaurs, new in their evolution. Not only do they 
represent capital transcending its own limits, they are life itself, its own limit. At the end of the 
Cold War, the dinosaur comes back to life, surviving the meteor that brought its own kind of 
nuclear winter. Their return is an apocalyptic celebration of the fact that the bombs never fell 
from the sky and ended all human life; they survive because we evaded a similar end.20  
Our evolution is thus equated with the threat of nuclear war, which is an unconscious 
recognition of how close we are to the dinosaurs—hence the image of Gould on the cover of 
Newsweek (see Figure 2), which bears headlines about both nuclear arms and the “mysteries of 
evolution.” A Tyrannosaurus Rex and Gould, bearing a trilobite, bridge these headlines, one 
pointing to our extinction, the other to our origin. Even in the contemporaneous critical 
consciousness, Americans could not help but equate the idea of possible nuclear apocalypse with 
the extinction of the dinosaurs. The great evolutionary denial of Jurassic Park is the use of frog 
DNA to complete the missing links in recovered dinosaur DNA. As Dennett explains, the 
“choice of [. . .] frog” DNA “manifests an interesting error—an instance [. . .] of the Great Chain 
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Figure 2. Stephen Jay Gould, Evolution, and Nuclear Arms. 
 
of Being fallacy. Humans, of course, are more closely related to dinosaurs than either is to frogs. 
Human DNA would have been better than frog DNA. Bird DNA would be better still” (114-115 
n. 9).21 The denial of humankind’s genetic proximity to dinosaurs is what allows the dinosaurs to 
reproduce, having inherited the sex-changing genetic trait of frogs. It is our sense of history’s 
ending and denial of evolution that has made them. The triumph of capital, even over life itself, 
evolves in Jurassic Park into a revolution. These dinosaurs, born of capital, threaten to end all 
human life, therefore also threatening to end all capital. 
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IV. Anthropocentric Still Life 
The Gold Bug Variations demands that the reader imagine life not as something that 
struggles to any preconceived end, but that struggles for the sake of life itself: “Evolution sets 
such unlikelihoods into existence that it seems, given time, universally ingenious, eternally able 
to one-up. In fact, it’s a patch job, short-term kludges barely breaking even, ducking down blind 
alleys, working only with existing parts. The map is full of places that one can’t get to from 
here” (469). That which evolves life is an accident contingent upon a series of other accidents—
accidents of natural selection, of environment. “Nothing is a priori,” the passage continues, 
“other solutions will never hit upon the particular next trick, no matter how many eons you let 
spin. Life on the planet could have been entirely different: billions of years of prokaryotes, 
unchanged since inception, stretching on steadily until the sun dies” (469). The scale represented 
here invokes the amazing improbability that is life, insists on its precarious preciousness at the 
most minute level; through this focus on the minute, it points to the importance of all life, of the 
living world as one connected being that clambered among the wreckage of history, making a 
path to right now, accident by accident. 
The novel thus marvels at the immense magnitude of life through describing its smallest 
level, the four nucleotides that make up the three codons that code for all life. In Gold Bug the 
Cold War is represented as a perpetual war. It is a war that will go on decades beyond the 1980s, 
a war in which the only end imaginable is the destruction of all life on the planet. Yet it describes 
the fear of indecipherable mutation as outweighing the fear of annihilation: “The specter is more 
terrifying than mass extinction. The annihilation of most of the globe seemed survivable so long 
as some fraction of the message remained intact. But if monstrous meaninglessness propagates 
with the speed and exactitude of natural transmission, everything is over” (495). While full-scale 
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nuclear war would instantaneously end all life, the fallout from even the testing of such weapons 
can mutate DNA, scrambling the sequence that writes life.22 The threat of instantaneous death 
becomes a long death on the human scale of time. In this way nuclear time alters evolutionary 
time, raising the question: can life outlive certain radioactive isotopes’ half-lives? Powers writes, 
“The loss of a great library to fire is a tragedy. But the surreptitious introduction of thousands of 
untraceable errors into reliable books, errors picked up and distributed endlessly by tireless 
researchers, is nightmare beyond measure” (495). Life, metaphorically figured as “a great 
library,” can be consumed in a great conflagration at any moment, but fallout corrupts the 
smaller parts of this library of life, the books, words, and letters, becoming altered until 
unintelligible, until life cannot read itself, cannot reproduce life. The library in this metaphor 
shifts the descriptive scale, relating the body to a house of texts, which immediately takes the 
immensely small and grows it to a vast scale. It equates reading with reproducing, culture and 
life continuing through the ability to read and write.23 Life could have never emerged, or it could 
disappear in the blast of bombs, but more terrifyingly, fallout could contaminate life’s code, 
turning life into slaughter, scrambling the letters in all of the books in life’s library to the point 
that they are unreadable. In both scenarios—instant death or mutation of the text—there is no 
way to describe what has happened, and in this destruction of narrative resides a fear that, for 
Powers, drives the desire for representation, to live amidst threats that are meaningful in their 
creation of the meaningless.24  
In the face of such incomprehension Powers describes the desire to comprehend through 
representation, to tell a story: “A flat-out fascination with the threat, soberly maintaining that the 
only thing to do when the world begins to end is to stand aside and paint it. Uncover it. Name it” 
(341). The flat-out fascination is also a fallout fascination—a fearful fantasy based on the reality 
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that total death is totally possible. Yet the still image itself, in capturing the threat, rather than 
representing resignation in the face of fallout, gives a final protest against the possibility of 
annihilation. The description, like the image, captures the conflagration that will consume the 
painting and the painter.25 This fallout fascination is akin to the opening of Joan Didion’s 
Democracy (1984), published the same year in which the 1980s portion of Gold Bug is set. A 
“detonation theorist [. . .] a pretty fair Sunday painter,” Jack Lovett tells Victor Inez, used to try 
to render the pink of the fallout sky. “He never got it. Just never captured it. Never came close” 
(11). If the world will be destroyed then the only creative act that makes any sense, according to 
Powers, is the representation of such destruction. Like the detonation theorist of Democracy, the 
characters in Powers’s texts desire to contain that which cannot be contained. They want to 
deploy containment policy through aesthetic means so as to isolate the damage done—a damage 
that would have no viewer or reader.26 The art becomes incomprehensible in both form and 
content—the fallout, if apocalyptic, could not be represented or perceived—and thus becomes 
the equivalent of the library’s burning. 
The burning of the library, like the velociraptors’ ability to reproduce, signifies internal 
corruption destroying the whole. In their depiction of the genetic code mutating beyond legibility 
and authorial control, both novels display a fear of alien intrusion into their subject’s genetics 
and their own narrative traditions. In this way, Jurassic Park and Gold Bug deploy modernist 
forms of writing in their variations of the incest taboo that, in Our America (1995), Walter Benn 
Michaels locates in American modernism as “an attempt through language to substitute the blood 
ties of family for the affective and/or legal ties of love and marriage. It picks up the linguistic 
fantasy of the word becoming the thing” (5).27 The velociraptors of Jurassic Park are all 
genetically the same and are all born of computer code become flesh. They, like Jan O’Deigh of 
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Gold Bug, are barren. However, the very impurity of the velociraptors’ DNA—its mixture with 
that of frogs—leads to its being recoded and to the failed authorship of Wu and the other 
geneticists. Likewise, Jan’s portion of the Gold Bug’s narrative is comprised of various facts and 
snippets of information taken from reference books and encyclopedias that, when spliced with 
Franklin Todd’s biography of Ressler, make their offspring—the text of The Gold Bug 
Variations. While we have seen novels such as Leviathan and The Virgin Suicides trouble 
narrative through paradox and contradiction, the bodies and stories of The Gold Bug Variations 
and Jurassic Park are not obliterated by the bomb (or any lesser bomb), and instead synthesize; 
the plots, engineered into one another, nevertheless remain separate, a reproduction not through 
the body but only through the word that is then circulated on the market that both novels attempt 
to critique. 
The Gold Bug Variations and Jurassic Park depict and perform this incestuous 
reproduction as an argument against the purity of capital. Jan O’Deigh, after Ressler’s death and 
her year of unemployment and mourning, goes to an ATM to make a withdrawal. At the ATM, 
Jan tells us that she punched in her “four-digit sequence and watched the screen flash ‘Incorrect 
code. Please try again.’ Before I could reason with the machine, it cleared its screen and posted a 
new message: ‘Hello old friend. Here’s an easy one’” (Powers 628). The “incorrect code” is 
actually the correct code, or how else could Jan receive this message? Ressler’s language, 
translated from code, speaks to O’Deigh through the ATM—a different kind of automatic telling. 
The desire presented here is twofold: one can become the purity of language and continue after 
one’s death, become embedded in a code at once both correct and incorrect. While the characters 
discussed in the last chapter wanted to have things both ways, the characters in Gold Bug do not. 
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Ressler speaks beyond the grave because he programmed this message in life, because he 
planned for a future that he knew would transpire after his death. 
Ressler’s words pause the transaction and become the notes of Bach’s Goldberg 
Variations. The dead speak, music plays, and capital momentarily stops—all because of an 
“incorrect” code. The impossibility of the ATM code being both correct and incorrect manifests 
yet another symptom of capitalism’s nostalgia for socialism. “With a little programming,” Jan 
declares, “everything is possible.” Design and pure language become objects in the world: song, 
a message from the dead. Jan continues, “In the return of silence, the screen displayed: ‘Machine 
adaptation by SR.’ It cleared and wrote one more quote to compound the quodlibet: ‘He is a 
man. Take him for all in all.’ Another thirty seconds later, it changed again to read, ‘Please enter 
your transaction’” (631). She is urged to reconcile with Todd so that their stories can become a 
product for the reader, and in coupling her story with his, the novel becomes authored. This 
recursive act of the novel splicing its two stories together recalls the velociraptors defying the 
fail-safes due to their original DNA being spliced; ultimately, this desire for splicing reflects the 
culture’s anxiety over division.  
As two of the last novels composed during the Cold War, Jurassic Park and The Gold 
Bug Variations both express a desire for foreign threats. Both depict the shift in anxieties from 
the nuclear to the genetic and anticipate the resurgence of, in the words of Pat Buchanan, “the 
cultural war,” which would become “as critical to the kind of nation we shall be as the Cold War 
[was]” (Buchanan). With the Cold War ended, both novels, like the nation, dwell upon internal 
fears and express the threats of the future as those of being unable to communicate with any 
meaning. The end of the Cold War, the victory that should have brought the nation together, 
instead divided it. The spliced genes of the dinosaurs and the spliced narrative of Gold Bug 
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reflect a prescient fear of a future for the nation. In this future the lack of an external threat 
results in internal divisiveness. They demonstrate not only the shifting anxieties of the Cold 
War’s final years, but also a fear for a future in which capital does not purify or unite, but 
continues to alienate and birth new fears. In this way, these two novels can—indeed, should—be 
read as interstitial. Two of the final texts of the Cold War, they are also two of the first published 
after the end of history, and as such they point not only to fears from the past but to those of their 
future. The anxieties of both eras, reflected in these novels, continue to torment our present. By 
reading these novels as products of the cultural transition from anxieties of the nuclear to 
anxieties of the genetic, one can effectively see the lineage of literary fears born of the Cold War 
into texts produced beyond that conflict’s supposed close. Rather than preemptively announcing 
the end of the threat of annihilation, these novels show how this threat evolves, adapts, and 
continues to inform the production of contemporary American literature, suggesting that it is 
only in excavating the terrors of our cultural lineage that new anxieties and fears can be 
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Notes 
1 In How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics (1999), N. Katherine 
Hayles, in a discussion of the metaphysics of presence addresses the breakdown of teleological systems into random 
systems: “meaning is not front-loaded into the system, and the origin does not act to ground signification.” (Hayles 
285). Kenney’s poem operates in just such a manner, taking linear order and making it strange through a 
reorganization of the words in well known phrases, evolving meanings while weaving together various voices and 
moments of history to create a present reading experience. 
 
2 The problem that Einstein and others recognized (and continue to recognize) between his General Theory of 
Relativity and Quantum Mechanics that does not allow for a Theory of Everything is that, in short, in quantum 
mechanics things can happen that the General Theory of Relativity cannot explain—i.e. a particle being two places 
at once.  
 
3 That said, Richard Powers’s and Michael Crichton’s politics differ. While Powers, as Latour’s need for a coining 
indicates, is not often thought of as an author of Science Fiction, his politics lean toward the left while Crichton, at 
least on issues of science, tends toward the right. See, for instance, Crichton’s “Aliens Cause Global Warming” and 
his testimony before the Senate. 
 
4 For discussions of meaninglessness in American literature, see Amy Hungerford’s Postmodern Belief: American 
Literature and Religion Since 1960 (2010) (especially the introduction), and Malcolm Bradbury’s The Modern 
American Novel (1983), particularly the chapter “Realism and Surrealism,” and Walter Benn Michael’s discussion 
of Paul de Man’s materialism in The Shape of the Signifier (2006). For discussions of faith or the lack thereof in 
American Literature, see Arthur Bradley and Andrew Tate’s collection The New Atheist Novel: Fiction, Philosophy, 
and Polemic after 9/11 (2010) and John A. McClure’s Partial Faiths: Fiction in the Age of Pynchon and Morrison 
(2007), as well as Sean McCann and Michael Szalay’s essay, “Do You Believe in Magic? Literary Thinking After 
the New Left,” McClure’s response, “Do They Believe in Magic? Politics and Postmodern Literature” and their 
rebuttal, “‘Eerie Serenity’: A Response to John McClure.” 
 
5 In “The Prodigious Fiction of Richard Powers, William Vollmann and David Foster Wallace,” Tom LeClair favors 
a reading of The Gold Bug Variations that emphasizes the power of the natural world and the complexity derived 
from the seemingly simple, both of which LeClair claims “enunciates a new naturalism” (LeClair 20). For a 
challenge to this reading see “Science and the Sacred: Intertextuality in Richard Powers’s The Gold Bug Variations” 
by J. D. Thomas, who cleverly argues that the use of religious language in Powers’s novel is the most effective way 
to describe the realities of science. Finally, see Jay Labinger’s “Encoding an Infinite Message: Richard Powers’s 
Gold Bug Variations [sic]” for a discussion of how metaphor functions in the novel as a system that produces 
variety. These three essays make arguments that not only express how Powers uses evolution as an argument against 
telos, but also how he combines the content of his novel with its form, weaving wonders from waste. 
 
6 Both Gold Bug and Jurassic Park are far more interested in contingency and evolution than convergence. As I later 
argue, this is due to the influence of Stephen Jay Gould and Niles  Eldredge’s theory of punctuated equilibrium, 
among others. For discussions of Gould and convergence, see Nick Lane’s Power, Sex, Suicide (2005) (22-23). See 
also E. O. Wilson’s Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge (1998) and Gould and  Eldredge’s reviews of Wilson’s 
influential text. 
 
7 In The Blind Watchmaker (1986) Dawkins clarifies the kind of chance inherent to the process of evolution while 
also addressing the challenge for thinking in terms of evolutionary time and the popular confusion of chance and 
absolute chance (xvii-xix). See also Monod’s Chance and Necessity (1971) for a similar discussion. In the first two 
chapters of Towards a New Philosophy of Biology: Observations of an Evolutionist (1988), Ernst Mayer makes a 
strong argument against teleology, in which he states: “there is neither a program nor a law that can explain and 
predict biological evolution in any teleological manner” (3). For a discussion of teleological thinking in the work of 
Darwin, see “Darwin was a Teleologist” by James G. Lennox. For a response to Lennox’s essay, see “Darwin’s 
Concept of Final Cause: Neither New Nor Trivial” by T. L. Short. For an argument against metaphors of design in 
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evolutionary biology see Not By Design: Retiring Darwin’s Watchmaker (2011) by John O. Reiss (particularly 328-
330), which relates the problems of evolutionary development. This study’s first chapter provides a strong 
philosophical background regarding the problem of teleology in regards to evolutionary theory. 
 
8 In Our Posthuman Future (2002), Fukuyama writes at length about genetic engineering and its regulation. As a 
whole, his study is one that looks to a future where hierarchy is broken down due to genetic engineering, a fear that, 
he argues, can be stopped through government regulation. 
 
9 In The Last Dinosaur Book (1998) W. J. T. Mitchell discusses the commonly agreed upon theory regarding the 
extinction of the dinosaurs, “the Alvarez hypothesis, which proposes that a giant meteorite struck the earth about 65 
million years ago, raising a global dust cloud and producing a ‘nuclear winter’ that wiped out the dinosaurs and 
many other life forms as well. [. . .] Clearly it had a kind of automatic appeal to the popular imagination in the Cold 
War era, when the threat of something like the Alvarez meteorite seemed a real possibility” (211). The anachronism 
of nuclear winter killing the dinosaurs speaks to the perverse logic of dinosaurs’ return after the end of the Cold 
War. This logic dictates that if it did not kill us, then we can bring them back, using the science that we feared would 
end us to produce life that will end us; as Mitchell writes: “We live, it is often said, in the period of DNA and the 
computer. Dramatic as the discovery of nuclear energy was, it was really only a quantitative extension of the age of 
energy—the development of a bigger productive and destructive force. As we reach the end of the twentieth century, 
however, it is clear that biology has replaced physics at the frontier of science, and that computers and artificial 
intelligence constitute the frontier of technology” (216). In From Walden Pond to Jurassic Park (2001), Paul Lauter 
describes the film Jurassic Park as containing two contradictions relevant to my argument, both of which are also 
present in the novel. The first being that “the film [. . .] uses advanced technology both to mount a critique of 
science and to produce a resonating example of its outcomes” (108). Lauter is discussing the advanced special 
effects that were used in the film, but nevertheless, the novel proceeds to make a similar critique. The second 
contradiction is that, as Lauter writes, “it seems to me that the impact of the film is to neutralize the very critique of 
commodity production that it mounts” (111). While my point regarding Lauter’s above “contradiction” may seem to 
fall into the trap of the second contradiction, it does not, for the above critique of science is a critique of capital, one 
that both texts make in showing that once money has been spent to create a commodity, as will be demonstrated 
below, it takes a lot more than the tenets of chaos theory to get that commodity off the market.  
 
10 For a general discussion of chaos theory, see James Gleick’s Chaos: Making a New Science (1987). For 
discussions of chaos theory and its application to literary studies, see Chaos Bound: Orderly Disorder in 
Contemporary Literature and Science (1990) by N. Katherine Hayles, as well the collection of essays, Chaos and 
Order: Complex Dynamics in Literature and Science (1991), which Hayles edited. While neither of these studies 
discusses Jurassic Park, the philosophers Evan Kirchhoff and Carl Matheson heavily critique Hayles’s 
understanding and application of chaos theory in their article, “Chaos and Literature.” For further discussion of 
chaos theory and its uses and abuses in literary criticism, see Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectual’s 
Abuse of Science (1999) by Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont. 
 
11 For a discussion of the impact of evolutionary biology on American culture see Steven Belletto’s discussion of 
Jacques Monod in No Accident Comrade, pp. 7-13, as well as his discussion of creative design, pp. 147-148. For a 
discussion of science and narrative, see The Postmodern Condition (1979) by Lyotard, pp. 53-60. 
 
12 In his speech, “Aliens Cause Global Warming” Crichton discusses postmodernism’s understanding of science and 
questions whether the “post-modernists” are correct in relation to scientific evidence and debates regarding SETI 
and global warming. For a discussion of enlightenment thinking’s legacy, see Bruno Latour’s We Have Never Been 
Modern (1991), especially pp. 46-48. For a discussion of modernity against itself, see Ulrich Beck’s Risk Society 
(1992). 
 
13 See John Lewis Gaddis’s The Cold War: a New History (2006), pgs. 197 and 261.  
 
14 W. J. T. Mitchell writes of labor and production in Jurassic Park, designating the age that a text like Jurassic 
Park represents as one of “biocybernetic reproduction” (216).  
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15 For an extended study of the relationship between biology and dialectics, see Richard Levin’s and Richard 
Lewontin’s The Dialectical Biologist (1985), especially the first chapter on the ideology of evolution and the eighth 
chapter on the commodification of science. 
 
16 In The Blind Watchmaker Dawkins discusses punctuated equilibrium at great length. Particularly applicable to the 
above discussion are his comments on pages 344-346 and 354.  
 
17 For Gould’s take on the debate and the theory, see his Punctuated Equilibrium (2007). 
 
18 Denying the revolutionary radicalism of punctuationism in The Blind Watchmaker, Richard Dawkins returns to 
Gould’s initial assertions, demystifying the mass media reports of punctuated equilibrium that Gould and Eldredge 
encouraged. He writes that they “chose, especially in their later writings in which they were eagerly following 
journalists, to sell their ideas as being radically opposed to Darwin’s and opposed to the neo-Darwinian synthesis” 
(343). However, their ideas are not opposed to Darwin’s initial ideas. What Gould, Eldredge and other 
punctuationists oppose is “Darwin’s alleged belief in the constancy of rates of evolution [. . .] because they think 
that evolution [. . .] occurs rapidly during relatively brief bursts of activity. [. . .] When we say ‘relatively’ brief we 
mean, of course, brief relative to the geological timescale in general” (344-345). 
 
19 For an extended discussion of Cold War nostalgia, see Daniel Grausam’s “‘It is only a statement of the power of 
what comes after’: Atomic Nostalgia and the Ends of Postmodernism.” Of particular interest to the topic at hand is 
his reading of Richard Powers’s 2000 novel, Plowing the Dark.  
 
20 Gould himself testified before Congress (as seen in his Nova special, “Stephen Jay Gould: This View of Life”) 
that nuclear winter had occurred at least once before on earth, and that was the event that destroyed the dinosaurs. In 
a 1983 article he contributed to, “Long-Term Biological Consequences of Nuclear War,” (by Ehrlich et al.) he made 
a similar claim. See also the article “Nuclear Winter: Global Consequences of Multiple Nuclear Explosions” by 
Turco et al. for a similar analysis.  
 
21 In her essay “From Extinction to Electronics: Dead Frogs, Live Dinosaurs, and Electric Sheep” Ursula K. Heise 
provides a compelling ecological reading of the use of frog DNA in Jurassic Park: “The dinosaurs in the theme 
park, therefore, are not genetically pure, but partially frogs. Not only does this genetic mix turn them into creatures 
that are partially prehistoric and partially contemporary, it also associates them with another family of animals that 
is threatened by species loss” (63).  
 
22 Earlier in the novel Ressler watches a debate between Linus Pauling and Edward Teller, which was held in 1958 
(Powers 242-246). In the debate the physicist Teller (who worked on the development of the hydrogen bomb) 
argued that nuclear energy is safe and should continue to be used and developed for the good of the public. Pauling, 
a chemist and biochemist argued against continued nuclear testing, focusing on the dangers of fallout as a reason to 




23 For an extended discussion of language, the genetic, and metaphor, see Refiguring Life: Metaphors of Twentieth 
Century Biology (1995) by Evelyn Fox Keller. 
 
24 For an ecological reading of chance, contingency and the organization of information in The Gold Bug Variations 
see two essays by Trey Strecker, “Ecologies of Knowledge: The Encyclopedic Narratives of Richard Powers and 
His Contemporaries,” and “Self Organization and Selection in Richard Powers’s The Gold Bug Variations.” For a 
response to Strecker’s second essay that focuses upon the use of rhetoric in The Gold Bug Variations see 
“Circulatory Systems: Vitality and Rhetoric in Richard Powers’s The Gold Bug Variations” by Mitch Frye. For 
discussion of the organization of information, particularly in regard to the work of a reference librarian such as Jan 
O’Deigh, see “The Gender of Genius: Scientific Experts and Literary Amateurs in the Fiction of Richard Powers” 
by Sharon Snyder, “Chaos and Complexity in Richard Powers’s The Gold Bug Variations” by Scott Hermanson and 
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“Hooking the Nose of the Leviathan: Information, Knowledge, and the Mysteries of Bonding in The Gold Bug 
Variations” by Joseph Dewey. Finally, the author himself has chimed in on the use of information in the 
contemporary novel in “Making the Rounds,” pages 307-308. 
 
25 N. Katherine Hayles, in How We Became Posthuman, discusses Powers’s recursive language as it relates to 
computer programming—which in Gold Bug is compared to the function of DNA (Hayles 264-269). 
 
26 For a discussion of the anxieties and aesthetic expressions that stemmed from the possibility of total annihilation 
due to full-scale thermonuclear war, see Daniel Grausam’s On Endings (2011). For the most thorough and 
influential study of containment policy and its effect upon American culture, see Alan Nadel’s Containment Culture 
(1995). 
 
27 For further discussion of the incest taboo and its depiction in post-war literature, see Michael Szalay’s Hip 
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Chapter 4 
The Reality of Chance in American Fantasy: Representing Trauma, Accident, and Identity 
Men are born for games. Nothing else. Every child knows that play is nobler than work. He 
knows too that the worth or merit of a game is not inherent in the game itself but rather in the 
value of that which is put at hazard. Games of chance require a wager to have meaning at all. 
Games of sport involve the skill and strength of the opponents and the humiliation of defeat and 
the pride of victory are in themselves sufficient stake because they inhere in the worth of the 
principals and define them. But trial of chance or trial of worth all games aspire to the condition 
of war for here that which is wagered swallows up game, player, all.  
–Cormac McCarthy, Blood Meridian (1985) 
I.  Playing with Chance, Relinquishing Control 
In Kathy Acker’s Blood and Guts in High School (1984) Janey, while captive to a Persian 
slave trader, writes a poem titled “A throw of the dice will never abolish chance” (105).1 We are 
told that this is a poem that Janey wrote “by herself,” one that the slave trader will not see, will 
not correspond with. The slave trader has kept Janey captive, subjecting her to sadism and sexual 
slavery, the equivalent of living in a sexual dungeon. This poem appears in the section titled 
“The Persian Poems.” Janey has found a Persian primer and has begun to teach herself the 
language of her master. However, the mastery of her master’s language does not set her free. It is 
Acker’s narrative control that results in Janey finding the Persian grammar and that pushes the 
plot along. Janey remains the slave of both her Persian master and Acker, who controls what she 
translates. Through her use of experimentation—the intrusion of, for example, handwritten 
Persian—Acker creates a sense of chance for the reader in his or her endeavors to make meaning 
from the text. From the perspective of the reader, it seems that at any moment in Blood and Guts 
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in High School the linear narrative can be—and often is—broken with the intrusion of an 
innovation. Thus, the poem “A throw of the dice will never abolish chance” insists upon the fact 
that no matter how many encounters one has with chance, chance itself will continue to be a 
guiding factor in one’s existence, subjecting one to a form of ontological slavery. Blood And 
Guts in High School seems to be structured through a series of chance transitions and encounters, 
and this poem directs the reader to understand the novel as a throw of the dice. Chance will not 
be abolished no matter how much narrative structure is used to counter it. Or, in alternate terms, 
chance is a fundamental element in establishing narrative control, in not only understanding the 
novel but also in allowing for the plot of the novel to progress, all the while enslaving the reader 
and Janey, pushing us forward in a plot that is out of our control, in Acker’s hands. The poem 
begins: 
I don’t want nothing no more 
I just wanna be left alone 
I don want no cancer in my bones 
 All you people in the streets 
 You don wanna marry me 
 I don’t know what or who’s happening (Acker 105-106) 
Janey’s poem expresses what the reader experiences throughout the novel: that it is not clear 
what is happening due to the fact that Acker’s prose controls and guides us through a narrative 
that seems to be structured through a throw of the dice. At this point both the reader and Janey 
may want some clarity, some closure to the narrative rather than the narrative’s continued 
growth—a kind of aesthetic cancer, each story growing into another seemingly without purpose 
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or meaning. There is no marriage between Janey and the stories that happen to her, and this is 
why Janey and the reader are both frustrated and “don’t know what or who’s happening.” 
What is happening is that, through deploying such careful authorial control in such an 
experimental manner, Acker is relinquishing some of her control over the text’s meaning through 
depicting non-linear forms of representation. The inclusion of maps, diagrams, and drawings, as 
well as varying font styles, plagiarism (of Hawthorne’s The Scarlet Letter and Mallarmé, among 
other texts), and a reflexivity associated with the methods of postmodern aesthetics, results in 
Acker plunging the reader into the labyrinth of her text and allowing them to find their own ways 
in and out rather than guiding them down one path. Through relying upon chance, Acker creates 
the freedom for the reader to approach the text as a series of dice rolls, chance encounters that 
undermine the text as an interpellative force and allow one to subjugate the text. Acker’s 
deployment of chance and accident subverts her own authorial control, opening the text, creating 
the frustrating moments where it seems that anything could and very well may happen in this 
novel, but also allowing the reader to understand the novel as a series of chance encounters with 
a language that, through this use of accident, has become increasingly alien.  
The particular strangeness of Acker’s representation and deployment of accident becomes 
apparent when compared with the novel’s first use of accident. At the end of the first section, 
“Inside High School,” Janey and the rest of “THE SCORPIONS” flee a rock show in their van, 
when “A tiny red light appeared in the blackness. The red light grew larger and larger. I don’t 
remember the crash. Everyone died but Monkey who got brain damage and me. For a few days I 
floated in a dream” (44). As Katie Muth points out in “Postmodern Fiction as Poststructuralist 
Theory: Kathy Acker’s Blood and Guts in High School,” the dream maps immediately follow 
this car accident (89). The accident is initially used as a means of controlling the plot, pushing 
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the narrative forward and leading the reader into the experimental dream maps. The “alinear and 
labyrinthine” dream maps “interpret themselves [. . .] only to lead us into new dead-ends or to 
revisit old ones” (Muth 92, 94). The dream maps depict numerous unrelated events that stem 
from the trauma of the accident—the tuché—which Lacan called “the encounter with the real” 
(Lacan 53). The dreams themselves, as symptoms of the various traumas Janey has suffered, 
represent the inability to process accident and translate accident into narrative. Acker resists 
giving a narrative translation of the maps, providing them as drawn diagrams with descriptive 
passages that act as “a proliferation of refusals that send us scrambling through the text to make 
sense of it—refusals that slow us down, trip us up, abandon the story, and thus give us the 
uneasy feeling that something other than what we’ve just been piecing together matters more—
refusals that, however, deny to us what that something else might be” (Muth 99).  
Acker’s novel places chance and accident into narrative so as to undermine any coherent 
sense of plot or story, but such refusals proliferate throughout texts from the 1970s, depicting an 
America that was obsessed with not just controlling chance but the ways that chance encounters 
control narrative. In turning to the 1970s in this final chapter I hope to show the continuity 
between American culture’s perception of accident crystallizing into conspiracy in the late 
1960s, as I discussed in the introduction, and how the evasion and denial of accident in the 1980s 
and early 1990s began to form. Three of these post-73 texts that show chance as a means of 
controlling narrative, Dungeons & Dragons (1974, 1978), The Deer Hunter (1978), and 
Gravity’s Rainbow (1973), manifest similar labyrinthine narrative structures subverted through 
the use of chance. These texts depict an American anxiety that developed after the end of the 
1960s, Vietnam, and Watergate, one that desires to exist within the overwhelming force of a 
master narrative in the face of a world in which all that has happened is out of one’s control. The 
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depictions of chance as a means of control reveal that in seizing chance the individual has the 
capacity to author their own existence against perceived visions of teleology. The resistance of 
teleology via chance and accident ultimately shows an America that yearned for a master 
narrative that would lead the country away from the turmoil of the 1960s and return America to 
the perceived utopic period of the 1950s. Of course, such a place can exist nowhere but in the 
recurrent narrative structure of a nostalgic vision of America in which ethics could be seen in no 
uncertain terms. Such a narrative is embodied in the election of Ronald Reagan, as discussed in 
the first and second chapters, to the office of President “on the strength of his promise to bury 
that decade and the systemic crises it had come to stand for” (Killen 273).2 Such a vision was 
impossible after the traumas of the 1960s. Americans could no longer see a straight dividing line 
between good and bad; instead, the problem of what it meant to be an American and a 
responsible ethical agent in the world, one in control of one’s present and future actions, became 
a labyrinthine journey. In the chapter that follows, I show that, like Acker, these authors use 
accident and games of chance to depict the American imagination as paranoid fantasy: as 
Russian roulette played against one’s enemies as well as closest friends, as dungeon crawls 
where the only way one could become an agent was to throw the dice. These texts reveal that 
Americans in this period yearned for the paranoid fantasy and denied the possibility of chance, 
which is represented in these texts as the ultimate threat to American’s sense of a coherent 
identity and history—a threat that, as I discuss in the conclusion that follows this chapter, 
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II.  Satan Plays Dice: Dungeons & Dragons and the Fantasy of Controlling Identity  
“You have authorized Russian roulette. [. . .] Over the months to come there will be many 
thrilling and harmless clicks of the gun as Dungeons and Dragons [sic] is held to the heads of our 
young people. But another deadly explosion will come” (Brooke). So said the Faith Bible 
Evangelical Free Church’s Reverend Robert O. Bakke to Putnam, Connecticut’s Board of 
Education. The Board of Education had just decided to allow students to continue playing 
Dungeons & Dragons at school after a heated debate between members of the Board, school 
officials, the Reverend, concerned parents, and the Christian Information Council. The reason for 
this debate regarding the ban of the role-playing game: the suicide of a local teenager, Roland 
Cartier. Since the early 1980s Dungeons & Dragons and Advanced Dungeons & Dragons, the 
first and best-selling fantasy role-playing game, has been the subject of controversy regarding its 
effects upon players’ abilities to separate their own identities from those of their imagined 
characters and the narratives in which they participate.3 The Reverend’s words, delivered in the 
form and with the authority of prophecy, compare a game in which one plays the role of a 
character-type from fantasy to the “game” of Russian roulette. Following the Reverend’s 
metaphor to its ends, the act of performing a character is equivalent to placing a bullet in the 
chamber of a gun, spinning the chamber, then holding the loaded weapon to one’s head and 
pulling the trigger.  
The problem that the Reverend has with Dungeons & Dragons is, according to his 
metaphor, with the game’s deployment of chance, the accidental intruding into his belief system. 
Yet while Dungeons & Dragons appears to be based largely upon chance—the roll of the dice—
the narrative structure of the game, on the part of the Dungeon Master and the players, actually 
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allows for few accidents to intrude upon the game’s narrative, as Daniel Punday explains in his 
Five Strands of Fictionality (2010):  
role-playing games are built around controlling chance: depending on random events but 
narrowly limiting the effects of chance to overrule player tactics. When players know, for 
example, precisely their number of hit-points and the possible damage caused by an 
opponent’s weapon, they can calculate all possible outcomes of a particular encounter. 
This predictability can help to explain why many handbooks warn players against 
knowing too much about the rules of the game. [. . .] The desire not to allow players to 
calculate the odds of every action can be seen as a recognition that doing so robs the 
game of the feeling that something extraordinary might happen. Obviously, outside of the 
scope of actions covered by numerically based rules, the game can still stage surprising 
events and introduce unlikely characters. But since these rules are often used to determine 
the outcome of particularly important events (a climatic battle, for instance), allowing 
them to be entirely predictable seems to some designers to set an inappropriate tone for 
the game as a whole. (Punday 164) 
Chance must be controlled in the narrative of the game in order for the narrative to remain 
coherent and successfully tell a story that satisfies both the needs of the players and the Dungeon 
Master. Chance creates a large part of the game’s suspense at the level of simulated combat, but 
the structured use of chance in the game only creates suspense, namely in the expectation that 
one’s character can perish, thus ending the story for that player. In his study Shared Fantasy: 
Role-Playing Games as Social Worlds (1983) the sociologist Gary Alan Fine discusses the way 
chance is used in the game: “it is not the chancy [sic] roll of the dice per se that players most 
object to. Rather, it is the location of this chance in the game. Rolls are particularly objectionable 
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at critical junctures in the game when they may result in severe negative outcomes” (91). The 
players know that chance will be a factor in the game, and because they know this they wish to 
forgo the roll of the dice and provide speech acts that will clearly designate what their character 
does. In the game, language is used as a means of control, a way of adding to the Dungeon 
Master’s narrative and even providing a counter to it. Fine continues, “for nonessential events, 
players sometimes roll the dice even when they clearly have the right to speak for their 
characters, for example, how much alcohol a player will consume or what to say to an attractive 
female character. However, this overplaying of the chance factors is rare and it is far more 
common for players to deny the implications of chance through folk beliefs and through 
cheating” (91). The players have no problem putting the non-narrative aspects of the game, i.e. 
events that have no effect upon the greater narrative arc, into the hands of chance. Nevertheless, 
as Fine notes, players try to avoid chance so that they can achieve their desires without having to 
rely upon factors outside of their imaginations and their use of language.  
The element of chance in both Russian roulette and Dungeons & Dragons makes the 
lives of individuals—whether real or imagined—subject to the throw of the dice, the spin of the 
chamber. The perils are found in the Reverend’s agreement with the Christian Information 
Council’s statement that “playing these games can desensitize players to murder, suicide, rape, 
torture, robbery, the occult or any other immoral or illegal act [. . .] the company, TSR, is making 
a profit while familiarizing its millions of followers with terms and rituals of occult forms of 
religion” (Brooke). For both the Reverend and the Christian Information Council, playing 
Dungeons & Dragons alters the identities of the player. This change in identity results in the 
characters committing in reality the acts that their characters commit in fantasy. However, his 
agreement with this statement goes beyond the terrors of the mere teaching of “the occult.” The 
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Reverend finds the largest risk in the element of chance. His is a fear of “the occult” and a fear 
that playing “the occult” will lead, through accident, to a belief in the occult, which will result in 
a transformation of the teenage player into a real-life occultist. In other words, the casting of dice 
becomes equivalent to the casting of spells. 
What Dungeons & Dragons provides for Reverend Bakke and the Christian Information 
Council is an enemy that is but one part of a vast occult conspiracy to corrupt American youth 
and destroy Christian values. In their paranoid reading, the enemies of Dungeons & Dragons 
remove the element of chance from the game—as seen in the Reverend’s metaphor and as will 
be seen in Jack Chick’s comic strip, “Dark Dungeons”—and remove the element of chance from 
reality as well. Their denial of chance derives from their belief in a teleological Christian history, 
one in which good will triumph over evil. It is significant that their beliefs mirror the fictional 
worlds of fantasy role-playing games. In The Fantasy Role-Playing Game: A New Performing 
Art (2001) Daniel Mackay explains that the fantasy genre expresses the desire for a world 
lacking moral ambiguity: 
the wave of fantasy films in which good and evil are clearly defined indicated a nostalgic 
longing for a time before the aggravating cultural, political, and economic ambiguities of 
the late 1960s and 1970s. The ambiguities of this era did not correspond to the mirages of 
communism versus free world, cowboy versus Indian, and good guy versus bad guy that 
permeated the political rhetoric and the cultural climate of the 1950s. The initial success 
of role-playing games captured the attention of an American looking for good versus evil, 
if not in real life then at least in their character’s abilities and physical attributes 
according to the role-playing game’s rules. (Mackay 23-24) 
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In the fantasy world of the game’s opponents—one that mirrors that of Dungeons & Dragons’ 
own fantasy setting—an overwhelming demonic force conspires against all that is good.4 The 
demonic force, however, as I argue below, stands in for more mundane but nonetheless troubling 
social problems, such as homosexuality and drug abuse. Eve Sedgwick has written of paranoia 
(extending Guy Hocquenghem’s theorizing): “If paranoia reflects the repression of same sex 
desire [. . .] then paranoia is a uniquely privileged site for illuminating not homosexuality itself, 
but precisely the mechanisms of homophobic and heterosexist enforcement against it” (126). 
This fantasy appeals so much because it removes any element of chance from reality: it is easier 
to combat a Satanic conspiracy than it is to stop or explain homosexuality, teenage drug abuse, or 
Russian roulette. The fantasy of Satanic conspiracy works both upon the game’s proponents and 
opponents, as both long for a world with clearly defined heroes and villains. However, the 
opponents were the ones who believed and continue to believe that fantasy—Satanic conspiracy, 
the occult—are corrupting the players of this game, rather than actual social problems that stem 
from an America in conflict not with outside forces but with itself. The era of Reagan “was 
nostalgic in the literal and original sense of the term, a longing to return to the homeland, which 
the afflicted one desperately feels he will never see again” (Wilentz 136). While Wilentz points 
out that Reaganism is not the only instance of American nostalgia, Daniel Marcus writes that 
“Reagan depicted the 1950s as the stopping point of American historical progress, and 
functioned in conservative rhetoric as the repository of the accumulated virtues of the past” (61). 
The nostalgia of Dungeons & Dragons opponents is typical of the overwhelming ideology of the 
Reagan era; one that looks to the 1950s as the location of a prelapsarian America.5 
This nostalgia is teleological, and such teleology extends into the way that the 
contemporary situation is imagined as one that maps onto the preconceived notions of the 
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perceived political climate of the 1950s while also creating a hope of redeeming the present and 
restoring the longed for, lost past. In this case, we see evangelical Christians battling Dungeons 
& Dragons much in the same manner that a player of the game would battle monsters. Both the 
believer and the player are indulging in paranoid thinking. This paranoia is best represented in 
Thomas Pynchon’s description of the effects of the drug Oneirine: “About the paranoia noted 
under the drug, there is nothing remarkable. Like other sorts of paranoia, it is nothing less than 
the onset, the leading edge, of the discovery that everything is connected, everything in the 
Creation, a secondary illumination—not yet blindingly One, but at least connected, and perhaps 
a route In” (703). However, the player must believe that everything connects because they are 
playing a game in which various bits of information, as in a mystery, will lead them to a 
solution—whether it is a monster’s one weakness or the way one must turn inside of a dungeon. 
One can successfully play a game of Dungeons & Dragons believing that everything connects 
because the game, as a narrative structure, is teleological. “A paranoid reading practice is closely 
tied to a notion of the inevitable,” Sedgwick writes; “there are other features of queer reading 
that can attune it exquisitely to a heartbeat of contingency” (Sedgwick 147). Paranoid reading 
works in Dungeons & Dragons because the players know that they are playing a story, working 
towards an end, though this end may not be the one that they or the Dungeon Master intended 
because of the roll of the dice.6 In this way chance acts as a way for players to cope with a game 
that does not meet their initial expectations. Through engaging in paranoid reading, the players 
can accept a game in which their characters perish as the foregone conclusion of a narrative that 
engaged with chance. While paranoid reading acts as a method for players to enter into a game, 
for the evangelical opponents of Dungeons & Dragons, it is perceived simply as the way of the 
world. The telos that they believe in is one of final conflict in the actual world with terrifying 
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evil forces, which props their belief that there must be an evil to combat, a demonic force that 
they must slay and most certainly will overcome.7 In other words, the critics of Dungeons & 
Dragons read the game as authentically inauthentic, believing that playing it will become real 
life; rolls of the dice will result in actual perils rather than determining the outcome of fictional 
narratives. 
Reverend Bakke was not the first to decry Dungeons & Dragons on the grounds that 
fantasy role-playing not only teaches “the occult” but also leads tragic consequences. In 1984 the 
evangelical Christian cartoonist Jack T. Chick wrote and illustrated a comic strip title “Dark 
Dungeons” that depicts a story similar to the one that The New York Times would report a year 
later. In “Dark Dungeons” teenage friends Marcie and Debbie play Dungeons & Dragons. When 
Marcie’s character Black Leaf dies in the game Marcie responds hysterically, as if she, rather 
than her character, is dying (Figure 1). Marcie’s panic signifies more than a recreational  
 
Figure 1. The Death of Black Leaf (panel two of “Dark Dungeons”). 
 
investment in the game. In fact, she does not take Dungeons & Dragons to be a game at all, 
identifying the death of her character as her own death. This is made all the more apparent in 
Debbie telling Marcie that she no longer exists. Marcie’s identification with her character and 
grief over her character’s death is exacerbated through Debbie’s continued play of the game—
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the narrative of the fantasy world continues without her. “Dark Dungeons” depicts death as 
equivalent to one’s inability to continue participating in narrative.  
Following Black Leaf’s death and Marcie’s departure, Ms. Frost, the dark-haired 
Dungeon Master, declares that because Debbie’s character has reached the eighth level she is 
now ready to use “real spells.” The play of the game has actually taught Debbie “real” occult 
practices—so much so that she can join a real-life coven (Figure 2). The panel depicts a coven of  
 
Figure 2. Role-playing, occult training (panel four of “Dark Dungeons”). 
 
adults, all robed and seemingly of varying ages, welcoming Debbie. Ms. Frost refers to Debbie 
with the name of her character as if this facet of the real world is merely an extension of the 
fantasy world. Interestingly, this coven of witches consists of both genders, while the strip makes 
protagonists of only female players of Dungeons & Dragons. While there are an equal number of 
both male and females playing the game, the strip oddly focuses on the problems of three female 
players. This is particularly strange because most players of the game (especially in the early 
1980s) were male.8 As a piece of propaganda, the strip plays on a host of stereotypes relating to 
the Bovaryesque figure of the female who longs to live in fantasy rather than engage with reality. 
Nevertheless, the role of men in this panel also marks the coven as a parallel to the company that 
published Dungeons and Dragons, TSR (of which the members and writers of the books were all 
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men). Particularly striking is the man who shakes Marcie’s hand, whose bald-head is perhaps 
meant to mark him as Anton LaVey, the founder of the Church of Satan. Overall, this panel 
panders to the fear that a large underground occult network exists and uses something as 
seemingly innocuous as Dungeon & Dragons as a means of recruiting. The fear of Dungeons & 
Dragons that this strip wishes to instill in the reader, whether parent or teenaged player, is based 
upon the idea that while one may believe that he or she is playing a mere game, they are actually 
being indoctrinated into occult practice against their intentions and thus by accident.   
Despite having entered a “real” world of wizardry, after her initiation, Debbie continues 
to “play” Dungeons & Dragons, ignoring Marcie’s phone calls and grief. When Debbie 
eventually goes to Marcie’s home, she finds that Marcie has hanged herself; apparently “a part of 
her died” with the death of her character (Figures 3. and 4). Covered with various Dungeons &  
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Figures 3-4. Marcie’s suicide and suicide note (panels ten and eleven of “Dark Dungeons). 
 
Dragons paraphernalia, Marcie’s room holds all of the danger signs for a teenager who lives in a 
fantasy world.9 This point is made all the more heavily with her suicide note. Marcie blames 
herself for the death of her character, an extension of herself that she apparently cannot live 
without. Debbie’s assertion that Marcie didn’t have to kill herself once again situates Dungeons 
& Dragons in the realm of chance. While Marcie certainly did not have to kill herself, Debbie’s 
exclamation reminds us that there are things out of one’s control—that chance killed Black Leaf 
and that this chance event lead to Marcie’s decision to end her own life. In taking the blame for 
Black Leaf’s death Marcie asserts narrative control over events; thus, she takes the blame for 
Black Leaf’s death and takes control into her own hands, ending her own life. When Marcie ends 
her own life she also ends any interaction she can have with chance. Chance is the real threat 
here, not the occult. 
Now mourning her friend’s death, Debbie tells Ms. Frost that she should have helped 
Marcie rather than continued playing the game—to which Ms. Frost responds that Debbie should 
“get her priorities straight.” Debbie realizes that “Jesus is the only answer” and attends a 
Christian service, at which the speaker is a man who “came out of witchcraft” (Figure 5).  
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Figure 5. Born again (panel twenty of “Dark Dungeons”). 
 
Marcie chooses Christ to guide her through life rather than the Dungeon Master’s Guide (1979). 
Ms. Frost is here given up for the guidance of an older man that can sympathize with her 
experiences. Of importance here is that Debbie follows the advice of an older, attractive 
Christian male. The answer is not to invest one’s life in role-playing a character and studying the 
occult but rather to be born again. This resolution requires abandoning the world of imaginary 
fantasy role-playing and entering into the “real” world of male-female relationships—for 
Evangelical Christians, among others, the original role-playing game. This relationship can only 
begin with Debbie repenting her sins, performing a speech act that gives her soul to Christ. The 
intention behind the words she speaks is devoid of chance. The meaning of her words is to be 
taken as sincere and it is their sincerity that saves her. In this speech act there is no risk of failed 
intentions.10 Through investing her faith in Christ, the logos, Debbie attempts to defeat chance. 
While with the roll of dice, one’s intentions have no bearing on the consequences, Debbie here 
uses words that deliver only her intentions and a known set of consequences. 
 There are two significant misrepresentations of Dungeons & Dragons in “Dark 
Dungeons.” The first of which, as noted before, is the fact that the strip depicts only young 
women playing Dungeons & Dragons, which is popularly and somewhat accurately associated 
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with teenage male players. Chick runs into an ideological wall in his attempt to show the evils of 
the game. Were he to have shown young men being taught occult practices, the strip would have 
taken on the same implicit homosexual message, but in order for the strip to place the young 
male players into the world of heterosexual relations, he would have had to introduce a female in 
the role of either the young male who helps save Debbie or the “speaker,” who clearly stands for 
a priest. Mike, the young man who aids Debbie, based upon his appearance, very well could be  
 
Figure 6. Saving Debbie (panel 16 of “Dark Dungeons). 
 
Ms. Frost’s male twin (Figure 6). As Frost’s male double, he saves Debbie from the fantasy 
world of Dungeons & Dragons. Mike cares for Debbie’s immortal soul and displays these 
feelings for her not through a romantic engagement with her but in the terms of the Christian 
faith. In the panel above he guides Debbie in the same way that Ms. Frost once guided her. He 
knows what it is she struggles with, addressing her with loaded language, saying that she should 
go to the afternoon’s meeting because “the speaker came out of witchcraft” (my emphasis). It is 
as if the strip itself cannot help but depict Dungeons & Dragons as a poor metaphor for other 
perceived social problems—homosexuality and drug use. While “Dark Dungeons” posits 
Dungeons & Dragons as fraught with teenage homosexual practices—staying up late playing out 
fantasies with one another—one can also note Marcie’s appearance, distraught state, and plea for 
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some way to continue playing the game as a stand-in for a dependence upon drugs. The game 
itself is depicted as being addictive—Marcie’s room only holds Dungeons & Dragons 
paraphernalia—an act that Marcie cannot and does not want to quit. Moreover, Debbie’s 
disregard for the game, the fact the Ms. Frost pushes her to “real spells,” maps almost perfectly 
onto the stereotypical gateway drug narrative. While both drug abuse and homosexuality are 
coded in “Dark Dungeons,” I will later show how both of these perceived social problems were 
associated with Dungeons & Dragons in the late 1970s and early 1980s. As well as accidentally 
initiating one into occult practice, Dungeons & Dragons may, by accident, result in behavior that 
is equivalent with drug abuse as well as homosexuality.  
 The second misrepresentation of Dungeons & Dragons correlates with both coded 
depictions of homosexuality and drug abuse. When Ms. Frost kills Marcie’s character she says, 
“the thief Black Leaf did not find the poison trap, and I declare her dead.” The misrepresentation 
here is that Dungeons & Dragons, a game where one’s desired actions are accomplished through 
first a speech act (“I’m going to attack the dragon with my sword”) then a roll of the dice has, in 
“Dark Dungeons,” been evacuated of its element of chance. Ms. Frost simply declares Marcie 
dead, just as Debbie repents of her sins through a speech act. The game is not played this way, or 
else it would merely consist of a series of speech acts that the players would utter in order to 
accomplish their desired goals. There would be no risk and no element of suspense were the 
game—if it could even still be called a game—played in this way.11 In removing the element of 
chance, “Dark Dungeons” portrays the game in the same manner that it portrays indoctrination of 
and entrance into the world of the occult and Christianity. One achieves their actions, in both the 
occult and the strip’s representation of Dungeons & Dragons, in the same way that one is born 
again—through a speech act. 
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In other words, it is a foregone conclusion that playing the game leads to the failure of 
Christian values and the death of its players. The New York Times article in which Reverend 
Bakke compares playing Dungeons & Dragons to playing Russian roulette provides two reports 
that contradict the claims of the Reverend and the Christian Information Council. Paul Roy, the 
state police trooper who investigated Cartier’s suicide, said, “Dungeons and Dragons no way 
killed this kid [sic].” The article continues, “he said the youth had become involved with drugs 
and had had confrontations with his mother” (Brooke). As well, the article gives the statement of 
a friend who played Dungeons & Dragons with the teen: “I’m sick of them saying that Roland 
killed himself because it was D and D—it was drugs.” The Reverend’s and Christian Information 
Council’s attack upon Dungeons & Dragons functions in the same manner as Chick’s 
representation of the game: as a thin veil for problems that the church and society perceives—
homosexuality and drug abuse. The Reverend’s and Christian Information Council’s attack upon 
Dungeons & Dragons thus uses the game as a means to overlook the fact that Roland apparently 
had more mundane—and more serious—problems than an initiation into the occult.   
The controversy surrounding Dungeons & Dragons, its associations with teenage suicide, 
and the use of it to veil teenage drug abuse and homosexuality began, as mentioned above, 
before “Dark Dungeons” was published or Roland Cartier killed himself. In September of 1979 
The New York Times reported a search that was being conducted in the steam tunnels beneath the 
University of Michigan. Police and private investigators were looking for James Dallas Egbert 
III, a sixteen-year-old prodigy who attended the university (Sheppard). The New York Times 
reported: “the student’s disappearance is shrouded in mystery, and school officials believe that 
he may either have become lost in the tunnels, which carry heat to campus buildings, while 
playing an elaborate version of a bizarre intellectual game called Dungeons & Dragons [sic] or 
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that the disappearance might be just a hoax” (Sheppard). William Dear, the private investigator 
the Egberts hired to find their son, wrote a book about the ordeal. The Dungeon Master: The 
Disappearance of James Dallas Egbert III (1984) begins on August 22, 1979 with Dear 
receiving a phone call from Egbert’s uncle. Dear, who became an outspoken critic of Dungeons 
& Dragons after the Egbert case, tells the story of his investigation in a structure that itself 
follows a game of Dungeons & Dragons, falling into a similar problem as that of Chick and 
Reverend Bakke, namely the elimination of the element of chance for a teleological structure that 
nevertheless maps onto key narrative elements of Dungeons & Dragons.12  
Dear depicts himself as a hardboiled detective (Dear ix), and describes his team of 
investigators as if they are a party of characters from Dungeons & Dragons—though it should be 
said that often it is difficult to tell whether or not this depiction is intentional. Among his party 
are: his chief investigator, Dick Riddle, who “is loyal, absolutely honest, and persistent”; James 
Hock, who has “the ability to blend into crowds and become virtually invisible”; and Frank 
Lambert, “a thirty-year-old, former green beret who served as a sniper in Vietnam” who has “the 
temper of a wildcat” (Dear 4-5). When describing each of his investigators, he provides a story 
of a past adventure he had with one of them, such as this one with Frank: “while searching for a 
map we’d been hired to find, he spent fourteen days on a sailboat, most of the time without food 
or water. He is almost eerily strong” (Dear 5). Dear bizarrely describes his associates and 
presents himself as if they are larger-than-life characters—the kind one would find in a game of 
Dungeons & Dragons—while condemning the game itself.  
Dear and his party of hyper-masculine investigators go so far as to intimidate one Peggy 
Hogan, a member of the university’s “Gay Council,” of which Ebert was a member (150). Dear 
  209 
condemns Dungeons & Dragons while discounting Egbert’s use of drugs as the cause of his 
problems through the reported words of Riddle:  
“I think there’s not necessarily any connection between drugs and Dungeons & Dragons 
[sic]. It does bring up a point, however. We know Dallas took drugs, and I find it 
frightening to think of what the combination of drugs and D & D [sic] might do to him. 
Again, that false sense of security—he might think his magic-user could do anything. 
Dungeons & Dragons [sic] advertises as a fantasy game; add Dallas’s tremendously 
creative mind and the power of some drugs to distort reality, and you could very well 
have a recipe for disaster.” (142) 
Drug use alone isn’t the problem—it is the combination of drugs with Dungeons & Dragons. 
While certainly one should be concerned about a sixteen-year old using drugs, it is not clear here 
what Dear and Riddle feared would happen: would Egbert actually cast a spell? Dear goes 
further, associating Dungeons & Dragons with occult practices through his tangential description 
of an occult ritual he witnessed while following a lead in his search for Egbert (148-150). While 
Reverend Bakke, among other critics of Dungeons & Dragons, figured the game in terms very 
similar to the fantasy setting of the game—a struggle between the forces of good against those of 
evil—Dear took his investigation of Egbert to an even deeper realm of the fantastic, searching 
the dungeon-like steam tunnels beneath the University of Michigan for Egbert III, enacting what 
is known in the game as a dungeon crawl.  
 Perhaps Dear’s endeavors were the most anticlimactic game of Dungeons & Dragons 
ever played. No one was found in the steam tunnels and William Dear never found Egbert III. It 
was Egbert the III who called Dear from Louisiana, where he had run away. Dear portrays 
Egbert as a kind of Dungeon Master, manipulating everyone from the start, with his initial note 
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to a pushpin “map” that he left in his room: “The gun shape on the map represented both a gun 
and a power plant on campus. The meaning of the gun, I thought, was obvious, as in shooting 
yourself. Suicide. [. . .] a gun is the most obvious way to indicate suicide” (268). Why a gun is 
the most obvious symbol of suicide—and not a symbol of murder—is never stated. What was 
important to Dear was that Egbert III went so far as to map out a puzzle, a kind of game—a 
message of where he was and what he was planning. Dear says of this information: 
It occurred to me that Dallas had been, in a way, a dungeon master. By disappearing, 
leaving clues, and setting up alternative outcomes for his adventure, he had created a 
game in which the other adventurers—me and my men, his parents, anyone who was 
involved—never knew what to expect. In Dallas’s ultimate game of Dungeons & 
Dragons [sic], his only real opponent had been death. (269) 
Dear figures Egbert’s suicidal tendencies with the same metaphor that Reverend Bakke used to 
condemn Dungeons & Dragons: Russian roulette. This, of course, ignores the fact that the goal 
of Russian roulette is not to die. Egbert himself showed everyone that if he wanted to shoot 
himself, he would—and it would not be because he lost a game. A year after he first disappeared, 
Egbert III held a gun to his own head, pulled the trigger, and finally succeeded in committing 
suicide (after two failed attempts). Yet Dear reads the game as a reality that Egbert III had forced 
upon those who were looking for him. Of course, Egbert III was no mastermind, no dungeon 
master. He was a troubled teen who had struggled with drug abuse and his sexuality. In this 
regard, the first case that made Dungeons & Dragons a scapegoat for various social problems 
came to be repeated, as if the same dungeon were being crawled through, the dice being rerolled, 
over the next decade. 
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 On September 22nd 1985 the Providence Journal reported that William Dear, among 
others, was in town to speak against Dungeons & Dragons, despite Cartier’s mother saying that 
the game had nothing to do with his suicide and the fact that the high school would not be 
sponsoring a club for Dungeons & Dragons due to a lack of student interest (McVicar). The 
cases of Egbert III and Cartier, through the way that the media and various individuals criticized 
the game, point toward a larger fear regarding the breakdown of American values in the late 
1970s and early 1980s, one that has less to do with the Satanic power of a fantasy role-playing 
game and more to do with American trauma regarding the misadventure in Vietnam.13 As Killen 
writes, “when in the early 1980s Ronald Reagan invoked for the first time the ‘Vietnam 
syndrome,’ he meant the sense of neurotic, and quite un-American, self-doubt that defeat had 
inflicted on the nation’s sense of collective purpose, the reluctance to project its military abroad” 
(107-108). The hysteria around Dungeons & Dragons’ incorporation of chance in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s reflects this breaking point in American culture, when, due to the traumas that 
the Vietnam War inflicted, the Manichean divide between Soviet and American forces came to 
be viewed not as the fantasy struggle between evil and good, but as a situation in which there 
were no heroes, no villains, only hunters and hunted.14 
  
III.  Chasing the Dragon: The Deer Hunter and the Disintegrating American  
One shot. This mantra in Michael Cimino’s 1978 film The Deer Hunter speaks to the 
ways that accident and chance shape identity through inflicting a subject to events that are out of 
his control. The Deer Hunter explores the ways that events beyond one’s control come to affect 
one’s sense of place in the world and ability to locate one’s self in that world. Early in the film, 
while preparing to hunt in the woods of rural Pennsylvania, Michael (Robert De Niro) tells Nick 
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(Christopher Walken) that “one shot” is the signature of the true hunter—that one shot is all it 
takes for a true hunter to make a kill. According to Michael, more than one shot mars the 
hunting, depriving the shooter of the actual role or identity of the hunter. The mantra, only 
spoken a handful of times in the film (and appearing nowhere in the shooting script), nonetheless 
resonates throughout several scenes in the film, standing behind the acting and actions of the 
scenes as a shaping force that distinguishes between sport and game—especially after Michael, 
Nick, and their friend Steven (John Savage), who have willingly enlisted, ship off to Vietnam.15  
In Vietnam the mantra of “one shot” acquires new meanings. The three friends are 
captured by the Vietcong and forced to play games of Russian roulette against other prisoners 
and one another.16 Nick thinks that he is the only one who escapes after Michael plunges into a 
river in order to save Steven during a failed rescue attempt. Unknown to Nick, both Michael and 
Steven survive and return to America. Nick, however, cannot leave. The last time we see Nick 
until the film’s conclusion, he enters a gambling hall where Russian roulette is being played. 
Michael sits among the crowd, and while he sees Nick, Nick does not see him. Both Nick and 
Michael watch the same game of Russian roulette—then Michael watches as Nick approaches 
the table, holds the gun to the head of the winner, pulls the trigger, then holds the gun to his own 
head, and pulls the trigger again. The gun does not fire; both chambers are empty. Nick escapes 
from the fray that ensues in the car of a Frenchman named Grinda (Pierre Segui). Michael 
pursues them, but to no avail. Believing Michael dead, Nick begins to abuse heroin and play 
Russian roulette at the behest of Grinda. Only after Michael returns to America does he realize 
that Nick is still alive—and still playing Russian roulette—when he visits Steven in a veteran’s 
hospital and discovers that Steven has received large sums of money from an unknown 
benefactor. Nick, now known only as “the American” has been sending his Russian roulette 
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winnings home. Michael decides to make good on a promise he made to Nick before they left: to 
not leave Nick in Vietnam.  
With the change in setting from the rural and recreational hunting of Pennsylvania to the 
brutal tasks of the Vietnam War, the mantra of “one shot” ceases to be a command used for sport 
and that of a life-threatening game. At risk in the film’s depictions of Russian roulette are the 
lives and the identities of the characters. The Deer Hunter uses Russian roulette and the phrase 
“one shot” to meditate upon the friction between accident and control that shapes identity. The 
film uses the abrasive dynamic between accident and control to reference the plastic and 
reflexive nature of the medium of film and its depiction of trauma, as well as the malleable 
movements of the actors themselves. This is especially relevant in their depiction of a post-
Vietnam and post-73 shift in white masculine identity from that of the lone huntsman of the 
American frontier to that of the American soldier struggling for solidarity and identification with 
one’s fellow captives and one’s captors as prisoner of war. This shift in identity and exploration 
of sympathy reveals the complicated relationship that Americans had with their own recent 
history after the end of the 1960s, explicitly depicted in the film’s erasure of the American myth 
of the frontier.17 In The Deer Hunter, the fantasy of the American frontier disintegrates as Saigon 
falls, with “the American” in one of its gambling halls, a gun to his head and all the chips 
down.18 
The Deer Hunter and Dungeons & Dragons share an affinity with fantasy and chance. In 
the latter, as discussed above, chance and fantasy converge so as to create a nostalgic vision that 
reinforces the desire for American redemption. This desire manifests in an escape into a fantasy 
world where unambiguous forms of good and evil confront one another in a series of battles in 
which good eventually triumphs. Such fantasies operate as an escape from that tumultuous 
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decade, the 1960s and its wake, into the morally ambiguous 1970s. As demonstrated above, the 
elimination of chance only reinforces this moral divide and acts as a means to return to a less 
complicated era, namely that of the 1950s and that decade’s perceived moral clarity regarding a 
righteous United States of America and its allies battling the horrors of the Soviet Union and its 
satellites in a struggle between freedom and communism. Yet Dungeons & Dragons, a game in 
which players enter into dungeons and purge them of “monsters” that are figured as racially 
other, can also be read as a fantasy version of Vietnam.19 Like The Deer Hunter it represents a 
journey into the wilderness in search of experience, a twist on the Puritan hunting myth; yet in 
the case of The Deer Hunter, the fantasy becomes the reality that the opponents of Dungeons & 
Dragons feared—accident’s intrusion obliterates American identity. The American youths who 
discover the reality of war in Vietnam are shattered by this reality; Michael ceases to believe in 
the mantra of the “one shot,” realizing that chance is far more powerful than any one man’s will 
to power, while Nick loses himself in a belief that he exists outside of chance—that he is 
condemned to continue pointing the gun at his head and pulling the trigger without the hammer 
ever falling on a loaded chamber. 
 “One shot” is first discussed as Michael and Nick prepare to hunt, where it appears as a 
piece of advice that Michael once gave Nick and gives once again. “One shot” is spoken as a key 
word in a philosophy and as a gift—a form of grace that is meant to guide Nick, not just in his 
hunting, but in his immersion in nature and into Vietnam. In this scene the two walk around 
Michael’s small home. Their conversation oscillates between playfulness and seriousness as 
Nick waterproofs his gun while Michael looks at his reflection in the mirror and packs his 
hunting gear. He wears a hunting cap and a tuxedo: 
Nick: You tryin’ to look like a prince? 
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Michael: What do you mean, “trying”? . . . You should’ve done that a long time ago, that 
way it would’ve set. 
Nick: I know. 
Michael: Then why didn’t you do it? 
Nick: ‘Cause I forgot. For Christ’s sake Mike, Steven’s getting married in a couple of 
hours. I don’t know what we’re even doing talking about hunting for the last time before 
the army. The whole thing . . . it’s crazy.  
Michael: I’ll tell you one thing . . . if I found out my life had to end up in the mountains, 
I’d be all right. But it has to be in your mind.  
Nick: What? . . . One shot?  
Michael: Two is pussy. 
Nick: I don’t think about one shot that much anymore, Mike. 
Michael: You have to think about one shot. One shot is what it’s all about. A deer has to 
be taken with one shot. I try to tell people that. They don’t listen. . . . You really think 
about Vietnam? 
Nick: Yeah. . . . I don’t know . . . I guess. I’m thinkin’ about the deer. Going to Nam. I 
like the trees, you know? I like the way the trees are in the mountains, all the different . . . 
the way the trees are. . . . I sound like some asshole, right?  
Michael: I’ll tell you, Nick, you’re the only guy I go huntin’ with, you know? I like a guy 
with quick moves and speed. I ain’t gonna hunt with no assholes.  
Nick: Well, who’s an asshole?  
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Michael: Who’s an asshole? Who do you think’s an asshole? They’re all a bunch of 
assholes. I mean I love ’em. They’re great guys. But without you, I’d hunt alone. 
Seriously, that’s what’d I do.  
Nick: Well, you’re a fuckin’ nut. You know that Mike, you’re a maniac, control freak.  
Michael: I just don’t like no surprises.  
By the end of their dialogue the two friends are smiling, laughing at their jokes. The laughter of 
their friends and hunting companions, the “assholes,” can be heard as the scene ends. This 
outside laughter enters the scene as if following the punch line of an absurd and sinister joke. 
Michael makes his desire for control, his disdain for surprises, explicit in this scene. Talk of 
Vietnam rises to the surface of this conversation to only submerge beneath the talk of hunting. 
With dialogue’s mixing of hunting and Vietnam among the discussion of “one shot,” it becomes 
clear that “one shot” has already begun to mean more than hunting, less than a mantra to be 
carried to war. 
 For Michael, the ideal hunter is one who kills in “one shot” and, who through this shot, 
embodies a pure masculinity—“Two is pussy.” The homosocial interaction of this scene places 
Michael in the role of the pure masculine hunter and Nick in the role of a more feminized male. 
He does not think about the “one shot” but instead enjoys hunting for the setting of the 
mountains and the trees.20 While both Michael and Nick are in touch with the “virgin” land, it is 
Michael who “takes” the deer from it while Nick desires to attain harmony with it. Michael will 
only hunt with Nick because of his speed and because he listens—not only to Michael, but also 
to the land. Nick likes “the way the trees are,” the way that they exist: the birches, maples, and 
pines of the Pennsylvanian mountains, all parts of different families of trees, but all together, 
identifiable as of the same place, existing in the same time. Nick thus finds peace and pleasure in 
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the accidental nature of the forest. This pleasure and reassurance in accident and deep time is 
similar to the pleasure a character such as Ressler takes in the chance nature of life and the 
history of life as discussed in the previous chapter. However, Nick derives this pleasure less from 
the accidents of evolution and more with the accidents of his mere existence, his ability to be 
among such elements of nature.  
 While Nick is clearly preoccupied with their future, Michael’s preoccupation with 
hunting allows him to exist only in the present—a kind of “one shot” that extends into the past 
and the future but nonetheless remains an extended moment. Michael demands to be in control 
because he cannot cope with contingency, the surprises that the future always holds—that which 
happens between shots. Michael desires to experience time as only event, and not as the 
moments that lead to and from such an event, while Nick’s thoughts of the trees represent a 
relationship to a deeper sense of time that manifests in his sympathy with a landscape that 
existed long before him and will exist long after his demise. Michael, in perceiving time through 
the “one shot” sees only an extended present, ephemeral and always moving towards the next 
time he takes a deer; he thus finds security in his ability to control the present, while Nick takes 
comfort in the vastness of time and space.  
 The film explores Michael and Nick’s relationships to time and “one shot” when they are 
forced to play against one another as prisoners of war in Vietnam. Michael approaches Nick and 
tells him that the only way they are going to escape is if they play against one another and play 
with three bullets in the chamber of the gun (as opposed to only one). Nick hesitates, seeing that 
Michael has once again come to rely upon “one shot”: his plan involves each of them holding the 
gun to their head and pulling the trigger, then using the three bullets to kill three captors, each in 
one shot, while Nick attains the nearest gun. In this plan, the game of Russian roulette becomes a 
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complex gambit, a gamble made in order to wrest control from chance. Nick’s hesitance arises 
from his understanding that the chances of he and Michael actually surviving their attempt to 
escape are slim—but he goes along with this plan because he also understands that if they do not 
do something, their lives will, either way, end in a game of Russian roulette (Figure 7).  
 
Figure 7. Chance and Fate in the enemy’s hand. 
 
Cans of Miller High Life and piles of cash rest on the table between Michael and Nick. If 
it weren’t for the guns, it would look as if they were playing a friendly game of poker—perhaps 
even Dungeons & Dragons. Between them, the leader of their captors sits, his hand on the pistol, 
ready to load it. While Nick stoically looks across the table at Michael, Michael gazes at the gun, 
the faintest smile beginning to break across his face (Figure 8). Here Michael thinks of the “one 
shot” while Nick thinks about future risks, about all that could go wrong with their plan. Michael 
consumes the moment, and takes control, while Nick passively exists within it, hand clenched on 
the table, a representation of the pressure he feels. Michael then looks to the guard to his right 
and the camera. It is as if time has stopped for everyone but Michael, who has taken control 
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Figure 8. An eerily “friendly” game of Russian roulette.  
 
of the present, willing an event from nothing. The leader then sets the gun on the table—amidst 
the cans of American beer and Vietnamese currency—and with a fast cut to an insert shot we see 
the gun spin. 
The gun points at Michael. With this insert shot we see that wristwatches rest among the 
currency and cans of beer, their hands pointing at different times (Figure 9). That Vietnamese 
currency and American products infiltrate the shot reminds us that this war is a product of not 
only both nations, but of other globalizing forces—as the watches cannot help but remind one of 
the doomsday clock and the history of the Cold War, figured in American terms as another kind 
of Russian roulette.21 Time has ceased to exist in the moment of the “one shot” upon which 
Michael and Nick have wagered their futures. In this shot the inanimate have taken on their own 
active presence. The gun, the object that will produce the “one shot” has frozen, like the watches, 
upon Michael who has begun, as he will soon tell Nick, to “will the chamber empty.” Devoid of 
human presence, this close-up takes action out of the hands of the human agents and puts them 
upon the frozen hands of the watches and the chance that the gun’s chamber holds a bullet. The 
absence of the human brings home the power of pure chance; agency has become an illusion 
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Figure 9. The gun and time stops on Michael. 
  
 
Figure 10. A calm act. 
 
that Michael nonetheless strives to actualize. In this shot, all is left to time and chance—time that 
Michael wills into “one shot,” the driving force of his assertion of control over a spin of fortune’s 
wheel.22 
With a quick change of facial expression, the force of will that Michael exudes over the 
situation appears (Figure 10). From the faint smile and relaxed hand that holds the gun to the 
  221 
grimace and clenched pull of the trigger one sees Michael’s will become manifest (Figure 11). In 
these actions we witness the manifestation of his desire to control chance, to willfully author the  
 
Figure 11. Willing the chamber empty. 
 
game. The leader turns away from the camera, hiding his initial look of shock and anger at 
Michael’s taunting expression. The chamber empty, it becomes Nick’s turn to lift the gun and 
place his life in the “one shot” that Michael has devised for their escape. Here the shot has  
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Figures 12-13. Mimicking Michael’s face and will. 
 
reversed over the table—the table has, in the eye of the viewer, turned—and we see Nick turn 
away from chance. He hesitates, setting the gun on the table, unable at first to hold the gun to his 
head and pull the trigger. But Michael tells him to “will the chamber empty.” This exertion of a 
will to power, a control of the animate over the inanimate, is outside of Nick’s character; he 
prefers to exist amidst nature, not control nature with “one shot” (Figures 12-13). Nick’s face 
contorts to mirror Michael’s as he pulls the trigger, mouth open in an unintelligible speech act 
meant to command chance to his will. With the turn of his head from the camera to looking past 
the camera we see the pained and doubtful expression on Nick’s face, one that signifies his lack 
of control over the situation and resignation to chance. While Michael’s grimace exuded a stern 
resilience to any other circumstance other than that of his own devising, Nick’s grimace is one of 
pure pain, a premature response to the understanding that the chance of the chamber holding a 
bullet has increased. 
 But this chamber also contains no bullet. Michael again takes his turn, this time willing 
the chamber full—ready for him to quickly turn the gun on the leader of the enemy soldiers and 
take “one shot.” While he pulled the trigger during his last turn Michael looked directly at the 
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leader. Now he looks to the soldier who aims the gun at him, laughter in his eyes, a grimace 
shifting to a teeth-bared smile (Figure 14). The smile becomes a laugh as he shoots the leader  
 
Figure 14. Michael prepares to take “one shot.”  
 
between the eyes. Here the film makes a series of fast cuts as Michael takes “one shot” two more 
times, killing two guards and giving Nick the time to move fast—to make good on why Michael 
hunts only with him—and shoot the other guards, which in turn gives Michael time enough to 
take another of their guns and kill the rest of the enemy soldiers. 
 In this scene the meaning of “one shot” changes. A game of chance has supplanted the 
sport of hunting, as the hand of the hunter turns the gun upon himself. The game of Russian 
roulette, in confluence with the mantra of “one shot,” has made “one shot” mean the creation of 
control from the contingent. Like Dungeons & Dragons, this game of chance becomes, instead, a 
game of control, a game in which one’s future rests not upon the sheer luck of the loaded 
chambers but upon one’s ability to imagine this luck as part of a larger plan. The shift in 
masculinity that both Michael and Nick display moves from emasculation to a version of the 
hunter taking from the wild American frontier. In Vietnam, across the table from Michael, Nick 
becomes consumed with the mantra of “one shot” and loses himself. His sense of time 
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evaporates the moment that he holds the gun to his head and attempts to will the chamber empty. 
While he does not actually will the chamber empty—one’s will, of course, has no effect on 
chance—the trauma of the act empties his identity, shattering his sense of deep time into the 
fragmentary extended present of the “one shot”—an extended present that leaves him merely 
“the American” without a past or a future. Nick’s new experience of time is a symptom of the 
trauma he suffers, representing an American desire for a teleological sense of history, one similar 
to that which we have seen in the media’s representation of Dungeons & Dragons. This history 
is one in which the rugged individual can still control his own destiny, shaping history rather 
than being shaped by the contingencies of history. 
 The depiction of Michael and Nick’s final game of Russian roulette develops the 
consequences of the contingencies of this history. “We don’t have much time, Nick” is the first 
thing that Michael, near the end of the film, says to Nick as he sits across from him in a 
warehouse in Saigon. They are again about to play Russian roulette against each other. Michael 
has entered the game against “the American” because Nick does not recognize him, and Michael 
and Nick do not have much time because Saigon is falling: yet the meaning of Michael’s words 
resonate beyond this specific reference to a deeper meaning, namely that their sense of time and 
history is also about to change—especially when we take into account these two characters’ 
relationships with time. It is Nick who now lives in the present while Michael has a sense of both 
the past and the future. Without acknowledging Michael’s pleas to stop, Nick lifts the revolver to 
his head and pulls the trigger (Figure 15). The chamber is empty. Nick’s blank facial expression 
reads as one of calm, of a silent willing of the chamber empty. He exists in the extended present, 
a completely different subject now that he has become “the American.” While before he could 
not bear to hold the gun to his head, could barely play the game, he now evinces a sense of total 
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Figure 15. “The American.” 
 
 
Figure 16. A plea of love. 
 
control over himself and chance. Michael then holds the gun to his head and asks, “Is this what 
you want? . . . Is this what you want? . . . I love you Nick” (Figure 16). The concern Michael 
shows as he gazes at Nick is one of sacrifice. He knows that with the pull of the trigger his future 
could be lost. He has become aware of time. Sitting across the table, Nick merely stares at 
Michael, expressing no sign of desire. Michael pulls the trigger: the chamber is again empty. 
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Michael begins to speak as Nick takes the gun from the referee and Michael pleads for Nick to 
not play again, to instead come home. He then grabs Nick’s wrist and holds his arm down on the 
table (Figure 17). As in their earlier game of Russian roulette this insert shot shows a watch— 
 
Figure 17. Time and time again. 
 
one that Michael now wears. Yet Nick also wears the marks of time—track marks from his 
heroin use. Michael has become the bearer of linear time, while Nick is lost to two kinds of “one 
shot”: the injection of the syringe full of heroin and the pull of the trigger in his games of 
Russian roulette. He lives for two events, the fix and the pull of the trigger. Nick has not only 
lost his experience of time to the belief that he exists outside of contingency, condemned to a 
limbo of lost identity; he has also lost his body and any agency he once had while gaining a 
dependency upon heroin as a means to negotiate time spent away from Russian roulette and “one 
shot”.23  
Holding Nick’s wrist, Michael asks a question that attempts to bring Nick back to a sense 
of time and that does manage to evoke a response from him: 
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Michael: Nicky, do you remember all the different ways of the trees? Do you remember 
that? Do you remember? Huh? The mountains? You remember all that? 
Nick: Yeah. One shot.  
Michael: One shot! One shot!  
Nick: (laughs) 
Michael: Hey.  
Nick: Yeah.  
Nick then holds the gun to his head and pulls the trigger (Figures 18-19). The chamber empties 
into his temple, smoke and blood emerge, and Nick collapses to the floor where Michael 
embraces him, Nick dying in Michael’s arms.  
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Figures 18-19. “One shot.” 
 
In trying to bring Nick back to the sense of deep time that he had at the movie’s beginning, 
Michael has only condemned Nick, who can only remember “one shot” rather than “all the 
different ways of the trees.” The way that Michael phrases this reminder—“all the different 
ways”—returns Michael and Nick, as well as the viewer, to the earlier scene in the movie. It 
stretches the present moment into the past as Michael and Nick sit across from each other in a 
recreation of the traumatic event that forced Nick into the present. Nevertheless, confronting the 
original traumatic situation does not ease Nick’s pain or return to him a sense of history. Instead 
this return to the original site of trauma delivers the “one shot” that Nick has evaded since he and 
Michael played against one another in captivity. “The American” can only leave Vietnam as a 
corpse, which is to say that he can never leave Vietnam; the American subject and the American 
century are, in The Deer Hunter, trapped in Vietnam.24  
 If as “the American” Nick lives in the constant present of the “one shot” then Michael 
concurrently becomes another kind of American. He gains a sense of time, but his sense of the 
past only brings him pain, and his sense of the future—one without Nick—is that of 
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homecoming and mourning. His home, America, changes because of the loss of Nick. “The 
American” has died, scattered across the falling Saigon, a man who stands for the lost cause of 
the lost Vietnam War and the shattering of American identity due to the traumas of the war. The 
game of Russian roulette and its embodiment of accident finally represents the “one shot” in 
which Michael once ardently believed but which has since been replaced with disillusionment. 
For Michael “one shot” has ceased to be something that he can experience.25 As the other 
American, he represents the inability of American culture to accept chance and take chances in 
the late 1970s and 1980s. Instead, American culture retreated into a past that appeared to hold no 
chance of disruption or violence. Such a denial of chance reveals American culture’s inability to 
comprehend its present in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and is, ultimately, a denial of the 
American that is Nick at the film’s end. Like Janey in Blood and Guts in High School, this 
American has died, and rather than scattered across the pages of a novel, his identity has 
scattered across Vietnam, his loss of life and time a brutal requiem for the high stakes of imperial 
endeavors. 
 
IV.  The Disintegrated American: Games of Confidence and Conspiracy in Gravity’s 
Rainbow 
The Deer Hunter, Dungeons & Dragons, and the game’s critics all express a willingness 
to believe in a teleological conspiracy rather than to engage with immediate social problems that 
stem from a number of causes. Early in Gravity’s Rainbow, Thomas Pynchon explores the 
confluence of accident and identity in relation to the problems of believing in teleology rather 
than understanding one’s place in the world as wholly contingent. Gravity’s Rainbow, when read 
with The Deer Hunter and the early history of Dungeons & Dragons, reveals the beginnings of a 
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post-73 anxiety regarding American dominance in the aftermath of Vietnam and Watergate, as 
well as the beginnings of nostalgia for the “simpler” 1950s. Pynchon complicates this in 
portraying World War II not as the “just” war, but as a precursor to Vietnam, particularly in the 
way that Tyrone Slothrop suffers a fate similar to Nick’s in The Deer Hunter.  
In part two of the novel, “Un Perm' au Casino Hermann Goering,” army lieutenant 
Tyrone Slothrop literally loses his identity. Katje Borgesius, working for British Intelligence—
and possibly, as is so often the case in Pynchon’s novels, as part of a larger conspiracy—distracts 
Slothrop so that his identity papers can be stolen; she thinks: “Watch closely, while I make one 
American lieutenant disappear” (198). Slothrop’s encounter with Katje results in his entering a 
labyrinthine conspiracy—one that is not merely a struggle with identity, but a quest for the 
rocket 00000 and the Schwarzgerät. In searching for the rocket Slothrop assumes the identities of 
several different figures: Ian Scuffling, Rocketman, Max Schlepzig, and Plechazunga. Most 
importantly, though, when Slothrop loses his identity he also loses any capacity to see accident.26 
With the loss of his identity Slothrop believes that he is winding through the heavily plotted 
passages of a complex labyrinth rather than through a series of picaresque adventures.  
 Shortly after losing his identity Slothrop enters the Himmler-Spielsaal, which Pynchon 
describes as if it is an establishing shot in a film: “Deserted in noon’s lull, here are resonant 
reaches of mahogany, green baize, hanging loops of maroon velvet. Long-handled wood money 
rakes lie fanned out on the tables. Little silver bells with ebony handles are turned mouth-down 
on the russet veneer” (202). Everything in the Himmler-Spielsaal appears to be randomly 
arranged; however, we know that Pynchon has set this scene as he has set up Slothrop.27 It is 
important to keep in mind the metafictional facets of this scene—that Slothrop is a character in 
the midst of a massively plotted labyrinth known as Gravity’s Rainbow, and that Pynchon knows 
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that we know this and that he knows that we know.28 The novel encourages the structure of 
teleological paranoid thinking that proliferates throughout its second section.29 We see this 
paranoia begin to form as the narration moves from the establishing description of the setting to 
Slothrop’s point of view: 
Around the tables, Empire chairs are lined up precise and playerless. But some are taller 
than the rest. These are no longer quite outward and visible signs of a game of chance. 
There is another enterprise here, more real than that, less merciful, and systematically 
hidden from the likes of Slothrop. Who sits in the taller chairs? Do They have names? 
What lies on Their smooth baize surfaces? (202) 
In the empty game-room Slothrop does not see a game of chance, but something “more real.”30 
But what can be “more real” than chance? As Lacan says in The Four Fundamental Concepts of 
Psychoanalysis (1973, 1978), originally delivered in 1964, the tuché—Aristotle’s term for a 
subject’s experience of chance—is translated “as the encounter with the real” (53). He continues: 
“The function of the tuché, of the real as encounter—the encounter in so far as it may be missed, 
in so far as it is essentially the missed encounter—first presented itself in the history of psycho-
analysis in a form that was in itself already enough to arouse our attention, that of the trauma” 
(Lacan 55). The encounter with the real, which occurs by accident, inflicts a trauma upon the 
subject because the accident acts as a surplus that the subject cannot fit into his sense of reality. 
“Is it not remarkable that, at the origin of the analytic experience,” Lacan says, “the real should 
have presented itself in the form of that which is unassimilable in it—in the form of the trauma, 
determining all that follows, and imposing on it an apparently accidental origin?” (55). The 
encounter with the real—the accident—creates a trauma that places the subject within a 
teleological framework, one that is determined yet nonetheless is born of accident. The belief in 
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the determined situation is merely an effect of accident, of an encounter with the real, which not 
only crushes subjectivity but also forces that subjectivity to remain oblivious to the horror that 
accident constitutes reality. An encounter with the real, in the case of Slothrop, catalyzes his 
paranoia, a belief that he is the subject of conspiracy rather than accident. 
This conspiracy against Slothrop is doubly written—first by Pynchon, and second by the 
conspirators, “Them.” With the elimination of chance, Slothrop begins to figure himself as a 
piece being played in a larger game. The Empire chairs that are “lined up precise and playerless,” 
point to a pattern that is beyond Slothrop’s understanding. He wonders who is playing him, and 
he also begins to figure “Them,” these invisible players as well as the furniture, as the table upon 
which he is being played. They are not only figured as those who sit in the Empire chairs, but as 
Empire itself, one that transcends the Empire style: a global conspiracy.  
 In Slothrop’s reckoning, he is the center of a plot—and in this regard, he is not entirely 
wrong. Metafictionally, as noted above, he is the center of a plot, with Pynchon as author. The 
danger that Slothrop encounters in losing his identity is not one of not knowing who he is—at 
this moment in the novel he is all too aware of who he is, an American in World War II Europe 
without any proof of his being an American—but in imagining how others perceive and plot his 
identity. The Slothrop family has earned its social and economic status through “timberland 
whose diminishing green reaches were converted acres at a clip into paper—toilet paper, 
banknote stock, newsprint—a medium or ground for shit, money, and the Word. [. . .] Shit, 
money, and the Word, the three American truths, powering the American mobility, claimed the 
Slothrops, clasped them for good to the country’s fate” (28). Yet without his identity papers, 
Slothrop has lost his control over authoring himself—his control over the Word, his family 
legacy and inheritance, as well as any access he may have to money—leaving him only with shit. 
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 Like a player of Dungeons & Dragons, Slothrop considers himself to be a powerless 
figure at the center of an elaborate plot. Without using chance to control his fate, Slothrop is as 
powerless as a player of Dungeons & Dragons who cannot roll the dice but must instead simply 
battle the fictional monsters of the Dungeon Master’s design with his own words. The words 
themselves are not enough to change anything: in fiction, it is always one’s word against 
another’s, and these words do not lead to resolution, only more words. Slothrop, like Nick in The 
Deer Hunter, is an American who loses his identity while at war. Both characters cease believing 
in chance in order to exist in a world where they have willed chance away. In their paranoid 
fantasies they can author the world around them rather than be directed by an author or authored 
by a director. The denial of chance as a means of denying one’s history and fantasizing agency in 
a world seemingly out of one’s control manifests itself in Gravity’s Rainbow as a means of 
negotiating history in order to understand the present not as a series of coincidences but as a 
series of plots one can control to a desired end. 
Pynchon uses chance to guide and control Slothrop and to provide him with motivation 
and depth. As Slothrop struggles with accident and teleology—chance and conspiracy—his 
paranoia is shown to not only be justified, but also to be infectious. The next time we see the 
Himmler-Spielsaal, it is full of people; however, we are not in the room, but outside with 
Slothrop, looking in, lacking identity, living a life that seems to be dictated by anything but 
chance:  
And if you need help, well, I’ll help you. . . . Voices, music, the shuffling of cards all 
grow louder, more oppressive, till he stands looking into the Himmler-Spielsaal again, 
crowded now, jewels flashing, leather gleaming, roulette spokes whirling blurring—it’s 
here that saturation hits him, it’s all this playing games, too much of it, too many games: 
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the nasal, obsessive voice of a croupier he can’t see—messieurs, Mesdames, les jeux sont 
faits—is suddenly speaking out of the Forbidden Wing directly to him, and about what 
Slothrop has been playing against the invisible House, perhaps after all for his soul, all 
day—terrified he turns, turns out into the rain again where the electric lights of the 
Casino, in full holocaust, are glaring off the glazed cobbles. (Pynchon 205). 
The sound of the shuffled deck, an embodiment of chance, overwhelms Slothrop and draws his 
gaze to the Himmler-Spielsaal. The croupier calls out: “les jeux sont faits,” which means, “the 
chips are down” (literally, “the plays are made”). In this room of gambling, of games of chance, 
there is nothing that Slothrop can do. He feels that all agency has been taken from him, that he 
has no chance. The games have become real, and Slothrop, or what Slothrop knows as the “real” 
Slothrop, has disappeared. Through chance, Slothrop has encountered the real, and these games 
of chance have become real. Such a paranoid structure is similar to the criticisms of Dungeons & 
Dragons: the fear of a game of chance results in a belief that erases the accident and substitutes it 
with telos. Although Slothrop has been playing a game of chance that he was unaware of, he still 
does not know what kind of game he is playing. The scene continues with Slothrop reflecting 
upon his losses: 
Collar up, Bloat’s hat down over his ears, saying shit every few minutes, shivering, his 
back aching from the fall out of that tree, he goes stumbling along in the rain. He thinks 
he might begin to cry. How did this all turn against him so fast? His friends old and new, 
every last bit of paper and clothing connecting him to what he’s been, have just, fucking, 
vanished. How can he meet this with any kind of grace? Only much later, worn out, 
snuffling, cold and wretched in his prison of soggy Army wool, does he think of Katje. 
(205) 
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Slothrop mutters shit as he begins to believe that he dwells within a larger plot, a conspiracy—
outside of “the Forbidden Wing,” the game room. He is outside of chance, past his family 
history, though ironically on the page itself, as a creation of words, he has always existed beyond 
the reaches of chance—a fact that Pynchon and the reader not only are aware of, but derive 
pleasure from. In his thoughts of Katje, Slothrop finds some solace, despite the fact that it was 
she who thrust him into this labyrinth. In this regard, Slothrop is dealt grace—while preterite in 
the world of the novel, he is elect in readerly and authorial terms as the protagonist. The grace 
that he is given is in being elect as preterite, a suiting role for a character who is figured as the 
Fool of the Tarot: one who is always about to step off the edge of a cliff, always waiting to fall, 
suspended between redemption and ignorance, itself a plummet over him, a plummet into which 
he may descend.31  
 The labyrinth awaits, the chips are down, the plays have all been made. Slothrop again 
thinks of the Forbidden Wing, of the call “les jeux sont faits,” as he decides that his life has been 
plotted from the start, that he is not the author of his own actions but the slave of another’s 
agency: “The Forbidden Wing. Oh, the hand of a terrible croupier is that touch on the sleeves of 
his dreams: all in his life of what has looked free or random, is discovered to’ve been under some 
Control, all the time, the same as a fixed roulette wheel—where only destinations are important, 
attention is to long-term statistics, not individuals: and where the House always does, of course, 
keep turning a profit. . . .” (209). In the Casino, in the terms of games of chance, Slothrop 
decides that for him there have been no accidents, no happenstance, that his life is a novel or 
film, a narrative that has already been written and in which he is not an actor, merely one who 
waits for the story to come to its teleological end. Pynchon’s novel has made clear its awareness 
of the novel as a form that eliminates accident. In other words, it is no accident that the only 
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other time that the phrase “les jeux sont faits” is used in Gravity’s Rainbow occurs when we see 
Miklos Thanatz, husband of Greta Erdmann and witness to the launching of the rocket 00000, 
after he has fallen off of the Anubis: “Thanatz remains shaking and furious in the well-
established rain, under the sandstone arcade. I should have sailed on, he wants to scream, and 
presently does. ‘I wasn’t supposed to be left with you discards. . . .’” (667). In describing the rain 
as “well-established,” the narrator again alludes to the set of a film, the canned, pointing out the 
contrived setting while establishing it. Thanatz, unlike Slothrop, has a sense of self-righteousness 
about his bad luck. He states that he “wasn’t supposed to be left with you discards.” Of course, 
the pun here points to the fact that Thanatz himself has been discarded, become preterite, in the 
same manner that Slothrop has also become preterite. Not only has Thanatz been thrown 
overboard, he has also been given up for a chance at being dealt a better hand. As the narrative, 
like the scene above with Slothrop, shifts to Thanatz’s point of view, we learn that he only fell 
overboard due to a series of accidents: 
Where’s the court of appeals that will hear his sad story? “I lost my footing!” Some mess 
cook slipped in a puddle of elite vomit and spilled a whole galvanized can full of creamed 
yellow chicken nausea all over that starboard weather deck, Thanatz didn’t see it, he was 
looking for Margherita. . . . Too bad, les jeux sont faits, nobody’s listening and the 
Anubis is gone. Better here with the swimming debris, Thanatz, no telling what’ll come 
sunfishing by, ask that Oberst Enzian, he knows (there is a key, among the wastes of the 
World . . . and it won’t be found on board the white Anubis because they throw 
everything of value over the side). (667-668)  
While the use of “les jeux sont faits” in the earlier passage designates that all of the bets have 
been made, it creates a sense of foreboding for the reader and especially for Slothrop.32 When the 
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phrase is first used it means that Slothrop has run out of luck, out of any hope of escaping from 
the labyrinthine plot of Them (and of course, Pynchon), yet here it is used with a lack of 
sympathy for Thanatz’s plight. This is because Thanatz is a figure of the elect, here cast down to 
the role of preterite. In Gravity’s Rainbow the fall of one of the elect is a moment to be 
celebrated as exactly what the elect deserve, while the fall of a preterite figure such as Slothrop 
only elevates him, making him a character worthy of attention. Being an outsider, in the world of 
Gravity’s Rainbow, makes one an insider. That both Slothrop and Thanatz are discarded, are 
existing outside of a deck, resonates throughout Gravity’s Rainbow—particularly in regard to 
Slothrop’s family history and the use of Tarot Cards in the novel. The lack of grace associated 
with Slothrop, his ancestor, and Thanatz is substituted with the free gift of dumb luck, survival 
through chance, not through the machinations of a conspiracy or the grim fantasies of a 
paranoid.33 Gravity’s Rainbow makes an argument for understanding chance as an agent in 
history, one that leads to providential discoveries that could not be made intentionally. 
 Slothrop has also fallen off of The Anubis—washed overboard in the same storm that 
caused Thanatz’s fall. Thanatz’s fall mirrors a moment from Slothrop family history—a detail 
that the narrative divulges just before the croupier calls out “les jeux sont faits” in the Himmler-
Spielsaal: 
Ghosts of fishermen, glassworkers, fur traders, renegade preachers, hilltop patriarchs and 
valley politicians go avalanching back from Slothrop here, back to 1630 when Governor 
Winthorp came over to America on the Arbella, flagship of a great Puritan flotilla that 
year, on which the first American Slothrop had been a mess cook or something—there go 
that Arbella and its whole fleet, sailing backward in formation, the wind sucking them 
east again, the creatures leaning from the margins of the unknown sucking in their 
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cheeks, growing crosseyed with the effort, in to black deep hollows at the mercy of teeth 
no longer the milky molars of cherubs, as the old ships zoom out of Boston Harbor, back 
across an Atlantic whose currents and swells go flowing and heaving in reverse . . . a 
redemption of every mess cook who slipped and fell when the deck made an unexpected 
move, the night’s stew collecting itself up out of the planks and off the indignant shoes of 
the more elect, slithering in a fountain back into the pewter kettle as the servant himself 
staggers upright again and the vomit he slipped on goes gushing back into the mouth that 
spilled it . . . Presto change-o! Tyrone Slothrop’s English again! But it doesn’t seem to be 
redemption exactly that this They have in mind. . . . (203-204) 
When we turn back in the novel’s narrative to this first instance of slipping and falling aboard a 
boat—slipping and falling due to a mess cook’s slipping—we find that the narrative itself is 
moving in reverse.34 This hysteron proteron brings the mess cook back to his feet, gives Slothrop 
a whole other nationality (foreshadowing the first identity he takes on, that of the English 
reporter, Ian Scuffling). This instance of plotting that Pynchon has controlled over the course of 
some 500 pages is, in the novel, merely accidents that are separated by over two hundred years. 
The parallels in the above passages seem to be quite an effort to merely show that Thanatz is a 
member of the Elect who is finally brought low—just as Slothrop was a member of an Elect 
family and has become preterite.35 Chance, rather than Providence, is marked as the causal agent 
of history. Such a representation of chance places a responsibility to ethics and history in the 
hands of individual agents and demands that such agents attempt to comprehend their place in 
history rather than merely accept the hand that they have been dealt as a foregone conclusion. 
 As the Fool from the Tarot, Slothrop is always ignorant of the precipice that he walks 
upon, though constantly about to fall. Yet as he comes to fill his role, Slothrop loses his sense of 
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a plot, his search for the rocket 00000 and the Schwarzgerät, coming to exist almost solely in the 
present, with no sense of past or future. In narrative terms, this means that he exists in a series of 
interlinked but self-contained picaresque adventures rather than in a heavily plotted labyrinth: 
“But what then? Slothrop and the S-Gerät and the Jamf/Imipolex mystery have grown to be 
strangers. He hasn’t really thought about them for a while. Hmm, when was that? The day he sat 
with Säure in the café, smoking that reefer . . . oh, that was day before yesterday, wasn’t it?” 
(434). By this point in the novel Slothrop has lost any sense of what he did two days ago: yet his 
loss of a sense of the present is a way that the narrative can help situate the reader in time. This 
episode occurs after the longest section of the novel, one that does not deal with Slothrop but 
instead around seventeen years in the life of Franz Pökler. In this regard, through having 
Slothrop exist more and more solely in the present, the narrative helps situate the reader in time 
after a long diversion. But while the reader is well established in time, Slothrop begins to lose his 
sense of the present as he also begins to lose his sense of the lack of chance. Existing in the 
present, like Nick in The Deer Hunter, Slothrop experiences this “one shot” not as a form of total 
control but a total loss of control. The plot loses any sense of purpose, and rather than reinforcing 
the machinations of a conspiracy, the novel posits that the lack of time—the constant present of 
the “one shot”—is merely the experience of a pure contingency, an encounter with not only the 
real, but the idea that the real itself is merely the result of an accident.  
Slothrop, rather than indulging in the teleology of paranoia and conspiracy, instead 
becomes terrified of the possibility that there is no plot but only accident (a fear that, at this point 
in the narrative, the reader may be sharing): 
Rain drips, soaking into the floor, and Slothrop perceives that he is losing his mind. If 
there is something comforting—religious if you want—about paranoia, there is still also 
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anti-paranoia, where nothing is connected to anything, a condition not any of us can bear 
for long. Well right now Slothrop feels himself sliding onto the anti-paranoid part of his 
cycle, feels the whole city around him going back roofless, vulnerable, uncentered as he 
is, and only pasteboard images now of the Listening Enemy left between him and the wet 
sky. (434) 
Like the other scenes in which games of chance have been evoked, this passage has rain, but here 
Slothrop is not standing out in it. The narrative does not give an establishing description of the 
setting; instead we are thrust into Slothrop’s point of view. “Anti-paranoia, where nothing is 
connected to anything, a condition not any of us can bear for long” echoes a sentence from 
Pynchon’s first novel, V. (1963) and the epigraph to this dissertation, in which a character is 
described as being “in the process of learning life’s single lesson: that there is more accident to it 
than a man can ever admit to in a lifetime and stay sane” (V. 343). The novel here references the 
fact that the last episode diverged from following Slothrop—making the point that Slothrop 
hasn’t done much since we last saw him—while also referencing the fact that the narrative has 
“uncentered” Slothrop, pushing him to the periphery. We are told: “Either They have put him 
here for a reason, or he’s just here. He isn’t sure that he wouldn’t actually, rather have that 
reason. . . .” (434).36 Published in 1973, a year that many consider to be the end of the 1960s, 
Gravity’s Rainbow represents the anxiety that Americans felt about how they had reached their 
present moment after the various tangents of the last decade. To have one’s identity shaped 
through the overwhelming force of history, a narrative one always enters in medias res, without 
control over events of the past, creates a teleology—that all happened because it had to happen, 
not because of contingency. From around 1973 into the early 1980s American culture 
experienced history as a paranoid fantasy, a conspiracy that fabricated meaning for the events of 
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the past decade. But it is utter fantasy to insist that the American dream was not a symptom of 
encounters with the real—the accidents of history—and was instead something that could still be 
achieved through sheer will. A far more terrifying world is created when identity is shaped 
against the overwhelming force of accident, the lack of any narrative but the one that we can read 
from our disparate, picaresque adventures. In such a world, there is no grace other than that 
which one provides for others. This American dream was much closer to the nightmare from 
which Americans hoped to awake in the 1970s—a lost war abroad, rift and breakdown at 
home—and instead of awakening, Americans continued dreaming this nightmare in which 
history conspired against them but would, in the end, be overcome not because of any active 
change in the reality of praxis, but only because that’s the way the story was always supposed to 
end.  
 
V.  Fantasies of Control and Games of Chance 
In the short story “The Dungeon Master” (2010) by Sam Lipsyte, the title character, a 
disturbed teen, asks the story’s narrator, “Remember all the newspaper stories about how the 
game makes kids crazy? Makes them do horrible things?” to which the narrator responds, “My 
mom clips them for me” (176). The Dungeon Master replies: “Love those. Take, for example, 
suicides. The game doesn’t create suicides. If anything, it postpones them. I mean, the world 
gives you many reasons to snuff it, got to admit” (176). This reference to newspaper articles 
about Dungeons & Dragons “making” players commit acts of violence against themselves and 
others locates the story sometime in the mid-late 1980s. The games to which the Dungeon 
Master subjects his players are not ones of fantastic escape from the mundane horrors of reality, 
but instead an oppressive and depressive reinforcement of the horrors of the mundane accident.  
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In this way, the Dungeon Master’s games express a black humor that undermines the 
occult fantasies of the game’s opponents in showing that reality is far more disturbing than 
fantasy. For example, the Dungeon Master’s little brother, Marco, has created some thirty-odd 
characters, each named Valentine (each iteration is numbered, i.e. Valentine the 2nd, the 15th, the 
32nd, etc.) who have all died in any number of freak accidents: “It’s painful enough when he rolls 
the dice, announces that a drunken orc has unspooled some of Valentine’s guts for sport. Worse 
are the silly accidents. One Valentine tripped on a floor plank and cracked his head on a mead 
bucket. He died of trauma in the stable” (163). Such a death is obviously not heroic but a 
subversion of the genre, a horrific intrusion of reality into fantasy, a reminder that the fall that 
kills the player is a battle not against a mythical monster but only against the dice—chance itself 
is the only enemy of one’s intentions. So when the “characters rendezvous at an inn called the 
Jaundiced Chimera,” we are told that, “We’ve all died here before, in brawls and dagger duels, of 
poisoned ale, or even just of infections borne on unwashed steins (166). Again, there is nothing 
heroic in succumbing to an infection from bacteria, and it is nothing that one can fight against in 
the game’s system. There is only the roll of the dice, blind chance, and the hope that somehow 
the Dungeon Master has a theoretical knowledge of a fantasy character’s immune system. The 
final representation of the horror of mundane chance intruding into the fantasy setting is the 
grimmest: “Meanwhile, no runaway oxcart smears us into the road. We are not nipped by rabid 
squirrels. We do not succumb slowly, like one early Valentine, to rectal cancer” (170). The idea 
that the Dungeon Master would subject his players to the death of one of their party’s members 
from a slow battle with rectal cancer is far more terrifying than the idea of occult practice. The 
Dungeon Master fixated upon condemning the characters of the fantasy game to real world terror 
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is a cold reminder that, as in Acker, and Mallarmé before her, “a throw of the dice will never 
abolish chance.”  
Lipsyte looks back at the early 1980s from the end of the 2000s and depicts Dungeons & 
Dragons as a game in which reality is much more sadistic than fantasy. Such a depiction of the 
1980s argues that the realities that Americans fantasized—think Reagan’s Star Wars—were far 
more horrifying than the fantasies into which Americans escaped. In other words, what Lipsyte 
portrays is the fact that there is no chance that anyone can escape from reality. A player, rather 
than the Dungeon Master, narrates this story primarily because the Dungeon Master does kill 
himself, eventually succumbing to the horrors of reality rather than escaping into fantasy 
(Lipsyte 178). That this player, one who has died in narrative scenarios due to numerous chance 
events, gets to tell the Dungeon Master’s story is ironic, but also fitting in that the player as 
Dungeon Slave survives in reality so as to be able to make sense of the seemingly meaningless 
chance events of the games.  
The player’s survival in “The Dungeon Master” is equivalent to both Michael’s survival 
in The Deer Hunter and the survival of Gravity’s Rainbow’s reader. Each of these texts allow for 
the player, reader, and viewer to cheat death, surviving after the end only to remind one that such 
a cheat is ultimately impossible—that with death, the games and the narratives end and that there 
is no way to understand one’s own death in the terms of a continuing narrative. The chance of 
survival is ultimately a means of controlling the narrative that one plays. In the context of post-
73 American culture, this desire to play out the trauma of the death of the American century 
shows at once a paradoxical denial of the horrors of recent history and an embracing of these 
very horrors. A strict black and white moral code returns with the opposition to Dungeons & 
Dragons, but this moral code only reproduces the narrative structures that it critiques. Such a 
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paradox appears in The Deer Hunter, which depicts the futility of attempting to defeat chance 
through taking chances. This struggle with absolute chance, as seen in Gravity’s Rainbow, results 
in one’s inability to actually establish and hold onto a strong enough narrative to understand 
one’s place in history and thus deal with the traumas that history has inflicted. American 
culture’s depiction and consumption of such indulgences into fantasy were symptoms for the 
underlying reality that in risking the chances of the 1960s, in the streets and in Vietnam, the 
American century and a version of the American dream were lost. But the dream was truly lost 
when it became a nightmare, when it was first treated as a game that could be played, something 
that could be risked for the sake of chance rather than out of necessity. What Blood and Guts in 
High School, Dungeons & Dragons, The Deer Hunter, and Gravity’s Rainbow make apparent is 
that the end of the American dream gave birth to American fantasies at once reconciliatory and 















1 This title is also the title of a Stephane Mallarmé poem. While I will not go into detail about the significance of 
Janey’s plagiarism, I will say that this resonates with the Einstein’s idea that God does not play dice. In other words, 
when Acker talks about chance she takes no chances, using one of the most famous lines about chance. 
 
2 See Arsenal of Democracy (2009) by Julian E. Zelizer, especially pages 287-299, for further discussion of 
Reagan’s election. 
 
3 For a discussion of this controversy see “Satanic Cults, Satanic Play: Is ‘Dungeons &Dragons’ a Breeding Ground 
for the Devil?” by Daniel Martin and Gary Alan Fine where they write: “Whatever else they may be for crusading 
groups, fantasy role-playing games, especially Dungeons & Dragons, represent a decisive moral realm through 
which Satan gains control of individuals and unravels the social fabric of communities. Dealing with the Devil is a 
precarious business. One may find that a deal has been struck without one’s full knowledge or consent of the 
transaction. Not all demons show their cloven hooves. Unlike university researchers, the Devil rarely provides 
‘informed consent’ in bargaining for a soul. Critics claim that such deals may be struck by fantasy game players 
whose engrossment in Dungeons & Dragons makes them unwitting and, hence, vulnerable customers to this 
salesmanship. Assessing involvement of the Prince of Darkness depends ultimately on the type of ‘plausibility 
structure’ that one employs. Our belief that fantasy role-playing games are not, as a rule, havens for Satanists is not 
proven, but is based on our faith in the secular character of middle-class, adolescent leisure in late twentieth-century 
America” (Martin and Fine 109). For further engagements with America’s fear of Satanism and the occult at the end 
of the twentieth century see the collection in which this essay appears, The Satanism Scare (1991) edited by Jams T. 
Richardson, Joel Best, and David G. Bromley. 
 
4 The return of the fantasy genre in the years after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 may remind one of the 
historical period that Mackay discusses. For example, one need only think of the binaries between good an evil 
presented in the Lord of the Rings (2001-2003) films, or, its prequels in the adaptation of The Hobbit (2012-). 
 
5 For further examinations of the representation of the 1950s in politics, see Daniel Marcus’s Happy Days and 
Wonder Years: The Fifties and Sixties in Contemporary Cultural Politics (2004) and Bernhard von Bothmer’s 
Framing the Sixties: The Use and Abuse of a Decade from Ronald Reagan to George W. Bush (2010). 
 
6 Dungeons & Dragons began as a way of making chance an exciting but controllable factor in a narrative game. 
Gary Gygax, “a bored insurance underwriter” (Smith 15) and Dave Arneson created Dungeons & Dragons as an 
extension of the medieval warfare game that Gygax also co-created, Chainmail (1971). When one plays Chainmail, 
one controls an army of soldiers in battles against other players who are also controlling armies; when one plays 
Dungeons & Dragons, one plays the role of a character that one has usually created. In Warlocks and Warpdrive 
(1999) Kurt Lancaster distinguishes “three overlapping performance frames observable in role-playing games. At 
the center are the characters that are part of a dramatic plot—the imaginary realm of the fantasy world; surrounding 
this are players participating in a game that has rules; and around this exists the real world. These frames exist 
simultaneously, feeding off of each other” (Lancaster 39). What the Reverend and other critics take issue with is the 
possibility that these three frames will blend so wholly together that the players will not be able to distinguish 
between fantasy and reality. In other words, rather than playing their characters they will become their characters. A 
player has a large amount of control over the type of character that they will play and it is the task of the Dungeon 
Master to create adventures that are delivered in the form of oral narratives for the various players to engage with. In 
Fantasy Role Playing Games (1981) John Eric Holmes explains, “for the player the fascination of the game lies 
partly in solving the problems set by the DM, partly in the growth and development of the character he guides 
through the game. Starting as an alter-ego of the player, or perhaps a mere blank faceless non-entity, the character 
begins to develop as his or her adventures unfold” (Holmes 76). While the player may feel their way into their role, 
the Dungeon Master does everything from create the plot and anticipate its various iterations to play any number of 
non-player characters that the party encounters over the course of the game session. When encountering various 
monsters or enemies in the game and engaging in combat with them, both the Dungeon Master and the players rely 
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upon the roll of dice to determine whether or not they successfully attack their opponent and to determine how much 
damage their attack inflicts. 
 
7 Martin and Fine make a similar point in “Satanic Cults, Satanic Play”: “To see fantasy as the breeding ground of 
the Devil is in part to give testimony to this enchantment. To engage actively in fantasy role-playing and creative 
imagination is to enchant. In framing fantasy role-playing games as occultist activities, crusading groups share with 
Dungeons & Dragons players a sense of ‘the world reenchanted.’ What is different is that fantasy role-players, in 
contrast to members of the crusading groups, define these activities as inherently social, imaginative, and limited 
rather than cosmological and self-defining” (Martin and Fine 121). 
 
8 See Gary Alan Fine’s Shared Fantasy for an extensive discussion of the gender makeup of fantasy role-players. 
For a discussion of male erotic fantasy and role-playing games see Michelle Nephew’s essay “Playing with Identity: 
Unconscious Desire and Role-playing Games” especially pages 122-123 and 136-137. 
 
9 For a discussion and rejection of folie à deux in regard to role-playing games, see Fine, 218. 
 
10 See J. L. Austin’s How to do Things with Words (1962), especially the first lecture, as well as his “Performative 
Utterances” and Derrida’s response, “Signature, Event, Context” especially pages 14-15. 
 
11 As Fine writes, “Often the players or the referee must roll dice to determine outcomes of battles or other 
encounters among players, or between players and hostile creatures. These dice rolls, which determine (through the 
rules) who is killed or the extent of injury, provide some formal structure for an otherwise very flexible game” (Fine 
7). In “The Role-Playing Game and the Game of Role-Playing: The Ludic Self and Everyday Life” Dennis D. 
Waskul writes “All a player can know are the rules of the game, which detail probabilities for various actions 
characters might take. The development of a fantasy persona depends on how a player handles the outcomes of these 
probabilities, which always entail uncertainty and chance. Consequently, the fantasy personas of role-playing games 
are not unlike people in everyday life, chiefly influenced not by the basic traits they start out with, but the choices 
they make, the outcome of those decisions, chance, and the ongoing dialectical relationship between consequences 
and personal adjustments” (Waskul 25). 
 
12 As well as Dear’s book, Rona Jaffe wrote a work of fiction based on the Egbert case, Mazes and Monsters (1981), 
which was adapted into a TV movie starring a young Tom Hanks Mazes and Monsters (1982). 
 
13 For an extensive study of the impact of the Vietnam War on American culture see The Scar that Binds: American 
Culture and the Vietnam War (1998) by Keith Beattie. 
 
14 The late 1970s and early 1980s saw the crystallization of the 1960s counterculture’s disillusionment over the 
Vietnam War. For a discussion of the 1960s, the counterculture, and the Vietnam War, sees Marianne DeKoven’s 
chapter “Tell Me Lies About Vietnam” in her study Utopia Limited: The Sixties and the Emergence of the 
Postmodern (2004). 
 
15 Lawrence H. Suid explains the early gestation of The Deer Hunter in his study Guts & Glory: The Making of the 
American Military Image in Film (2002). According to Suid the film emerged simply from the idea of a man having 
to play Russian roulette (Suid 352). From there it became a screenplay known as The Man Who Came to Play, 
though was not initially set in Vietnam. Quinn Redeker came up with the initial idea and developed it and wrote the 
first draft of the screenplay with his partner Lou Garfinkle. It was Garfinkle who said, “No, The war in Vietnam is 
current. Nobody is touching it. It seems to me that we can develop something that will perfectly delineate the 
problem Americans have living with a gun at their heads. That is a condition man should not have to live with” 
(Suid 352). The original version of the script involved two characters, Merle and Keys. Both meet in a POW camp 
in Cambodia. Keys cares for Merle, who suffered a head wound when he was captured. Keys, an air force pilot, 
manipulates the wounded Merle into playing games of Russian roulette. Merle, the wounded army infantryman goes 
along, relying on Keys to make decisions for him. Keys fakes his own death, in Saigon, after their escape. This 
faked death takes place during a game of Russian roulette. Merle remains in Saigon, playing Russian roulette until 
 
  247 
 
he has mentally recovered. He returns to the United States and attempts to bring Keys’s widow some of his 
winnings. It is then that he discovers that Keys faked his death. Now Merle manipulates keys, coercing him to return 
to Vietnam for a final game (Suid 353-354). This script, under Michael Cimino’s direction, became what we know 
as The Deer Hunter. For a full production history see Suid, 352-365. For an explanation of the writing process and 
an alternative view of the production history of the film see Michael Deeley’s Blade Runners, Deer Hunters and 
Blowing the Bloody Doors Off: My Life in Cult Movies (2009), especially 162-181. For a discussion of the initial 
reception of the film, see Robert E. Bourdette Jr.’s essay, “Rereading The Deer Hunter: Michael Cimino’s 
Deliberate American Epic” in America Rediscovered: Critical Essays on Literature and Film of the Vietnam War 
(1990). For yet another production and reception history of the film, see War Films (2006) by James Clarke. 
 
16 It should be said that there are no documented cases of Russian roulette having ever been played in Vietnam. As 
Suid writes: “Ultimately, however, Cimino’s film failed to capture the essence of the American tragedy in Vietnam 
not only because it distorted or ignored history, but also because its central metaphor, the recurring game of Russian 
roulette, portrayed a fiction” (357). However, the film gains much of its force from the depictions of Russian 
roulette, a game of chance which is also the ultimate fiction in the film and which acts as a form not only of control, 
but as an excellent metaphor for Vietnam. That even the chance game that gives one a sense of control is a total 
fantasy points to the American people’s feelings of total passivity when it came to the war and its aftermath. For an 
early defense of The Deer Hunter that delves into the film’s complex portrayal of racism, see Frank Burke’s “In 
Defense of The Deer Hunter, Or: The Knee Jerk is Quicker than the Eye.” For a discussion of the structural 
relationship between the deer hunt and Russian roulette see Burke’s “Reading Michael Cimino’s The Deer Hunter: 
Interpretation as Melting Pot,” especially 253-254. 
 
17 In “The Superman in Vietnam” Leonard Quart argues that in the case of Michael “there are aspects of his 
character that allow him to be turned into a symbolic figure—part of that American romantic tradition stretching 
back to James Fenimore Cooper: a mythic figure who carves out his identity in confrontation with nature. Like 
Cooper’s Natty Bumppo in The Deerslayer and The Last of the Mohicans, Michael is an outsider—chaste, 
honorable, forbearing, revering the mountains and nature, and given to a purity of purpose embodied in his deer-
hunting gospel of the one-shot kill” (160). For a discussion of the deer hunter myth and its reception in early 
America, see Richard Slotkin’s Regeneration Through Violence: The Mythology of the American Frontier, 1600-
1860 (1973), especially his discussions of Cooper. For another discussion of The Deer Hunter and myth see John 
Hellmann’s essay, “Vietnam and the Hollywood Genre Film: Inversions of American Mythology in The Deer 
Hunter and Apocalypse Now” in Inventing Vietnam: The War in Film and Television (1991). 
 
18 Richard Slotkin writes in Gunfighter Nation: The Myth of the Frontier in Twentieth Century America (1992): 
“Historical events (like the defeat in Vietnam) always call into question the validity of ‘the guiding myth’ (626) and 
“The return of the last American combat forces from Vietnam in 1973 marked the sudden end of the pre-eminence 
of the Western among the genres of mythic discourse” (627). Quart argues that this mythology is complicated all the 
more through “The Deer Hunter’s implicitly racist vision of white Russian-Americans as men of integrity and 
courage (few black soldiers appear in the film) and the Vietnamese as chillingly malevolent figures has the effect of 
totally distorting the historical and moral reality of the war. The fact that they are Russian-American both frees them 
from the ethnic stereotypes and audience expectations other ethnic groups carry in Hollywood films and gives the 
war an even more racial cast. For now the Cold War aspects of Vietnam get lost, Russians being the good guys here 
fighting as Americans against the barbarism of the alien, yellow-skinned Vietnamese” (Quart 166). For a critique of 
Slotkin and a complication of his arguments regarding the frontier myth, see Raya Morag’s Defeated Masculinity: 
Post-Traumatic Cinema in the Aftermath of War (2009), particularly pages 155-159). Morag makes an argument that 
the mythological structure of The Deer Hunter and other Vietnam films complicates the frontier mythology of the 
hunt, expressly in the complications of Oedipal structures, eros, and libidinal exchange between soldiers at war. 
 
19 In “Rereading The Deer Hunter” Bourdette argues that “the ‘one shot’ ideal and our involvement in Vietnam 
illustrates Cimino’s more important point: our belief, rooted in our myths, that as a nation we could solve that 
complex historical situation by ‘one shot’” (176). 
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20 In Cinematic Geopolitics (2009) Michael J. Shapiro notes that “In The Deer Hunter, the mountains are largely a 
space of reprieve, a space where elemental impulses can be exercised in a less complex environment, one free from 
the pressured temporal rhythms of everyday life in an industrial city” (140). Shapiro goes on to read Nick’s response 
to the mountains as purely aesthetic while Michael’s is an iteration of control and industriousness. For a discussion 
of the use of landscape and myth in the film, see “The Regeneration of America: Uses of Landscape in The Deer 
Hunter” by Don Francis. 
 
21 As early as 1950 The New York Times reported that Norman Cousins, the editor of The Saturday Review of 
Literature, “addressed a general assembly of the Institute for Atomic Energy in Education” stating that the world is 
engaged in a game of “Russian roulette” (“Atomic Odds Described”). 
 
22 For a discussion of Russian roulette as a form of control see Robin Wood’s Hollywood from Vietnam to Reagan 
(1986), especially page 294. For a discussion of Russian roulette as a symbol of national suicide, see Sylvia Shin 
Huey Chong’s “Restaging the War: The Deer Hunter and the Primal Scene of Violence” in which she argues that for 
the reciprocal nature of the game as not only a version of execution but also as a metaphor for the My Lai Massacre 
(95). 
 
23 For a discussion of risk and The Deer Hunter see “Risk, Las Vegas, and The Deer Hunter” by Richard M. Ratzan, 
MD. 
 
24 In American Myth and the Legacy of Vietnam (1986) John Hellmann argues that Vietnam stands for the 
destruction of Kennedy’s New Frontier (182). He goes on to say, “the point of The Deer Hunter “is to determine 
how a culture proceeds once it has experienced the inversion of its central assumptions about itself” (182). In 
Prisoners of Culture: Representing the Vietnam POW (1993), Elliot Gruner argues against Hellmann’s reading, 
finding The Deer Hunter to be an anomaly in its depiction of the “eroded American self,” while other films, such as 
the Rambo series attempted to depict a redemptive whole (Gruner 144-145). The Deer Hunter depicts the 
disintegration of the development of American mythology under Kennedy and a shift from a cohesive vision of 
American identity that began to fragment in the 1960s and the crystallization of this shattered subject post-73. For a 
discussion of the Rambo films and Kennedy’s New Frontier, see John Hellmann’s essay, “Rambo’s Vietnam and 
Kennedy’s New Frontier” in Inventing Vietnam: The War in Film and Television (1991). For an extension of the 
inversions of myth and history that The Deer Hunter depicts, see Sylvia Shin Huey Chong’s essay “Restaging the 
War: The Deer Hunter and the Primal Scene of Violence.” 
 
25 As we see when Michael attempts to hunt alone after he first returns from Vietnam. He deliberately misses the 
deer that he is hunting. 
 
26 For an extended discussion of uncertainty in Gravity’s Rainbow as well as Pynchon’s other early novels, see 
Pynchon: The Voice of Ambiguity (1981) by Thomas Schaub, especially the introduction, which gives an overview 
of uncertainty and contingency in his works up to Gravity’s Rainbow. For further discussion of uncertainty in 
Gravity’s Rainbow see Pynchon’s Mythography: An Approach to Gravity’s Rainbow (1987) by Kathyrn Hume, 
particularly her chapter “Chaos and Cosmos Integrated.” For a more recent study of the overarching representation 
of paranoia in American literature of the last fifty years see Emily Apter’s “On Oneworldedness: Or Paranoia as a 
World System.” 
 
27 For a discussion of Gravity’s Rainbow and the ways in which the novel treats the reader not as a reader but as one 
watching a film, see “Moviegoing” by David Marriott. For a study of the novel and its intertextual relationship with 
film, see “Beyond the theater of War: Gravity’s Rainbow as Film” by Scott Simmon. While Simmon’s essay is 
interested in identifying Pynchon’s allusions and uses of films ranging from those of Godard to Cooper’s King 
Kong, in this chapter I am interested in the way that he uses film elements to set up his and describe his scenes. 
 
28 One of the earliest acknowledgements of this facet of Pynchon’s fiction is discussed in George Levine’s essay 
“Risking the Moment: Anarchy and Possibility in Pynchon’s Fiction” which was collected in Mindful Pleasures: 
Essays on Thomas Pynchon (1976). Levine writes: “Anticipating such readings, I’m sure, Pynchon made characters 
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like Herbert Stencil and Oedipa Maas pretty good literary critics themselves. Writing about them thematically is like 
joining them, and that is part of the irony and experience of reading the books too” (113). More recently Mark 
McGurl has argued in The Program Era: Postwar Fiction and the Rise of Creative Writing (2009) writes about 
“how much of an old-fashioned English major [Oedipa] is” (190). McGurl goes on to discuss how The Crying of Lot 
49 was written “amidst the long haul of the monumental Gravity’s Rainbow” and ultimately made him 
“conveniently teachable to undergraduates happily ever after [. . .] its frequent use as a college textbook produces 
the novel’s most powerful form of reflexivity. Strictly regulating the commerce between the reader and the third 
person narrator who might (in theory) have solved the mystery of the Tristero rather than letting it ride, Pynchon 
aligned the experience of untold thousands of college students who have tried to understand The Crying of Lot 49 
with an English major protagonist who is doing much the same thing” (191). Pynchon’s novels are filled with 
characters that try to read the situation that the book represents as the reader is attempting to read the book itself. 
This parallel relationship between reader and character bridges the fictional world with that of reality much in the 
same way that the narrative structure of Dungeons & Dragons bridges fantasy with reality through the act of role-
playing. In other words, if one reads Pynchon as if one is a character in a Pynchon novel then the labyrinth will 
continue to consume the reader. If Pynchon’s novels are read as fictional worlds that are meant to persuade the 
reader to read against fiction—towards perhaps the strong historicism of Pynchon’s fiction—then this leads not only 
to a way out of the fictional labyrinth, but perhaps also an understanding of the “real” world. As Daniel Grausam 
writes in On Endings: American Postmodern Fiction and the Cold War “The novels frequently cut in another 
direction, exploiting the distinction between their historical setting and the time of their publication and reading. Just 
as Pynchon’s characters use their knowledge of the past to recognize the significance of events in ways unavailable 
to any contemporary observer of them, so too is the reader able to grasp realities unavailable to any character” (43). 
For a discussion of postmodernist reading practices see Marginal Forces/Cultural Centers: Tolson, Pynchon, and 
the Politics of the Canon (1992) by Michael Bérubé, especially his chapter “Against the Avant: Pynchon’s Products, 
Pynchon’s Pornographies.” 
 
29 In Ideas of Order in the Novels of Thomas Pynchon (1983) Molly Hite provides a general reading of the novel’s 
use of the parabola as “a metaphor for control and structure. It represents the kind of conceptual system that human 
beings use to circumscribe and rationalize their experience in order to take charge of it. [. . .] The more 
comprehensive the structure, the more likely it is to look like fate, so that humanity finds itself serving an antihuman 
Higher Purpose when it is seduced by the clarity and coherence of its own explanations. The implicit model for all 
totalizing systems is the myth of the providential plan, which purports to account for all aspects of human life by 
directing history to a predetermined end” (98). Gravity’s Rainbow’s use of the parabola provides a teleological 
structure that the reader (and the characters, for the most part) clearly want to evade; i.e. no one wants the bomb to 
land on them, and the novel is very much about the problems one faces when attempting to escape from a 
predetermined structure—such as a novel or the seeming trajectory of humanity’s relationship to technology and its 
potential for destruction. As Tony Tanner writes in City of Words: American Fiction 1950-1970 about V. (but is 
applicable to this discussion of Gravity’s Rainbow), “What Pynchon manages to suggest is that the fantasies we 
build to help us to live represent, in fact, an infiltration of that death we think we are so eager to postpone. They 
represent an avoidance of reality, by substituting for it a fetishistic construction” (171). For further discussion of 
determinism and the representation of an unpredictable universe in scientific terms in Gravity’s Rainbow, see 
“Science as Metaphor: Thomas Pynchon and Gravity’s Rainbow” by Alan J. Friedman and Manfred Puetz. For a 
counterargument to Hite’s, see John McClure’s Partial Faiths: Postsecular Fiction in the Age of Pynchon and 
Morrison, especially pages 34-37. 
 
30 In “Pynchon’s Paranoid History” Scott Sanders gives a reading of this scene as revealing “the key features of 
Slothrop’s thought throughout the novel: the perception of reality as either governed by chance, and therefore 
meaningless, or else governed by some hidden powers at once ‘more real’ than chance and more ruthless; and the 
belief that this order, which is felt to lurk behind the debris of the world, is not merely secret, not just passively 
mysterious like a remote deity, but ‘systematically hidden from the likes of Slothrop’” (142). My reading of 
Gravity’s Rainbow is that the encounter with the real that is chance/accident is considered far more ruthless than a 
paranoid conspiracy due to the fact that the idea that pure chance governs all actions allows for very little agency or 
ability to understand one’s ontological state in a cold ruthless universe. 
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31 For a discussion of grace in Gravity’s Rainbow see Partial Faiths by John McClure, especially pages 40-41. For 
an explanation of the use of Tarot in Gravity’s Rainbow see Steven Weisenburger’s A Gravity’s Rainbow 
Companion. 
 
32 For a reading of this parallel that gives a different interpretation of the relationship between elect and preterite, see 
Thomas Moore’s The Style of Connectedness: Gravity’s Rainbow and Thomas Pynchon (1987), especially pages 
133-137. 
 
33 Moore argues, “the ‘grace’ ethic of Gravity’s Rainbow perhaps feels itself as some higher power of V.’s “keep 
cool but care.” In any case, grace is now clearly preterite, not elect, property [sic]” (134). Grace, the free gift, 
doesn’t seem to have much relation to the mantra “keep cool but care.” To “keep cool but care” means to remain 
calm without grace, to care despite how hard going things may be. Keeping cool and caring is something certainly 
associated with Pynchon’s preterite, while their lack of grace, as discussed above, is a kind of grace in that it keeps 
the characters striving for meaning rather than becoming complacent.  
 
34 See “‘Presto Change-o! Tyrone Slothrop’s English Again!’: Puritan Conversion, Imperfect Assurance, Slavific 
Sloth in Gravity’s Rainbow” by Christopher Leise for a reading of this passage that places it in the context of Puritan 
practice and history. 
 
35 For a discussion of this scene in terms of its depiction of time and as a critique of American history, see “The New 
Jeremiad: Gravity’s Rainbow” by Marcus Smith and Khachig Tololyan, 174-175, and for a further discussion of 
Puritanism and paranoia in Gravity’s Rainbow see “From Puritanism to Paranoia: Trajectories of History in Weber 
and Pynchon” by Ralph Schroeder. 
 
36 For a reading of the “paranoid” and “anti-paranoid” divide in Pynchon see Postmodern Sublime: Technology and 
American Writing from Mailer to Cyberpunk (1995) by Joseph Tabbi, where he writes: “Neither the straight 
(paranoid) nor the ironical (anti-paranoid) projection does anything at all to resist whatever power, totalitarian or 
otherwise, happens to be in place at a given moment. Postmodern irony changes nothing (and not in the potentially 
subversive way that philosophy, for Wittgenstein, ‘changes nothing’ except our conceptual orientation toward the 
ideological status quo, which leaves open the potential for us to change everything). The elaboration of an ironic, 
self-consciously linguistic universe is the problem in Pynchon, not the solution to fragmentation, uncertainly, and 
alienation in the technological subject, as novelists and critics of the generation after Pynchon are coming to realize” 
(77). I think that we should read the anti-paranoid as a sincere representation of the problems of believing that 
nothing is connected—that there are no causes no effects—and as a critique of paranoid thinking. While certainly 
the irony of this scene is that Slothrop, in his anti-paranoid state yearns for paranoia, this represents a desire for 
critical historiography, the kind of sincere engagement with one’s subject that writers from the next generation, such 
as Wallace—as Tabbi goes on to discuss—yearned for. 
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Coda 
Accident Now, Again 
In this dissertation I have argued that representations of accidents in American cultural 
texts from the past fifty years express a desire for control and authorship to be exerted over 
contingency. Figures of minor political power—such as University Professors, elevator 
inspectors, authors, heads of church, soldiers, and scientists—manifest this desire often looking 
to figures who wield an immense amount of power, from Presidents of the United States to 
omnipotent gods, to intervene in disaster and make meaning from the accidents that disrupt 
everyday life. This desire for control over the accident reveals a politics of the accident, in which 
subjects create fictions, narratives, and thus meaning for events that very often have no meaning, 
their causes being beyond the understanding of the subjects who experienced their effects. In 
ascribing meaning to the accident, such subjects rely upon teleology, a meaningful history with a 
predetermined end, so as to maintain an illusion of control over their own lives.  
The desire for an American subject immune to accident, such as those subjects we saw at 
the end of the last chapter, continues to exist today with individuals who deny accident in 
everyday life and instead embrace conspiracy theories. I would like to conclude with a brief 
discussion of how the radical individual of American cultural texts produced since I began 
writing this dissertation in 2008 blames accident upon the government, going so far as to 
construct elaborate conspiratorial narratives to provide a teleology and meaning for chance 
events. Texts such as the television series Breaking Bad (2008-2013) and The Americans (2013-
), and Steve Erickson’s novel These Dreams of You (2012), insist upon placing the blame for 
accidental events or the acts of other radical individuals upon the government of the United 
States. While the introduction focused upon the Kennedy assassination as an event that shaped 
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American culture from 1963 forward, and while the first chapter and sections of those that 
proceeded looked at the influence Ronald Reagan had upon cultural products, I would like to 
close by looking at more recent history and how the culture has constructed Barack Obama as a 
figure of blame, a controlling force, and author of conspiracies from before his own birth. I make 
this my closing gesture in order to demonstrate that, if anything, the politics of the accident are 
as strong as ever, performed in recent years as an insistence that all events are the products of 
government authorship. 
When read together “737,” “Down,” “Over,” “ABQ,” the titles of four episodes from the 
second season of the television series Breaking Bad, describe the in-air-collision of two 737s 
over Albuquerque, New Mexico, the aftermath of which is teased in the pre-credits sequences of 
the aforementioned episodes. Each sequence depicts, in black and white, the front and backyard 
of the White household—or, the White house. Each sequence implies that some horrible act was 
perpetrated upon the residents of the home, leading the viewer to believe that enemies in the drug 
world had finally caught up with Walter “Walt” White (Brian Cranston), a fifty-year old high 
school chemistry teacher who turned to cooking meth after being diagnosed with terminal lung 
cancer. Over the course of the thirteen-episode season, these openings present the viewer with 
pieces of foreshadowing, building suspense and raising the expectation that something Walt and 
his partner Jesse had done had caught up with them. However, the season finale dispels such 
foregone conclusions; by the end of “ABQ” Walt stands alone in his backyard while fiery debris 
and ash rains down upon him, closing the season with a foreboding apocalyptic crash, reminding 
the viewer and Walt that there are events in the world well beyond anyone’s control. 
Yet this sense of control and consequence for one’s actions is taken up in “No Mas,” the 
premiere of the third season, which indicates that the collision of the two 737s occurred due to a 
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series of events in which Walt was directly involved. When Walt entered Jesse’s apartment in 
“ABQ” hoping to help him kick his addiction to heroin he discovered both Jesse (Aaron Paul) 
and his girlfriend Jane (Krysten Ritter) in a heroin-induced sleep. In an attempt to awaken Jesse, 
Walt accidentally turns Jane onto her back. She asphyxiates on her own vomit while Walt 
watches, a passive viewer, until she ceases seizing, then leaves. The viewer discovers in “No 
Mas” that Jane’s father, Donald (John de Lancie) is an air-traffic controller who returned to work 
shortly after the his daughter’s death, and it is his distracted state that results in the accidental 
collision. By the time Jesse—fresh out of rehab—and Walt can discuss what happened, the 
Federal Aviation Administration has already said that Donald had perhaps returned too early to 
work. Jesse, trying to make meaning from this accident, blames himself. He asks Walt, “You 
been following this airplane crash?” and, after Walt reluctantly nods, continues: 
Jesse: You know it was Jane’s dad who accidentally crashed them together ‘cause he was 
so torn up? 
Walt: Hey look, let me stop you right there, alright? You are not responsible for this, not 
in any way shape or form . . . alright? Now I-I am very up to date on this thing—probably 
far more than you are—and there are . . . there are many factors at play there. 
Jesse: Yeah? 
Walt: For instance, there’s some sort of collision radar on the jet that may not have been 
working properly. Now that’s public record, you can look that up. A-And the whole 
system is run on 1960s technology. No. No, really, I blame the government. 
Jesse: You either run from things, or you face them, Mr. White. 
Jesse insists that the collision is his fault, and Walt—having not told Jesse that he let Jane die—
uncharacteristically says that he blames no one but the government. The above events of 
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Breaking Bad deftly illustrate the calculus of blame. While Walter White holds a PhD in 
Chemistry from UC Berkeley, at the beginning of the series he works two jobs—one as a high 
school chemistry teacher and a second at a car wash. The recession—which Obama began 
dealing with before his election—and his diagnosis of terminal lung cancer, are the impetus for 
Walt to begin cooking meth. He plans to make enough money to support his family after his 
death, which includes paying off the mortgage of their home, providing college tuition for his 
son and unborn daughter, and enough money to pay the bills and allow them to return to being 
comfortable members of the middle-class. While accidents transpire in Breaking Bad, they are 
only accidents from the perspective of the characters; the viewers are often privy to the causes 
that lead to seemingly accidental effects. For example, in the pilot episode Walt and Jesse realize 
that a fire has somehow started outside of the RV in which they are cooking meth. The viewer 
knows that this fire started because one of the drug dealers who were making them cook, under 
threat of violence, threw his cigarette from the RV’s window after Walt insisted he put it out. 
The show turns Walt’s extensive knowledge of chemistry into a trope, making the camera a 
limited-omniscient narrator in order to demonstrate that while everything happens for a reason at 
the level of cause and effect and at the level of physics and chemistry, one cannot be aware of all 
causes.  
Breaking Bad is not the only acclaimed television show that has something to say about 
the government’s culpability in vast conspiracies authored from the fragments of chance events. 
The absence of cause in the fourth episode of The Americans (2013-), “In Control,” transfers the 
aforementioned desire to understand the present as the culmination of a series of plots to past 
events. This series, drawing upon the Illegals Program from 2010, depicts two KGB agents in 
deep cover as a married couple, complete with children and a home in the suburbs of 
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Washington D.C. This episode depicts the fallout of John Hinckley Jr.’s attempted assassination 
of Ronald Reagan. While the husband, Philip Jennings (Matthew Rhys), believes that this could 
be the act of a deranged lone gunman, his wife Elizabeth (Keri Russell) believes that it is the 
beginning of a coup that Secretary of State Alexander Haig has orchestrated. However, 
Elizabeth’s belief only comes from her understanding the chain of Presidential procession better 
than Haig himself, whom she watches on television mistakenly say—all true to history—that he 
“was in control here” due to Vice President Bush being on his way back to Washington D.C. 
from Texas. Of course, the Speaker of the House would have been the next to take “control,” 
should Bush not been able to assume the role. However, due to Haig misspeaking, Elizabeth 
insists that they begin to take the necessary steps in case of a coup, meeting with their handlers 
and being informed that they are to target for assassination a number of American politicians. 
The episode turns Haig’s misunderstanding into Elizabeth’s misreading, demonstrating once 
again the power of reading and misreading to lead to potentially catastrophic circumstances. At 
the episode’s end Peter and Elizabeth visit the home of their neighbor, FBI Agent Stan Beeman 
(Noah Emmerich), looking for more clues as to whether a coup has taken place or not. Beeman 
informs them that Hinckley attempted to assassinate President Reagan in order to impress Jodie 
Foster—and that, moreover, Hinckley’s motives are inscrutable, the acts of a madman. 
Hinckley’s unreasonable actions, like an accident, are meaningless.  
 Herein lies the episode’s inauthentic authenticity. While the fact that our enemies know 
our ways better than our leaders is intended to stir fear—and may here resound with a paranoid 
portion of the population—the episode itself, in this final reveal, turns the viewer’s attention to 
the problems of believing that one lives within the fictional realm of mediated drama. Hinckley, 
obsessed with the film Taxi Driver (1976) and the actress Jodie Foster, embodies a deranged 
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facet of the political subject of the Reagan administration. In the first chapter I took DeLillo’s 
Jack Gladney as a representation of the subject of the Reagan administration, an individual 
obsessed with plots. Yet here we see that Hinckley has taken plotting to an even greater extreme, 
mixing fiction with reality in order to authenticate himself as a valid partner for Foster. In order 
to feel real, he had to embody a fiction. Yet while Hinckley was found insane, setting new 
precedents for the insanity plea, Reagan responded in just as insane a manner to the attempt upon 
his life. Hinckley fired six shots at Reagan, and each of the bullets missed; the one that hit 
Reagan ricocheted off of Reagan’s limousine. Reagan was rushed to the hospital as news spread 
via television, raising for the public memories of the Kennedy assassination (Quindlin). 
However, Reagan’s response, touted to the media and broadcast and printed for all the country to 
see, were his words to his wife Nancy: “Honey, I forgot to duck.” This line, which Jack 
Dempsey said to his wife the night he lost his boxing heavyweight championship to Gene 
Tunney, invokes not just sport, but the illusion that the event itself was scripted and that Reagan 
simply forgot his cue. It was all, always, a matter of sticking to the script. 
 This sense of reality being a script which one either remembers or forgets has become 
increasingly prevalent in the public consciousness of the United States since the election of 
Barack Obama. The recent series of mass shootings—from the attempted assassination of 
Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords in 2011; the Aurora, Colorado Theater shooting, which 
transpired during a midnight screening of the superhero film The Dark Knight Rises (2012); and 
the Sandyhook Elementary School shooting in Newtown, Connecticut in late 2012; to the act of 
domestic terrorism at the 2013 Boston Marathon—have each been taken by a series of fairly 
prominent media personalities and a growing number of conspiracy theorists as instances of 
government conspiracy against the American people, motivated by the United States 
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government’s purported desire to limit citizen’s rights.1 This intriguing illogic transforms the 
federal government into terrorists. While terrorism is used to overwhelm a population and its 
government to the point the government limits rights to its citizens, removes freedom, so as to 
defend from outside threats, the conspiracy theorist believes that the government perpetrates 
atrocities on its own citizens in order to limit their rights. This leads to a form of paranoid 
reading in which every disaster, tragedy, and accident is part of a larger plot, an “inside job”. 
 Steve Erickson’s novel These Dreams of You (2012) tells the story of the Nordhoc 
family, comprised of novelist Alexander “Zan,” his wife Vivian, their son Parker, and their 
adopted daughter, of Ethiopian decent, Sheba.2 Throughout the novel, which opens with the 
election of Barack Obama, Zan fixates upon how the new president has inspired madness from 
many of his fellow countrymen. On his way to Paris from London, within the Chunnel, “Zan 
reads newspapers scooped up beneath skylights of the station arcade and, from the dispassionate 
vantage point of foreign shores, realizes that his country has lost its mind” (191). The nation has 
gone mad. In These Dreams of You Obama becomes a figure who inspires reparative as well as 
paranoid readings. These Dreams of You continues: 
In the dark of the Chunnel, the train comes abruptly to a halt. As they wait for the train to 
begin, Zan mulls the article in The Times that reports death threats against the new 
president up four hundred percent. Over the months that have followed his assumption of 
office, first there have been openly expressed hopes that he’ll fail, then accusations that 
he’s a radical, then questions whether he was born in the country and really president at 
all. [. . .] Then he’s accused of hating white people. Then he’s accused of fostering a 
presidency under which white people will be attacked and beaten. Then it’s claimed he’s 
setting up death tribunals that will condemn old people to termination. Then he’s 
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compared to fascist dictators, then people bring guns to events where he speaks, then a 
widely-read blogger calls for a military coup, then a minister in Arizona calls from the 
pulpit for the president’s death. A popular website runs a poll asking respondents whether 
he should be assassinated. (191-192) 
The narrative of These Dreams of You accumulates paranoid thoughts about the president. As I 
discussed in the fourth chapter, the desire to eliminate chance in the religious right often 
manifests as the transformation of the mundane into the fantastic, such as when a game involving 
pencil, paper, and the roll of the dice becomes a means of teaching wizardry. For critics of 
Obama, the president can become the cause of any and all problems, simply due to the fact that 
he is African American. The desire for him to be a foreign national, and thus not legally 
president, and part of some larger plot to overthrow the American government, provides an 
elaborate explanation that erases the fact that an African American was elected president of the 
United States. These Dreams of You addresses the role of race in the reception of President 
Obama through weaving into its story of our current political moment one of the late 1960s: the 
presidential campaign of Robert Kennedy.  
We first see RFK in 1966, the night before he flew to South Africa to address students in 
Capetown. He stands in the rain with Paul McCartney, having accidentally run into him and his 
manager Jasmine earlier in the night. Neither the politician or the musician recognize one 
another, and so, anonymous, Kennedy ponders the validity of giving his speech, noting that 
neither his nor the South African government want him to speak.  
“Will I only succeed in giving the white government a, a . . . an excuse to arrest black 
Africans? Am I only making trouble? Do I become the . . . rationale by which more 
blacks are oppressed, beaten, brutalized? Is this about my damned ego? Is this one more 
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test I put myself to, for which other people pay the price, as my brothers paid the price for 
my father? I keep going over the speech. Taking the anger out. Putting it back in.” 
“What is it these students want from you, then?” 
For the first time tonight the hair-trigger altar boy becomes all of a piece with his sad 
burning eyes. “I don’t believe one man changes everything,” he says, “maybe no one man 
changes anything, least of all me. I’m an accident. But I believe there are times when 
even men who aren’t great must find a way to try and do great things. People think I’m 
afraid of nothing when the truth is I’m afraid of everything, and not so long ago I vowed 
before a God I love and trust a little less than I used to that I would do all the things I’m 
afraid of, because I do believe anyone can change part of something, and that part of 
something changes something else, and soon the ripple in the lake is the wave on the 
beach.” (168-169) 
That Robert Kennedy sees himself as an accident places him within the upset narrative of the 
American century that I discussed in the introduction—had his brother not died, he imagines that 
he would not feel so compelled to remain in politics. The assassination of his brother was not 
supposed to happen; when Oswald assassinated John Kennedy, one man altered the narrative that 
history was supposed to take. However, in admitting that he is an accident, and that in being so 
he can become the “rationale” of those who wish to rationalize the irrational acts of an 
oppressive regime, Kennedy rejects the narrative that his brother’s assassination was “the seven 
seconds that broke the back of the American century”; he instead opens history to radical 
possibility, insisting that history is not a narrative, but a series of tiny events that coincide and 
make something so big that mass media can only understand it as narrative. Erickson, in drawing 
parallels between Robert Kennedy and Barack Obama, brings to the fore the indeterminate 
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question of how race and politics shape American history. These Dreams of You sustains 
throughout its pages the ambiguous rhetoric that Robert Kennedy deployed in the opening of his 
speech to the students in Capetown, for throughout the novel we are never told that the just 
elected president is Barack Obama, nor are we told that history is determinate. Kennedy’s words 
in South Africa: 
I came here because of my deep interest and affection for a land settled by the Dutch in 
the mid-seventeenth century, then taken over by the British, and at last independent; a 
land in which the native inhabitants were at first subdued, but relations with whom 
remain a problem to this day; a land which defined itself on a hostile frontier; a land 
which has tamed rich natural resources through the energetic application of modern 
technology; a land which once imported slaves, and now must struggle to wipe out the 
last traces of that former bondage. I refer, of course, to the United States of America. 
(Kennedy) 
For Kennedy the United States of America shares a history parallel to that of South Africa, just 
as These Dreams of You constructs Kennedy as parallel in history to Obama; in doing so, each 
narrative undermines rather than replicates teleological thinking. While we are told, “Following 
such a linear progression, Zan asks himself in the dark two hundred feet below the surface of the 
English Channel, what else could be next? Or, put another way, what possibly could not be 
next?” (192). Kennedy’s earlier assertion that he is an accident calls into question the foregone 
conclusion that, where Obama is concerned, the politics of assassination will return. While 
Robert fell, like his brother, to an assassin’s bullet, the past does not write the history of the 
future. Simply because we know the past does not mean that we know the future; simply because 
we know that Robert Kennedy, for whom the nation held feelings that were not to return until 
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Barack Obama entered Presidential politics, was assassinated does not mean that our feelings, 
good or bad, about Barack Obama determine his fate. 
 What do we learn from those who, in the words of These Dreams of You, “suggest the 
president is an imposter. They contend he was born in a secret african [sic] veldt and, as a 
newborn, smuggled into the country under the cover of a false birth certificate and false birth 
announcement in a hawaiian [sic] newspaper so that forty-seven years later he could seize the 
presidency. Some propose that this is God’s warning of the end time” (93). The inward turn 
discussed in the third and fourth chapters of Narrative at Risk in regard to the 1990s remains as 
vital now as it was then. Fears of apocalypse permeate the culture, the ideologies of evangelical 
fundamentalism extending well beyond the coterie of glass churches into major news stations 
and many homes. This belief in teleology has also permeated deeper into the culture, beyond the 
fundamentalist religions and into everyday secular life. The casual, rational reader of a website 
such as Gawker finds himself confronted on a near daily basis with articles explaining new 
conspiracy theories, such as the “#falseflag” phenomenon, without the context of rabid religious 
belief.  
  Each of these paranoids share in the denial of accident and attribute intention to a force 
they consider more powerful than themselves, whether god, president, or a coterie of shadowy 
individuals. In doing so, they make themselves the protagonists of a plot against America, 
against their own radical individuality for reasons that lack any reason at all. Yet the only plots 
against America being authored are the ones they write. I hope that this dissertation has begun 
the work of writing back, of using the plots of fictional texts to demonstrate that the reality of 
accident and the open futurity it provides may heal the wounds of paranoid thinking. Though this 
is no foregone conclusion, it is a conclusion, nonetheless. 




1 Such conspiracy theories have proliferated since the internet has been readily available to Americans. Mainstream 
news sites and papers frequently pick up and report such theories. For coverage of conspiracy theories relating to 
Sandy Hook, see Hunter Stuart’s coverage for The Huffington Post. For coverage of the conspiracy theories that 
connect Sandy Hook to the Aurora, Colorado The Dark Knight Rises shooting, see Max Read’s coverage for 
Gawker. And for coverage of Boston Marathon Bombing conspiracies, see Amanda Holpuch’s coverage for The 
Guardian.  
 
2 The tile, These Dreams of You, comes from a Van Morrison song, but also evokes the title of Barack Obama’s 
memoir Dreams of My Father (1995). 
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